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This work argues that intentional content plays at least two explanatory roles in 
cognitive science. First, it allows cognitive states to be type-individuated 
independently of their relations to one another and to mind external phenomena. 
Secondly, it allows for counterfactual preserving generalizations over states so 
individuated. Thus, intentional content does not play this explanatory role in highly 
encapsulated cognitive processes. By contrast, it is necessary to type individuate 
states that partake in isotropic cognitive processes. 
This work thus cuts a middle path between those who would eliminate 
intentional content from cognition altogether, and those who take it to be the ‘mark of 
the mental.’ Chapter 1 argues that there is no good reason to eliminate intentional 
content from cognitive science. But, it also argues that there is a coherent notion of 
computation without representation on offer as well. So, many cognitive processes 
could be explained as computations over states without intentional content. 
  
Chapter 2 argues that many extant accounts of the explanatory role of 
intentional content end up being otiose. Too often, such accounts are concerned with 
capturing our intuitions about the proper way to talk about cognitive processes. But, 
in many cases, this talk can be eliminated from our explanations without loss of 
explanatory power. 
Chapter 3 lays out the main argument. Many encapsulated cognitive 
processes—including early perceptual processes—can be explained in terms of 
computation without intentional content. In contrast, processes that are open to 
isotropic revision require their states to be individuated in terms of intentional 
content. 
Chapter 4 surveys some objections to this view. One worry is that if cognition 
is massively modular, then all cognition must be non-intentional. On the contrary, 
modular processes can also be open to isotropic revision, and thus be amenable to 
intentional explanation. 
Chapter 5 provides an example of such a modular process: the phonological 
system. It argues that states of the phonological system must be individuated in terms 
of intentional content. Phonological processing thus provides a case study for 
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Chapter 1: The Question of Explanatory Role 
 
1. The Horizontal Project 
In 1975, Jerry Fodor first laid down the rules: No Computation without 
Representation. Thinking is computation. Computation is the transformation of 
semantically individuated representations. So, if you want a computational theory of 
mind, it had better be a representational theory of mind. And we wanted a 
computational theory of mind, as it made for productive explanation. That 
representations had to come along for the ride seemed all for the better. A 
Computational Representational Theory of Mind (CRT) both vindicated traditional 
predilections for mental representations, and gave us an account of how minds could 
get those representations to do things we expected them to do, like compose 
inferences.  It was an elegant theory. 
But, from the start, CRT labored under a latent insecurity. To think was to 
implement computations. But, to implement computations was just to token states 
that causally interacted without regard to their semantic properties. Perhaps we could 
not have computation without representation, but representation didn’t seem to be 
doing any explanatory work for us. It was an inefficacious chaperone-- there mostly 









Not caring much for appearances or social convention, many philosophers 
suggested we could dispense with representations altogether. If we could make all the 
psychological generalizations we wanted in terms of the local syntactic properties of 
mental states, then there seemed no need to appeal to any semantic properties those 
states might have in propounding our psychology.  
Sure, maybe computational explanation appealed nominally to 
“representations.” But it would be a mistake to think that such “representations” had 
semantic properties-- that is, had intentional content, were about things such that they 
could be tokened correctly or incorrectly. Since computations operated solely upon 
syntactic properties, it seemed as though you could switch out one intentional content 
for any other without loss of generalization. As long as the syntactic properties of 
your mental states stayed the same, your explanation was unaffected. For the 
purposes of psychological explanation, any intentional properties so-called 
“representations” might have just didn’t matter. 
Meanwhile, others were convinced that psychology did need representations-- 
and not just of the nominal variety. Representations indeed had intentional content, 
were about things. Champions of this view were largely concerned with how we 
could have states with such intentional content. They spent most of the last 30 years 
trying to provide a respectable naturalistic reduction of intentional properties. So, 
debate raged both externally and internally. On the one hand, was the war in which 
eliminativists such as Stich, Dennett, Egan, and Chomsky arrayed themselves against 








factions within the realist camp, scrapped over how best to reduce intentional 
properties to a non-intentional supervenience base. 
This left debate over a central question somewhat neglected. If semantic 
properties were playing an explanatory role, just what was it? Only recently have 
philosophers begun to start tackling this question head on. Ramsey (2007) addresses 
this project as the “job description challenge.” Rey (1996) calls it the “horizontal 
project”-- in contrast to the “vertical project” of reduction. The purpose of this thesis 
is to stake a claim in this horizontal project. The goal is to get clearer on just what 
explanatory role intentional content plays in cognitive science, independently of how 
it might get reduced to non-intentional terms. 
Of course, just because the horizontal question has been somewhat neglected 
is not to say that parties to the debates over intentionality have had nothing to say 
about it. The eliminativist charge had it that intentional properties play no explanatory 
role. Appeal to intentional states was a mere façon de parler. After all, we often also 
use intentional idiom to good effect in other domains in which intentional properties 
don’t seem to actually be playing an explanatory role. Water seeks its own level. 
Lightning wants to get to ground. Sunflowers follow the sun. Electrons try to fill their 
valence shells. Might not appeal to intentional properties in cognitive science be 
similarly rhetorical? 
The first claim of this thesis is an affirmative answer to this question-- 
followed up quickly by the qualification that the attribution of intentional states is in 








some cases a mere façon de parler; but, in other cases, it’s a substantive attribution of 
intentional content that does explanatory work.  
This claim follows Burge (2010) in arguing that both the eliminativists and 
realists were wrong-- or correct, as the case may be. Some psychological processes do 
require intentional content for explanation, whereas others get along fine making 
generalizations over syntactically individuated computational states without appeal to 
intentional content. Tracing out the conditions under which intentional content is 
explanatorily efficacious, and characterizing what explanatory role it plays is the 
project the remainder of this thesis pursues.  
As such, this project cuts across most of the philosophical debates over the use 
of intentionality in cognitive science throughout the last 30 years. It remains neutral 
on questions as to how best to reduce intentional properties. And, it stakes out a claim 
at odds with both eliminativists and also realists, who would have it that all mental 
states are intentional.  
Thus, my position faces challenges from all sides. On the realist side, Fodor 
(1975; 1980) has argued that you just can’t have computation without intentional 
content. Section 4 of this Chapter, following the lead of Piccinnini (2006; 2007), lays 
out a notion of computational explanation devoid of representation. Against Fodor, it 
argues that such a notion can in principle play a role in psychological explanation. On 
the other side, eliminativists have argued that there’s in-principle no role for 








present Chapter surveys reasons why arguments for eliminating intentionality entirely 
from cognitive science fall short of the mark. 
Since I argue that intentional content does play a role in some psychological 
explanations, I of course disagree with the eliminativists’ ontology: in order to play 
such a role, intentional states must exist! Moreover, I am not committed to drawing 
the ontological inference that if attributing intentional content to a psychological state 
does no work in explaining the operation of that state within a particular 
psychological process, then the state has no intentional content. A state may have 
intentional content even if that content plays no explanatory role in some contexts1. 
There might, for example, be a mental state that has intentional content that is 
explanatorily efficacious in accounts of object recognition processes, but which does 
not factor into the explanation of how that same state is involved in upstream spatial 
frequency processing. Whether cognition traffics in such states that have intentional 
content that is efficacious in some cognitive processes but not in others is a supremely 
interesting question-- and a very hard one. It requires an account of, amongst other 
things, how precisely to individuate mental states across cognitive domains often 
studied in abstraction from one another. It also requires some account of the role that 
intentional content plays in psychological explanation. I take the present project, 





1 I’m enough of a Quinean to suppose that if we need never appeal to the intentional content of a state 
in our best explanations, then we ought conclude that the state has no such content. But, the present 








therefore, to be a precursor to tackling this harder question of how to integrate 
psychological explanations that don’t make use of intentional content with those that 
do. 
In any case, I’m not pursuing an ontological project of sorting mental states 
into those that possess intentional content from those that do not possess intentional 
content. I’m merely attempting to clarify, to the extent that mental states might have 
intentional content, under which conditions that content play an indispensable 
explanatory role, and under which conditions it does not. Thus, I prescind from the 
ontological aspects of the eliminativist-realist debates that were bent on sorting out 
just which states have intentional content if any. 
Nonetheless, the project is firmly metaphysical rather than epistemic. It is 
emphatically not concerned with characterizing what the state of our knowledge must 
be such that we might be justified in attributing intentional content. Rather, the goal is 
to characterize a metaphysical matter of fact: namely, under what conditions 
intentional content plays a crucial explanatory role in cognitive science. 
To be sure, there may be some notions of “explanation” that take facts about 
explanations to be facts about our epistemic capacities. I agree there may be some 
such interesting sense of “explanation” that may open up epistemic questions as to, 
for example, under what conditions we are justified in trading different epistemic 
virtues off one another in our explanations. I do not adjudicate such questions here. 








answer to such questions, dubbed “Pylyshyn’s Razor” (Devitt, 2006a): when we can 
eliminate intentional properties without loss of explanatory power, it’s best to do so. 
There are nonetheless interesting metaphysical questions about explanation 
that need not wait on fully fledged commitments on these epistemic questions. For 
example, I take it to be a straightforward metaphysical truism that quintessence plays 
no crucial role in our best physics. Once upon a time, of course, it did. And, changes 
in our epistemic position might well justify us taking it to do so again in the future 
(though this is doubtful). We can settle the metaphysical question of whether the 
explanatory power of our best theories survive elimination of quintessence without 
getting too bogged down in epistemological concerns about tricky conditions under 
which there might be explanatory tradeoffs between multiple theories, some of which 
posit quintessence and some of which do not. Given that none of our viable physical 
theories lose generalizations with elimination of quintessence, these epistemic 
concerns just aren’t germane to the metaphysical question. 
Since I do not favor eliminating intentionality from cognitive science 
altogether, there may well be some tricky cases in which positing or eliminating 
intentional content hinges on such subtle tradeoffs of epistemic virtues. All I wish to 
argue at present is that there is a significant subset of cognitive explanation that are 
not subject to such subtle concerns. There are many conditions in which it is clear that 









The present project also largely prescinds from the internal dispute amongst 
the realists about how best to reduce intentional properties to non-intentional 
properties. Curiously, defenders of intentional content have rarely tackled this 
horizontal project head on. In pursuing the vertical, reductive project, theorists such 
as Cummins, Gallistel, Millikan, and Neander have made assumptions about the 
explanatory work played by intentional content, though these assumptions are often 
left implicit in their discussions. Chapter 2 makes these assumptions explicit and 
argues that most of them are untenable. In many cases, the explanatory work these 
theorists take intentional content to do could easily be done by non-intentional, 
computationally individuated states. Nonetheless, I allow that any of these theorists 
may be correct in their claims about what constitutes a state as intentional. My claim 
is merely that many such accounts of content constitution may attribute intentional 
content that does no explanatory work within psychology. 
Burge (2010) is perhaps the first large scale attempt to undertake the 
horizontal project directly. His work has laid out a useful framework for adjudicating 
the explanatory efficacy of intentional states. Though I ultimately reject his answer to 
the question, I adopt his methodology throughout what follows. 
2. Intentionality 
Burge points out that a key feature of intentional states is that they have 
correctness conditions, such that an intentional state can be tokened correctly or 








just what it means to claim that a certain state is about something else. As Collins 
(2009, p.269) puts it: 
For a state to have content [x], there must be conditions C and C* 
such that [x] is satisfied under C and not satisfied under C* 
 
We can call the conditions under which [x] is satisfied the correct conditions and 
those in which it is not, incorrect conditions.  
Notice that the correctness conditions I appeal to here may never either 
actually obtain-- or even possibly obtain in a metaphysical sense. We can cache out 
what it is for a state to have the intentional content UNICORN by noting that it is 
correctly satisfied by certain conditions in which there are unicorns, and incorrectly 
otherwise-- even if it’s metaphysically impossible for such conditions to ever obtain. 
We can still characterize what it is for a state to be about unicorns in terms of the 
conditions in which the state would be correctly tokened. 
Notice that this way of characterizing the aboutness of intentional content 
retains the notion of content originally championed by Brentano such that a mental 
state may have intentional content independently of whether that content is satisfied. 
As Rey (2003, p. 147) puts it: 
An (intentional) content is however we are to understand x when we 
use the idiom "represent(ation of) x," but there is no x. 
 
This is the general notion of intentional content that I shall be addressing throughout 
the work. States have intentional contents insofar as they have correctness conditions 








even possibly obtain in order for a state to have the intentional content that they 
characterize.  
Characterizing intentional content in these terms helps capture two features 
commonly associated with intentional states. First, we can be in error in our thinking. 
What I think to be a cow on a dark night may actually turn out to be a horse. We can 
make sense of error by pointing out that in this case the satisfaction conditions of the 
content of my thought failed to obtain. Furthermore, we can think about things that 
don’t exist. I can hypothesize that fire is comprised of phlogiston even though it turns 
out that phlogiston doesn’t exist. Or, I can evaluate theorems about triangles even 
though it is metaphysically impossible for a triangle to ever actually be instantiated2. 
Thus, the horizontal project I shall pursue will be to ask whether such a notion 
of intentionality has an explanatory role to play in cognitive science. 
Methodologically, I’ll follow Burge’s lead in asking whether attributing correctness 
conditions to mental states does any indispensable explanatory work. Insofar as 
intentional states just are states with correctness conditions in the above sense, 
discovering an explanatory role for correctness conditions is to discover an 
explanatory role for intentional content.  





2 Note also that this way of characterizing intentional content prescinds from debates concerning 
whether that content can be reduced either to relations with mind external properties or relations to 
other mental states. That a state has the content [unicorn] such that it is satisfied only by certain 
conditions in which there are unicorns leaves it open as to whether it has that content in virtue of its 
relation to unicorns or in virtue of its relation to other mental states. The correctness conditions may be 
external even though the state may have those correctness conditions solely in virtue of relations it 








Chapter 3 will argue for a sufficient condition on the explanatory efficacy of 
intentional states. The claim is not that this is the only explanatory role played by 
intentional content; others may remain yet undiscovered. But, it is an important role. 
In short, the claim is that intentional content is explanatorily efficacious in 
generalizing over cognitive systems that admit of isotropic revision in Fodor’s (2000) 
sense. That is, intentional content allows for generalizations over cognitive systems 
that are open to influence from an indefinite disjunction of cognitive states in a way 
that states that are individuated only in terms of their syntactic properties do not. By 
contrast, cognitive systems that are encapsulated such that their operations can be 
characterized in terms of the proximal stimuli that impinge upon them can get along 
with states individuated only in terms of their non-intentional, syntactic properties. 
More anon in Chapter 3 precisely why these distinctions hold. 
Chapter 4 makes the case that there does indeed seem to be such a distinction 
between isotropic and encapsulated states at play within human cognition. It will 
further argue that the distinction does not map on to a distinction between finite-state 
versus read-write memory architectures, as suggested by Gallistel & King (2009), nor 
does it reduce to a distinction between personal and sub-personal processes. There 
may well be sub-personal modules encapsulated from more global belief fixation 
processes that are nonetheless amenable to intentional explanation. 
Chapter 5 is a case study of one such process: the phonological system. The 
argument here mirrors the more general, abstract case that Chapter 4 lays out. 








of distal properties and other cognitive states, the best way to make generalizations 
over it is to individuate its states in terms of intentional content. 
One more terminological issue to settle on before beginning in earnest. So as 
not to beg any questions, I’ll use “mental state” throughout to refer to the 
computational states cognitive scientists theorize about, remaining agnostic as to 
whether such states have intentional content or not. Of course, Brentano (1874) and 
his followers have held that intentionality is the ‘mark of the mental,’ such that it is 
close to analytic that mental states are intentional. I don’t have an opinion as to which 
of these linguistic conventions is best in some strong sense. But, obviously, adopting 
the Brentanian thesis from the start would be to beg the question. Sometimes one 
must just stipulate in order to get on with substantive argument. 
There are, however, more substantive worries as to whether the project as I’ve 
characterized it here is even coherent. The remainder of this chapter will survey these 
worries and give reason to dismiss them. First, Daniel Dennett argues that 
distinguishing between metaphorical and substantive uses of intentional idiom, as I 
do, is just uninteresting and in itself insubstantive. Steven Stich, meanwhile, takes the 
distinction to be interesting, but argues that in principle there’s just no room at all for 
intentional content to play an explanatory role within a computational theory of mind. 
Chomsky concurs with Stich, at least as far as linguistics goes, and adds some 
arguments of his own.  
In all cases, I argue, the criticisms miss the mark. There is an interesting 








with intentional content and those that do not but can nonetheless be characterized 
with intentional idiom as if they have intentional content. There is no reason in 
principle why intentional content can’t play an explanatory role in a computational 
theory of mind. And, to the extent that intentional content doesn’t play such a role, 
there are better arguments for eliminating it from certain psychological explanations 
than those advanced by Chomsky and Stich. 
 
3. Initial Objections 
3.1 Dennett: An Empty Question 
Dennett (e.g., 1987) holds that the present project is ill-founded. Asking 
whether intentional idiom is either a mere façon de parler or instead a substantive 
attribution that does explanatory work is an “empty question,” in the terms of Parfit 
(1984). He takes the question I’ve posed here to be tantamount to asking whether the 
current Republican party is the very same as the party of Lincoln or not (cf. pp. 41-
42). It might be useful to think of it as such for some purposes, but not for others. 
There is no fact of the matter as to whether the Grand Old Party bears some actual 
relation of identity to Lincoln’s. 
Dennett takes “intentional systems” to be systems that are fruitfully described 
using intentional idiom. As such, they comprise the examples concerning electrons 










...distinguishing those intentional systems that really have beliefs 
and desires from those we may find it handy to treat as if they had 
beliefs and desires… would be a Sisyphean labor, or else would be 
terminated by fiat. (p. 22) 
 
There may be a fact of the matter as to whether intentional idiom is useful in 
describing a given system, but there’s just no fact of the matter whether intentional 
properties play an explanatory role.  
Dennett comes to this conclusion largely because he takes all intentional 
content to be derived content. For Dennett, intentional systems derive any intentional 
content they might be said to have from us in one way or another. By contrast, many 
who take the idiom of cognitive science to be attributing intentional properties to 
mental states take the content so attributed to be original content. That is, mental 
states have intentional content independently of how we talk about, use, interpret, or 
otherwise interact with them. Of such original content, Dennett writes: “I have never 
believed in it and have often argued against it” (p. 288).  
With this distinction in hand, we can precisify the question I’m posing here: 
what explanatory role does original intentional content play within cognitive science? 
Given that Dennett thinks original content does not exist, presumably he does not 
think that that question is “empty,” as we had earlier worried! Instead, it would seem 
to admit of a straightforward answer: none. The question as to whether intentional 
idiom is playing a metaphorical or substantive attributive role is empty only if you 









Dennett’s own argument (pp.295-298) against original intentionality begs the 
question. He asks us to suppose that we build a robot capable of the same behavioral 
flexibility that allows us to survive from day to day. Such a robot, Dennett asserts, we 
intuitively take to be devoid of states with original intentional content (p.298). After 
all, he points out, the robot has been designed by humans to suit human purposes; any 
intentionality it might have must have derived from its designers.  
But, this just begs the question against the champion of original intentionality. 
It’s not clear that our intuitions-- or Dennett’s, as they may be-- are correct. Indeed, 
it’s not clear that you could build such a robot without somehow endowing it with 
states that have original intentionality. Fodor et al. need not be saddled with the claim 
that the mere fact a machine was made by humans for certain purposes by definition 
makes the device devoid of original intentionality. Instead, they could hold that 
certain states of the world have original intentionality, and you can build an artifact 
with such states by, well, putting them in it. One need only watch any a number of 
science fiction movies in which human designed machines put their minds to work on 
undermining the purposes of their creators to imagine this as at least a metaphysical 
possibility.  
Of course, Dennett could argue that positing original intentionality, as a 
matter of fact, doesn’t do any explanatory work. But, to take this position would be to 
stake out an answer to the very question we’re now pursuing: just what explanatory 








lights, that question is not empty. It’s a substantive issue to which he answers that 
original intentionality plays no explanatory role. 
3.2 Stich: Content is Explanatorily Otiose 
Of course, it would be nice to have an argument for such eliminativist claims, 
and Stich (1983) obliges. His Syntactic Theory of Mind has it that psychological 
generalizations can range over syntactically individuated states without loss of 
generalizations.  
The arguments he advances for this conclusion commit him to a very 
particular stance on how whatever putative content mental states have would be fixed. 
The argument is the following (cf. p. 165):  
1) The Representational Theory of Mind  individuates mental states in terms of 
their intentional content. 
2) Intentional content is determined by the unique causal histories and 
sociolinguistic environs of a creature. 
3) But, psychological explanation should respect a principle of Autonomy: it 
should explain the behavior of organisms in abstraction from their contingent 
causal histories or environmental contexts, solely in terms of states that 
supervene on the organism’s internal constitution. 
4) Individuating mental states in terms of intentional content thus violates 
Autonomy. 
 
Of course, this argument only holds if it’s in fact true that intentional content 
is fixed in terms of a creature’s contingent causal history and environment. But, 
intentional content needn’t be fixed in such a way. An externalist like Fodor (1987) 








dispositions. An internalist, like Block (1986), has it that the content is fixed by 
particular computational roles that the state enters into. The argument might be 
troublesome for an “anti-individualist” like Burge, who does indeed individuate 
content in terms of creatures’ contingent environmental situation. But, there is no 
reason on the face of it that a proper horizontal theory of content must commit itself 
to Burge’s anti-individualism as the proper story about how content is vertically 
determined. 
In fact, one of the nice features of pursuing this horizontal project is that it 
allows us to abstract away from debates concerning the vertical project-- how 
intentional content might be reduced to non-intentional properties. Indeed, such a 
reduction is interesting only insofar as it allows us to reduce whatever intentional 
states actually play an explanatory role in our best science! So, Stich’s argument is 
not damaging to the overall project of establishing an explanatory role for intentional 
content, independent of whatever vertical, reductive gloss we might give on that 
content. 
Stich does go on to press a point more trenchant to the horizontal project as a 
whole. If intentional content does play an indispensable explanatory role in cognitive 
science, it had better be able to capture generalizations that we cannot make solely in 
terms of mental states individuated syntactically. Stich argues that intentional content 









Stich (pp. 171-178) considers an argument from Pylyshyn (1980) to the effect 
that intentional content is necessary to make certain psychological generalizations. 
Pylyshyn argues, by way of example, that a purely syntactic theory of mind could not 
explain why Mary ran out of a smoke filled building. More precisely, it could not 
explain why she would exhibit such behavior under a “strange collection of diverse 
circumstances.” Her running might be eventuated by merely smelling smoke, or 
instead receiving a phone call telling her the building is on fire, hearing a fire alarm, 
etc. Pylyshyn argues: 
the reason the same [mental] symbols occur under such diverse 
circumstances is precisely that they represent a common feature of 
the circumstances-- a feature, moreover, that is not to be found 
solely by inspecting properties of the physical environments (E.g., 
what physical features do telephone calls warning of fire share 
with the smell of smoke?) What is common to all these situations 
is that a common interpretation of the events occurs-- an 
interpretation that depends on what beliefs Mary has about alarms, 
smoke, and so on… a semantic interpretation of the symbols as 
representations of something (p.161) 
 
I quote Pylyshyn at length both because his argument isn’t entirely 
perspicuous, but also because my own argument in Chapter 3 will be an expansion 
and elucidation of what I take to be his basic point. For now, I want only to counter 
Stich’s immediate objections to Pylyshyn’s approach. 
Stich argues that mental states individuated purely in syntactic terms could 
easily explain why Mary would run from the burning building in all these diverse 
circumstances. He first (p. 174) asks us to presume that each token string of states 








token string of states that are syntactically individuated. We should note that this is 
precisely what representational realists (e.g., Fodor 1987) standardly assume! Any 
token transformation of semantically individuated states is implemented by some 
token syntactic process.  
Stich goes on, however, to suppose that these token syntactic states can be 
type-individuated in such a way such that each syntactic type corresponds with a 
semantic type. So, the belief type individuated by the content [the building is on fire] 
has a corresponding syntactic state type-individuated syntactically as, say, an ‘F’ 
state. The desire individuated by the content [if the building is on fire, then leave the 
building] corresponds to a syntactic state type-individuated as an ‘F→ L’ state.  
But, it’s altogether unclear why Stich can safely assume that we can type-
identify syntactic states in a way that parallels the type-identity of intentionally 
individuated states. As we’ll see in Section 4 below, syntactic states are usually type-
individuated as such in terms of their relations to one another, or in terms of their 
physical shape.  
As Fodor (1987, p. 140) points out, we could well have semantic processes 
that supervene on syntactic processes. So, yes, any token semantic process would be 
implemented by a token syntactic process. But, the very same semantic process could 
be implemented by a disjunction of type-distinct syntactic processes. So, it’s an open 
possibility that each time Mary runs out of a burning building, she’s implementing a 
type-identical semantic process. But, each time, that very same semantic process is 








explain one-off why Mary fled the burning building in one particular instance, we can 
simply appeal to the token syntactic process that caused her behavior. But, if Mary 
has a history of running out of burning buildings, and we suspect she’ll continue in 
this regard, it’s unclear that we can make this generalization without appealing to an 
intentional characterization of Mary’s behavior. After all, each instance of building 
flight--past and present-- might in principle be implemented by type-distinct syntactic 
processes. 
Of course, whether intentional processes supervene on disjunctions of type-
distinct syntactic processes as a matter of fact is a matter of empirical investigation. 
One way of construing the present project is to think of it as sketching out the 
circumstances under which such supervenience relations occur and those in which 
they don’t. I take it Stich is correct that if we can type-identify intentional states with 
syntactic states, there is no reason to suppose that intentional properties are doing any 
explanatory work. It’s precisely this situation that I argue in Chapter 3 obtains for 
some encapsulated processes in early perceptual processing. In those instances, we 
can adopt Stich’s argument to conclude that intentional content plays no role in 
explaining these processes. 
Fodor’s point here is just that neither Stich nor I can simply help ourselves to 
the claim that intentionally individuated states can be type-identified with 
syntactically individuated states. Indeed, as I’ll also argue in Chapter 3, there is good 
evidence that certain cognitive processes open to isotropic revision can’t be so type-








an indefinite disjunction of other computational states, it may be difficult to type-
individuate them in terms of their relations to one another. That is, it may not be 
possible to type-individuate such states syntactically in such a way that allows us to 
attribute type-identical states to the same person at different times, or across persons 
at the same time. Thus, we would lose generalizations concerning why a person 
engages in a behavior in a variety of circumstances, or why multiple people from 
different backgrounds all engage in the same behavior. 
We can read Pylyshyn’s argument above as gesturing at this claim. In each 
instance of Mary’s building bolting, the mental states that precipitate it have different 
proximal causes. In one case, it’s the smell of smoke, in another it’s the sound of a 
voice, etc. Moreover, because the proximal causes are so diverse, the structure of the 
syntactic processes leading to Mary’s behavior is similarly diverse. In one instance, 
she must access states related to sounds and linguistic interpretation, and the general 
trustworthiness of various individuals who might tell her things over the phone. In 
another, she must access states associated with smells and combustion processes etc. 
If mental states are to be individuated syntactically-- i.e., in terms of their relations to 
one another-- it’s unclear why the states that eventuate in Mary’s fleeing the building 
should be type-identical in each of these instances. After all, in each instance, the 
states that cause her fleeing seem to have very different relations to one another. 
So, we have prima facie reason to suppose that we cannot always type-
identify intentionally individuated states with syntactically individuated states as 








content may not play an explanatory role in cases in which we can type-identify any 
states the explanation picks out with intentional idiom with corresponding 
syntactically individuated states. 
 
3.3 Chomsky: Gratuitous Externalism 
The most recent-- and perhaps unexpected-- proponent of intentional 
eliminativism has been Noam Chomsky (2000). As Rey (2003) points out, Chomsky 
seems to be caught in the grip of the same overly externalist, “anti-individualist” 
notion of intentional content that bedevils Stich and Dennett. Both assume that 
intentional content is determined by the de facto causal relationships that obtain 
between mental states and the environment. For example, Chomsky writes: 
 
[S]tudies of determination of structure from motion used 
tachistoscopic presentations that caused the subject to see a 
rotating cube, though there was no such thing in the environment; 
"see," here is used in its normal sense, not an achievement verb. 
...There is no meaningful question about the “content” of the 
internal representation of a person seeing a cube… [whether] the 
retina is stimulated by a rotating cube, or a video of a rotating 
cube…[or tachistoscopic presentations]” (2000, p. 159). 
 
Here, the argument seems to be that it makes no sense to distinguish instances 
in which a mental state is in fact caused by a cube from those in which it is not. 
Calling the former “representations of a cube” and the latter something else is not a 








identify the operations of the mind as type-identical despite changes in the distal 
stimuli that bring them about. 
We can grant Chomsky this (quite reasonable) point. But, that mental states 
are not type-individuated in terms of their de facto causal antecedents is not sufficient 
to demonstrate that they lack intentional content. Remember, the notion of content we 
are working with is one in which a state can have intentional content [X] even when 
there is no X! 
Indeed, the very fact that theories of vision type-identify mental states despite 
changes in their distal antecedents is prima facie reason to think that intentional 
content might indeed play a necessary role in such theories. After all, it seems to be 
an open question in virtue of what we can type-identify the mental states eventuated 
by videos and tachistoscopic presentations of cubes, but not type-identify these 
mental states with those caused by videos and tachistoscopic presentations of spheres, 
for example. A plausible suggestion is that the mental states caused by presentation of 
cube-like stimuli are type-distinct from those caused by spherical-like stimuli in 
virtue of the fact that the former are representations of cubes, and the latter are 
representations of spheres-- whether or not either is caused by actual cubes or 
spheres.  
Connecting some dots in Chomsky’s argument, we can reconstruct his likely 
reply to this worry. Chomsky might argue that we can type-individuate these mental 










The auditory system doesn’t “solve problems” in any technical 
sense of this term and, if they knew how to do so, the researchers 
might choose to stimulate the receptors directly instead of using 
loudspeakers-- much as they did with the computer model which, 
in fact, provided the main evidence for their theory of sound 
localization, which would work as well as for a brain in a vat as for 
an owl turning its head to face a mouse in the bush (p. 158). 
 
Again, the argument seems to be that the brain doesn’t employ intentional 
contents to solve problems because we can identify its operations as type-identical 
whether it’s actually in an environment in which there is a problem to be solved or 
not. In this case, though, the argument is supplemented with the claim that we could 
generalize about the operations of the auditory system in terms of stimulations of the 
“receptors.” If we had a story about just which type of proximal receptor stimuli 
caused various computational consequences, we could describe the operations of 
audition in abstraction from any environmental stimuli, or representations thereof. 
In Chapter 3, I’ll argue that something very like this conditional claim is 
correct-- but nonetheless it’s a big if! It’s not at all clear in many cases that we can 
give an account of the type of proximal stimuli that give rise to certain computational 
structures. For some operations, such a story does seem plausible. We’ll see in 
Chapters 3 that many accounts of early vision processes do seem to make 
generalizations over proximal stimuli. States of the early vision system can be type-
individuated in terms of the proximal stimuli that give rise to them. But, Chapter 5 








amenable to such proximal characterization. Sure, phonologists may be able to 
describe particular contingent proximal stimuli that will give rise to particular 
phonological states under particular conditions. But, given the diversity of proximal 
stimuli to which such states are sensitive, it seems unlikely that they can type-
individuate phonological states in terms of such proximal stimuli. 
It’s simply not sufficient for Chomsky to point out that a brain in a vat could 
be stimulated by electrodes in just such a way as to carry out the same process as it 
would if so stimulated ‘in the wild.’ Of course we can in principle reproduce any 
particular proximal stimuli in the vat that would have had antecedent distal causes in 
the wild. But, our psychological explanations aspire to characterizing the 
counterfactual conditions under which different proximal stimuli would give rise to 
that same cognitive process. It’s not obvious that we can characterize those cognitive 
processes solely in terms of the proximal stimuli that give rise to them. We might 
need to identify them in terms of their intentional content. 
Compare how Chomsky’s argument might apply to eliminating a 
computational level of cognitive explanation. We could reproduce any token mental 
process in a brain in a vat if only we induced certain physiological effects in certain 
receptors. It does not follow from this observation that cognitive explanation consists 
solely of describing the physiology of the brain. Instead, cognitive science is 
predicated on the notion that it can describe mental processes at a computational level 
that abstracts from particular physiological implementations of such processes. In like 








syntactic relations between computational states, it does not follow that there aren’t 
further generalizations to be made at an intentional level that abstracts away from 
token syntactic implementations. This is just to recapitulate the point raised against 
Stich’s syntactic theory of mind in Section 3.2 above. 
Curiously, Chomsky seems to take the fact that mental processes can be 
described computationally in a manner that abstracts from physical implementation to 
be evidence in favor of the view that intentional content is explanatorily inefficacious. 
He writes: 
recent studies show that if the optic nerve of an animal is “rewired” 
to connect to the auditory pathway early in life, “the auditory 
cortex gradually takes on a representation that is normally found in 
the visual cortex” (Weng et al. 2001); the “representation” is some 
internal structure R, which is used when the “rewired” animal 
performs “vision tasks with the auditory cortex.” In such 
performance, R enters into complicated relations with things in the 
outside world, but it does not “represent” them in anything like the 
sense in which a photograph of a landscape is said to represent the 
landscape (2003, p.276) 
 
Here, Chomsky seems to be pressing the point that mental states can be 
individuated not in terms of their relations to either proximal or distal stimuli, but 
rather in terms of the structural relations they bear to one another. We can individuate 
a collection of mental states as a type R in virtue of the fact that they implement a 
particular abstract computational structure. 
From here, Chomsky’s reasoning is at least two ways ambiguous. On the one 
hand, he seems to be pointing to the fact that the very same structure could be 








not clear why this truism should have any bearing as to whether the states have 
intentional content. 
Perhaps instead, we’re meant to focus on the fact that we can explain 
cognition in terms of the same structure, R, in abstraction from any of R’s 
“complicated relations” to either proximal or distal stimuli. Perhaps, for example, we 
see a rotating cube if and only if R becomes activated. But, there’s just no general 
story to tell about the circumstances under which R becomes activated.  
But, as we pointed out earlier, there do seem to be generalizations about the 
circumstances under which R becomes activated insofar as there are generalizations 
about the circumstances under which we see rotating cubes. We see cubes when 
presented with cubes, videos of cubes, stachistoscopic presentations of cubes, etc.-- 
but generally not when we’re presented with various presentations of spheres! The 
negative evidence as to why we see cubes under the former conditions but not the 
latter wants explanation. It’s unclear we can provide one without appealing to the 
intentional content of the states of R. 
Now, we could supplement this story about individuating mental states in 
terms of their abstract computational structure with an account of the type of 
proximal stimuli that activate such a structure. Thus, we might explain that various 
distal presentations of cubes tend to activate mental states with structure, R, because 
they all give rise to proximal retinal stimuli of a certain type. Generally, distal 
presentations of spheres don’t give rise to R because they don’t cause the same type 








diverse disjunction of cube-like stimuli gives rise to perceptions of cubes, whereas a 
diverse disjunction of non-cube like stimuli does not. Such an explanation may not 
have to appeal to intentional content. We might argue that people are able to visually 
discriminate cubes from spheres not because they represent them as such, but because 
cubes generally cause proximal stimuli of a particular type, which in turn gives rise to 
a mental structure R, which is structurally distinct from the mental structure the kinds 
of proximal stimuli caused by spheres gives rise to.  In fact, borrowing a suggestion 
from Burge (2010), Chapter 3 will argue that just such a non-intentional explanation 
suffices to characterize the dead reckoning capacities of desert ants.  
But, it’s far from clear that such a strategy will apply to cognition generally. 
After all, we’ve already noticed that there may be many cognitive processes that 
cannot be characterized in terms of the type of proximal stimuli that occasion them. 
Moreover, it looks as if there are many cognitive capacities in which we cannot 
identify structures amongst mental states like R that remain stable across and within 
subjects. Fodor’s (1987) critique of meaning holism is premised on the observation 
that many psychological generalizations aspire to hold across differences in the 
computational relations amongst mental states within and across subjects. It’s just not 
obvious that two subjects who perceive a rotating cube both instantiate the same 
relationship R amongst their mental states. In any event, the mere fact that a bit of 
computational structure can be realized in either visual or auditory cortex is not 
sufficient reason to suppose that processes involving the structure do not depend on 









4. Computation Without Representation 
The previous section argued that arguments to eliminate intentionality from 
psychological explanation more generally miss the mark. On the other side, Fodorians 
hold to his (1975) dictum that there just is “no computation without representation.” 
If our best theory of mind is computational, then of necessity it is intentional as well. 
This section argues against this claim to the conclusion that it’s at least in principle 
possible to give explanations in terms of computations without intentional content. 
One reason for thinking that computations must operate over intentional states 
is that the states over which computations operate can only be individuated in terms 
of intentional properties. This way of thinking goes along with Fodor’s (1987) 
rejection of inferential role theories of semantics. If we want to make sense of the 
idea that different people can have different thoughts about the same things, we must 
be able to individuate the states that represent the objects of their thoughts 
independently of the computations those thoughts enter into. So, for example, if we 
want to make sense of the fact that Aristotle believed stars were holes in the heavenly 
fabric and that you believe stars are huge orbs of plasma undergoing nuclear fusion, it 
seems that you and Aristotle must share some state that is individuated independently 
of its computational relations.  
These considerations may be sufficient to establish that some aspects of 
human cognition can only be explained via mental states with intentional properties 








this point. Nonetheless, they leave on the table the possibility that other aspects of 
cognition are explained by computations over states that are not individuated by their 
intentional properties.  
Of course, if this is the case, we want an account of how such states would be 
individuated and type-identified. Establishing the coherence of computation without 
representation thus rests upon giving an account of how computational states can be 
individuated independently of intentional properties. It’s not prima facie obvious how 
to do this. For Fodor (1998), computations just are “causal relations among symbols 
which reliably respect semantic properties of the relata” (10). Thus, computation can 
only be characterized in terms of the semantic properties of the states over which it 
ranges. 
4.1 Computational Implementation 
One attempt to characterize computations independently of semantic properties has 
been Chalmers’ (1994; 1996; 2011) account of computational implementation in 
terms of physical systems’ causal properties. Now, strictly speaking, Chalmers’ 
account on its own is not sufficient to respond to Fodor’s concerns. Chalmers’ theory 
gives conditions on a physical system implementing computations. Thus, it is an 
account of how we can specify the computations implemented by a physical system 
independently of any intentional properties the system might possess. But, strictly 
speaking, the account presupposes that we are already able to specify computational 








Nonetheless, Chalmers’ account is a helpful first step on the way to 
developing a theory that type-individuates computations in the abstract, 
independently of intentional properties. The account itself is quite simple. The idea is 
that a physical system implements a computational process if there is an isomorphism 
between computation, abstractly specified and the physical system. Such an 
isomorphism holds when there is a one-to-one mapping between, on the one hand, the 
abstract computational states and the state transition relations holding amongst them, 
and, on the other, the physical states of the system and the causal relations amongst 
them. Thus, we can specify when a system implements a computation without 
reference to the intentional properties of either the physical system or the computation 
it implements. 
The prime objection to this theory of computational implementation is that it 
entails pan-computationalism. Since isomorphisms are cheap, under Chalmers’ 
account, just about anything-- a rock, say--would count as a computation. Piccinini 
(2006; 2007) and others (Searle, 1990) worry that accounts like Chalmers’ erase the 
distinction between processes that are computations, tout court, as it were,  and 
processes that are not, strictu dictu, computations, but nonetheless helpfully modelled 
by, say, a silicon chip computer that itself implements computations. For example, the 
motions of the planets can be modeled by a computational account. But, you might 
think we’d like a way to individuate the causal relations between states of the 
machine modeling the planets as computational, without allowing that the causal 








Sometimes Piccinini writes as though this is an important distinction to 
maintain so that in giving an account of computational individuation, we hew to our 
intuitions concerning the extension of our folk concept or word, “computation.” For 
those of us for whom such considerations are not compelling, Fodor has an alternative 
objection to the pan-computationalism entailed by Chalmers’ account. Fodor worries 
that if it turns out that just about all physical systems implement computations, then 
there’s nothing substantive to the claim that the mind does. If everything is a 
computation, Fodor argues, the claim that thought is becomes trivial (1998, p. 10). 
This is indeed the conclusion that Putnam (1988) and Searle (1992) derive from their 
commitment to pancomputationism. If there is to be any substance to the claim that 
thought is computation, argues Fodor, pancomputationism can’t be true. And, we 
likely can preclude pancomputationism only if we characterize computation 
intentionally.  
Chalmers responds to this objection by adding on the requirement that the 
causal relations between physical states be reliable (2011, p. 331). Thus, while there 
may be a one-off mapping between causal relations between atoms in a rock and the 
state transitions in a computational structure, the rock will not count as implementing 
the computation because those causal connections are not reliably instantiated.  
We don’t want to rely on this notion of computation in explicating the 
computational theory of mind, however. That theory generally has it that the 
computational properties of mind supervene on physical brain states. If we require 








count as implementing computations, we’d be scotching this idea of supervenience. 
One of the nicest things about the supervenience thesis is that it allows us to theorize 
about the computations performed by minds in abstraction from the details of how 
these are physically implemented by the brain. Crucially, it allows us to suppose that 
the very same computations can be performed at different times by very different 
physical brain processes3. All it commits us to is the thesis that minds reliably carry 
out computations that are implemented in any given instance by something or other. It 
leaves open the possibility that the mind reliably performs particular computations 
even though they may not be reliably implemented by the same physical brain 
processes.  
Perhaps, in the end, it will turn out that the computations performed on the 
mind do map roughly one-to-one onto reliably re-occurring physical processes. But, 
there’s no reason to let our theory of computation dictate that conclusion, particularly 
since Chalmers’ account can address this objection without appeal to reliable physical 
processes. 
One possible alternative is advanced by Chalmers himself (pp. 332-333). He 
proposes something like a distinction between isomorphisms that are constitutive of 
phenomena and those that are not. The idea is that even though both digestive 





3 Chalmers’ stipulation would, of course, allow us to maintain that mental processes supervene on the 
brain in the sense that different brains and physical systems all implement the same computation. But, 
it would require that each of those brains have reliably instantiated causal processes that would 








processes and brain processes implement computations, the claim that brain processes 
do is more substantive because those computations go toward constituting those 
processes as cognitive. In contrast, the computations implemented by bowel processes 
do not constitute those processes as digestion. 
We don’t want to commit to some processes being essentially cognitive or 
essentially digestive. To claim, as Chalmers does, that “it is in virtue of implementing 
some computation that a system is cognitive” (pp. 332-333) is to put the cart before 
the horse. At any rate, it doesn’t answer Fodor’s objection that we need a notion of 
computation that can explain cognition. 
If the relevant type of explanation were conceptual, then I suppose Chalmers’ 
proposal would suffice. It specifies a sufficient condition on a system being cognition. 
As Fodor puts it in his (1975), if all we want from explanation are definitions, we can 
explain that Wheaties is the breakfast of champions simply by noting that it is what 
champions eat. But, we might also want to explain what it is about Wheaties that 
causes people to be champions. In that case, we want an account of how the vitamins 
and minerals in Wheaties cause champions to display phenomena we discover them 
to have, such as endurance, strength, etc. 
Similarly, Fodor wants from a theory of mind not just a conceptual 
explanation that the extension of thinking things and computing things overlap. 
Rather, he takes it as a strength of the computational theory of mind that it provides a 
causal explanation that accounts for various properties we empirically discover it to 








inter alia, how mental states can be truth preserving, and how mental states allow 
organisms to exhibit certain behaviors. 
Thus, Chalmers’ attempt to vindicate computational explanation as non-
vacuous by appealing to its facility for conceptual explanation doesn’t fully address 
Fodor’s concern. If the computational theory of mind just amounts to the claim that 
computation is constitutive of thought, but not, say, digestion, it really just entails that 
a lot more things are thoughts than we initially thought there were. So, insofar as 
stomachs implement computations, they are thinking thoughts, even though those 
thoughts by not be relevant to an explanations of how they digest. But, it’s just such a 
conclusion that Fodor wants to avoid. If it turns out that just about everything thinks, 
the thesis that thoughts are computations is just as vacuous as the thesis that only 
minds think, that thinking is computational, but just about every physical process is 
computational. 
We can easily revise Chalmers’ account to allow for computational 
explanations to be special varieties of causal explanation. The key is to recognize that 
while isomorphisms between physical systems and computational structures may be 
ubiquitous, only some of those isomorphisms prove to be explanatorily useful. For 
example, we might allow that, in Chalmers’ sense, a rock implements a particular 
Turing machine because there is a particular instance at which causal relations 
between states of the rock are isomorphic to the state transitions of the Turing 
machine. However, this isomorphism does not do any explanatory work. There are no 








Alternatively, in the context of cognition, the fact that there is an isomorphism 
between mental processes and a particular Turing machine may well prove 
explanatorily fruitful. If the mental states end up being intentional, then the 
isomorphism could explain how the mind is able to process them in a truth-preserving 
manner, as Fodor argues. If the input states have particular causal connections to the 
environment, then the isomorphism can explain how an organism interacts with its 
environment, as Gallistel (1990) and Cummins (1989) press. Rather than appeal to 
computations that feature in conceptual explanations, as Chalmers suggests, we can 
just distinguish between computations that feature in causal explanations and those 
that do not. 
Of course, it might turn out that computations also so feature in explanations 
of phenomena other than cognition. For example, recent studies have had great 
success at modeling ant colonies as implementing computations, employing 
algorithms that allow for efficient search procedures (Pinter-Wollman et al., 2013). 
We need not argue either that the colony is thereby thinking (as Chalmers does) or-- 
to bar that claim-- argue that it’s not actually implementing computations in order for 
our explanations to remain interesting. Surely, it’s quite interesting that both minds 
and ant colonies implement computations! We can allow that cognition is 
computation, but that lots of other things may be as well.  
This response still adequately responds to Fodor’s worry. If it had turned out 
that cognition was computation only insofar as just about everything is, then it would 








certain computations are (causally) explanatorily efficacious makes it a substantive 
hypothesis that brains are such computational systems. There may be other non-
cognitive systems that are also computational in the same sense. But, in each case, it’s 
a substantive matter whether certain computations are explanatorily efficacious or 
not. Against this background, it’s a quite substantive claim that brains implement 
explanatorily efficacious computations. 
 
4.2 Type-Individuating Computations 
So, we can exonerate Chalmers’ theory of computational implementation from the 
principal charge against it. It still remains, however, to demonstrate how this account 
of implementation can be parlayed into an account of computational individuation 
that is independent of intentional characterization but nonetheless does not fall prey to 
Fodor’s objection that any such account will end up being trivial. First, we’ll take a 
look at the attempts Piccinini and Rescorla have made at this project, only to reject 
them as being needlessly baroque. Rather, Chalmers’ account of computational 
implementation can be modified to give an account of how to individuate 
computations independently of intentional states. 
Piccinini himself proposes that within the purview of computer science, 
computation is the manipulation of “symbols [that] are typically marks on paper 
individuated by their geometric shape” (211). Piccinini seems to embrace this view of 
computational individuation in order to counter arguments to the effect that 








must be specified in intentional terms. Such an argument would have it that 
computations are individuated by the functions they compute, where those functions 
are individuated by the ordered pairs of objects that the inputs and outputs of the 
computation are about. According to this view, a computation is individuated 
semantically as an addition process because the input/output pairs it generates are 
something like <(1,2), 3>, <(2,3),5>, etc., where “1,” “2,” “3” are about the numbers, 
one, two, three, etc.  
In order to circumvent this way of thinking about computation, Piccinini 
recommends that we define functions over the geometric marks rather than any 
entities those marks might be about. Thus, we individuate the above computation as 
operating over the geometric figures, ‘1,’ ‘2,’ ‘3,’ etc. This is one way to circumvent a 
commitment to intentional properties being essential to computational individuation.  
But, it’s a needlessly baroque maneuver with unhappy consequences. For one, 
it entails that processes operating over symbols with different geometric properties 
are de facto different computations. Thus, a process that generates input strings such 
as: <(1,10), 11>, <(10, 11), 101> would be a different computation than that 
described above, despite the fact that “1,” “10,” “11,” and “101,” are just the binary 
analogues to “1,” “2,” “3,” and “5”. But, on the face of it, it seems like we’d want to 
treat these two processes as instantiating the same computation. 
Of course, one way to do this is to identify the inputs and outputs of the 
computation as the objects represented by the symbols over which the two processes 








implementing the same computation despite making use of differently shaped 
symbols by claiming that these symbols are about the same set of entities (in this 
case, numbers). This is, of course, just the strategy that Piccinini wants to reject. 
Fortunately, Chalmers’ theory of computational implementation suggests 
another way of capturing what the two systems have in common without 
individuating their states in terms of intentional properties. In the first place, there is a 
one-to-one mapping between the numerals 1, 2, 3, etc. and the numerals 1, 10, 11, etc. 
Furthermore, the input-output pairs generated by the first process map one-to-one 
with those generated by the second process. So, for each input-output pair, were you 
to switch each symbol of the first process with its analogue symbol in the second, 
you’d end up with the same two sets of input-output pairs as before. That is, there’s a 
one-to-one mapping between the input-output pairs of the two systems that preserves 
the relations amongst them. So, the two sets of input-output pairs are isomorphic.  
The consequence of this is that we can abstract away from the two different 
systems described above in a way that doesn’t require appeal to intentional properties 
of their states. We can say that they both instantiate the same computation in that they 
both generate a set of input-output pairs that are isomorphic to one another. Thus, the 
two systems are just two instances of a variety of systems that all fall into a class of 
systems individuated by this property of generating input-output pairs that are 
isomorphic to one another.  
We can more finely individuate computational processes in terms of their 








implementing the same input-output transitions, we can stipulate that two systems 
implement the same algorithm if and only if the states that mediate the input and 
output are isomorphic as well4. Thus, we can avoid individuating computations in 
terms of intentional properties, without individuating them to such a fine grain as the 
geometric properties of their inputs. 
Of course, Rescorla (2013) argues that the above considerations argue in favor 
of individuating at least some computational states in terms of intentional properties. 
He points out that the same input-output pairs can be thought of as different functions 
depending on how we interpret their meanings. For example, if we interpret the pairs 
given above as representing numbers in arabic base-two notation, then they do 
represent the addition function. However, if we interpret them as representing 
numbers according to standard arabic base-ten notation, they no longer do. If “10,” 
“11,” and “101” represent the numbers two, three, and five, respectively, as they do in 





4 Strictu dictu, the correct account needs to be slightly more subtle, given that there may be varying 
degrees of abstraction in characterizing algorithms. For instance, you might have two systems that 
generate the same input-output pairs and that have internal states that are largely isomorphic to one 
another. However, suppose the second system has a state with no analogue to a state in the first, but 
which makes no difference to the final output. For example, two systems could have homomorphic 
states (that is, there is an injective--- but not one-one-- function from one to the other) and generate the 
arabic numeral corresponding to the product of the base-10 arabic numerals that are input. But, the 
second system might also go into a state analogous to adding zero. In one sense, the two systems are 
algorithmically equivalent in that their states are homomorphic and their input-output pairs are the 
same. In another, they are not, since the second system goes through some extra machinations on its 
way to generating the output. This second sense is just a more fine-grained specification of the 
algorithm involved, and the former is a more abstract one. Some contexts might lead us to care that the 
two systems are algorithmically different in the less abstract sense, and other contexts might compel us 
to acknowledge them as equivalent at the more abstract level. In any case, we have the resources to 
characterize them as the same algorithm at either level of abstraction either by showing that they are 








base-2 notation, then the function that outputs “101” when input “(10,11)” indeed 
instantiates addition. However, if the numerals are interpreted on the standard base-10 
model, then the process that generates the input-output pairs no longer implements 
addition. For, the sum of the numbers ten and eleven is not one hundred and one.  
We should grant Rescorla’s point that it’s sometimes helpful to individuate 
computational processes as interpreted computational processes, in which case, we 
may treat isomorphic structures of input and output as distinct given that they have 
different semantic properties. But granting this truth does not preclude the proposal 
that there is a level of abstraction at which we can individuate computational 
processes independently of their semantic properties.  
Rescorla’s argument indeed seems to assume that this is the case. His claim 
just is that, though two computational processes may fall into an equivalence class of 
formally isomorphic relations amongst primitives, if the intentional properties of 
those primitives differ, there is reason to distinguish them at another level of 
abstraction. So, Rescorla’s argument doesn’t establish that some computations cannot 
be individuated non-semantically-- it just establishes that sometimes it is helpful to 
further differentiate computational systems by way of their semantic properties. That 
claim is almost certainly correct. I’m sure there are many computations that operate 
over intentional states, just as there are many computations that do not. 
Rescorla also pushes the idea that semantic individuation “facilitates 
homogeneous description of systems that are heterogeneous under syntactic and 








allows for this level of abstraction. Systems individuated in terms of isomorphisms 
between their primitive components and the relations holding amongst those also 
abstract away from any particular account of the physical or geometric properties of 
those primitives. 
But, now we have come back to where we started. Chalmers’ isomorphism 
account of computation falls prey to the objection we raised at the beginning of this 
section. Namely, Chalmers’ account seems to entail pan-computationalism. It leaves 
no room for a distinction between computational systems and non-computational 
systems that can nonetheless be modeled computationally. Since the modeled system 
and the computation used to model it would both be isomorphic with each other, both 
of them would be computations on Chalmers’ view. 
Of course, these considerations still leave on the table the possibility that there 
is a way to characterize computation non-intentionally that nonetheless does not 
entail a commitment to pan-computationalism. Piccinini’s work is an attempt to 
defend this position. Ultimately, Piccinini’s proposal is unsuccessful, but it will be 
instructive to see why. 
We found unsatisfactory Piccinini’s initial attempt to rescue the notion of non-
intentional computation from the implication of pan-computationalism by way of 
individuating computational states in terms of their geometric properties. However, 
Piccinini (2007) does not seem to fully endorse the view that geometric shape is 
crucial for individuating computational symbols. He also relies on a mechanistic 








By a mechanistic account of some system, X, Piccinini means: 
a description of X in terms of spatiotemporal components of X; 
their function and organization, to the effect that X possesses its 
capacities because of how X’s components and their functions are 
organized (p. 506). 
 
In the abstract, computations consist of strings of letters from a finite alphabet 
and a list of instructions for generating new strings from old strings. For 
Piccinini: 
A letter is simply a type of entity that (i) is distinct from other 
letters and (ii) may be concatenated to other letters to form lists, 
called ‘strings.’ A string is an ordered sequence of letters (pp. 508-
509). 
 
Since mechanisms are to be specified in terms of spatiotemporal components rather 
than abstracta, Piccinini also individuates “digits” as “concrete counterparts” to 
abstract letters: “a digit may be a component or state of a component of the 
mechanism that processes it” (p. 510).  
Digits are individuated as such by way of the functional role they play in a 
mechanism. However, it’s unclear how this notion of functional role individuates the 
elements of computation in a way that’s fundamentally different from the way 
Chalmers’ proposal individuates computational states via their isomorphic relations to 
one another.  
For instance, by way of explicating this functional individuation, Piccinini 
writes: “in an AND gate, all of input types ‘0,0’, ‘0,1’, and ‘1,0’ give rise to outputs 








type ‘0’ just in case it behaves in a way that comports with this AND gate structure. 
That is, two particular voltages can be individuated as digits of type ‘0’ and ‘1’ just in 
case they behave in a way that can be mapped on to the abstract description of an 
AND gate! But, the property of being able to be mapped on to such a structure just is 
the property of being homomorphic with that structure! It’s thus hard to see how 
Piccinini’s description of computation is significantly different from theories that 
individuate computational processes via homomorphisms. 
Piccinini acknowledges that his account shares much with Chalmers’ when he 
writes: “digits and strings thereof are equivalence classes of physical entities or 
states” (p. 514). Presumably a digit or string falls into an equivalence class if it is 
homomorphic with the other members of that class, just as Chalmers suggests. 
So, on the face of it, Piccinini’s account does not have much that distinguishes 
it from Chalmers’. Crucially, it does not yet have the resources to surmount the 
objection that entails that just about everything is a computer since there are 
homomorphisms to be had between computational structures and just about anything 
else. He can overcome the objection by retreating to his stance that computational 
states are individuated geometrically. But, as we saw, this stance individuates 
computations too finely for the purposes of empirical psychology. 
Fortunately, there’s just no need to provide an account of computation that 
does not entail pan-computationalism. We can buy into the pan-computationalism 
entailed by Chalmers’ account as long as we can distinguish between computations 








everything implements computations. But, some of those computations are useful to 
explanatory psychology because they allow us to give a causal explanation of the 
generalizations discovered by its enquiry. 
Shagrir (2001) seems to take something like this view. He starts off by noting, 
as we have, that any physical system could be given multiple syntactic descriptions in 
something like Chalmers’ sense. He proposes that we determine which of these 
possible syntactic descriptions constitute what he calls the computational structure of 
a physical system. Shagrir concludes, as have I, that the relevant syntactic 
descriptions are just those that feature in our best empirical generalizations about a 
system.  
However, Shagrir further concludes that the intentional content of intentional 
states is essential to determining what those syntactic descriptions are. By contrast, 
I’m pressing the view that we can (in principle, in some instances) individuate 
computational systems independently of intentional content. So, we should see why 
it’s unnecessary for Shagrir to appeal to intentional properties in his characterization 
of computational generalizations. 
Shagrir’s argument comes down to noting: 
We are therefore left with two sorts of features that could explain 
the choice of computational structure: environmental features 
correlated with the intrinsic physical/neural properties of the 
cognitive system, and phenomenal features (conscious 
experiences) correlated with these neural properties. But both 
kinds of features are precisely the ones we associate with the 
content of the system’s states. Thus content impacts computational 









We might allow that the computational processes that are explanatorily 
adequate are those that help explain how a creature interacts with its environment. 
Thus, in the case of the desert ant discussed by Gallistel (1990) and Burge (2010), it 
is the fact that there are computational processes implemented by the ant that are 
homomorphic to the spatial relations of its environment that helps explain how the ant 
is able to navigate the space of its normal environments. It may also well be true that 
connections between cognitive systems and the environment are involved in 
constituting the intentional content of cognitive states.  
However, it’s just not obvious that because physical states of a creature’s 
neural system are correlated with certain environmental properties that those physical 
states therefore represent those environmental properties. In fact, in the following 
chapter, I’ll argue that we can explain many phenomena by appeal to 
homomorphisms between computational states and environmental properties without 
appealing to intentional states.  
Regardless, we need not establish this claim now to see that Shagrir’s 
argument is misguided. We could concede, along with Gallistel and Cummins, that 
homomorphisms between computational processes and environmental properties 
constitute the intentional content of those computational states. But, it does not follow 
from this that the states cannot be individuated independently that intentional content. 
In fact, establishing that a functional isomorphism obtains between a computational 








states and environmental states independently before going on to show that these two 
independently individuated systems are nonetheless homomorphic! 
Thus, contra Shagrir, we can pick out some computational processes as 
explanatorily efficacious independently of their intentional content. If we adopt the 
thesis that computations are individuated as equivalence classes of isomorphic 
structures, along Chalmers’ lines, we can satisfy Fodor’s requirement that the thesis 
that the mind is computational is a substantive claim. While just about every physical 
process may be computational in Chalmers’ sense, only some computational 
processes play an explanatory role. Thus, it’s a substantive thesis that the operation of 
minds can be explained by the postulation that they are computers whereas the 
operations of rocks generally cannot be. 
It would be further interesting if computations-- individuated independently of 
intentional properties were sufficient for capturing all the generalizations of our best 
psychology. Such a result would constitute the elimination of intentional properties 
from the posits of psychology. However, the present work argues that such an 
elimination is not available to us. It does argue that some psychological 
generalizations may be captured in terms of computation independent of intentional 
properties, whereas others do require the postulation of intentional states. Caching out 
the distinction between these two modes of explanation is the chief goal of this study.  
Of course, we haven’t yet demonstrated that computation either with or 
without intentional states is explanatorily efficacious. The present chapter merely 








computation without representation that could possibly do explanatory work in 
psychology. Chapter 3 will argue that it does in fact do such work and explicate just 
what that work is. This will allow us to develop an account of the explanatory work 
that intentional properties do over and above non-intentional computational 
processes. We’ll then be in a position to see how this difference between 
computational explanations and intentional explanations influences how we should 
understand explanations in the cognitive sciences in Chapters 4 and 5 
Before we move on to this positive account of the explanatory role of 
intentional content, however, Chapter 2 will look at existing proposals about the 
explanatory role of intentional states and point up what is unsatisfactory about them. 
We’ll then be in a position to see why a new answer to the horizontal question of 
intentionality is necessary.  
5. Cognition With and Without Representation: An Itinerary 
So, the eliminativists don’t give us reason to rule out an explanatory role for 
intentional content within cognitive science in principle. And, in principle, there is a 
notion of computation without intentional content on offer. But, if we are to admit 
intentional content as an explanatorily efficacious posit within cognitive science, then 
we owe an account of just what sort of explanatory role such content may play. The 
remainder of this work is devoted to sketching out such an explanatory role. 
Chapter 2 argues that the explanatory roles for content assumed in the 
reductive projects of many intentional realists end up being in many cases otiose. 








of intentional explanation do not allow for counterfactually robust generalizations. In 
particular, too often, attempts at vertical reduction took  approaches seem too often 
concerned with capturing our intuitions about the proper way to talk about mental 
processes. 
Chapter 3 continues with this analysis, presenting a series of example 
cognitive processes. It argues that a number of cognitive processes that occur early in 
both phylogeny and diachronic processing can be explained in terms of computation 
without intentional content. This is not because they are early systems. Rather, it’s 
because such processes can be generalized over solely in terms of the proximal input 
to which they are sensitive and the computational transformations they perform on 
that input. 
By contrast, processes that cannot be generalized over their proximal inputs 
are amenable to intentional explanation. That is, cognitive processes that are 
isotropic, in that they’re open to revision from an indefinite disjunction of inputs, 
require their states to be individuated in terms of intentional content. We’ll see that 
such processes also occur in early phylogenetic systems, such as the navigational 
capacities of honey bees. 
Chapter 4 surveys some possible objections and alternatives to the view set 
out in Chapter 3. It addresses Gallistel & King’s (2009) suggestion that intentional 
content crops up in systems involving read-write memory systems. It argues that this 









The chapter also addresses worries that depending on how the facts about 
cognition pan out, my proposal will either entail that all cognition is intentional, or 
that none of it is. On the one hand, recent psychological literature suggests that all 
cognition is cognitively penetrable. The worry is that there just aren’t any bottom-up 
encapsulated processes that would be amenable to explanation via computation 
without intentional content. The chapter argues, along lines laid out by Firestone & 
Scholl (2015), that the evidence against encapsulated processes isn’t conclusive. 
On the other hand, you might worry that if cognition is massively modular, 
then my proposal entails that all cognition is non-intentional. But, the chapter points 
out that modular processes can also be open to isotropic revision, and thus be 
amenable to intentional explanation. 
Chapter 5 provides an example of such a modular process in the form of the 
phonological system. It argues that states of the phonological system cannot be 
individuated independently of their intentional content precisely because they are 
open to revision from an indefinite disjunction of possible stimuli. Phonological 













As we noted in Chapter 1, most of the literature on intentionality over the past century 
has been explicitly concerned with what Rey (1996) has called the “vertical problem” 
of intentionality. In its most abstract form, the vertical problem is how to reduce 
appeals to intentionality in cognitive science to non-intentional terms. So, at one 
level, it involves a debate pitting intentional reductionists against the behaviorists, 
various connectionists, and others who hold that intentionality can be eliminated from 
cognitive science altogether. The vertical problem also encompasses the debates 
within the reductionist camp itself concerning how intentionality ought to be reduced 
to non-intentional properties. 
The present project is not concerned with this vertical problem, but rather 
what Rey terms the “horizontal problem,” or Ramsey (2007) calls the “job description 
challenge”: the problem of articulating just what sort of explanatory work 
intentionality does in cognitive science.  While few philosophers have explicitly 
grappled with this problem, those working on the vertical problem have taken stances 
on the issue. After all, in order to make arguments as to whether their favored 
reductions will allow intentional states to do the explanatory work they’re supposed 








about just what work intentional states do.  
The following chapter will examine these assumptions-- sometimes implicitly 
assumed, other times explicitly defended-- and find them all lacking. Though most 
theorists think of themselves as characterizing a notion of intentional content that 
does explanatory work, they sometimes overly constrain their accounts so as to 
accurately capture either our folk intuitions, or the talk of cognitive scientists, about 
when organisms are in intentional states. In so doing, many reductionists have failed 
to propose reductions that assign intentional states in such a way that they do any 
explanatory work in psychology. One notable exception to this general failing is the 
work of Jerry Fodor, which has always been concerned with capturing not our folk 
intuitions or scientific jargon, but rather a notion of intentionality that will do real 
explanatory work. 
In what follows, I leave aside whether any of the theories canvassed are 
adequate answers to the vertical problem of naturalistic reduction. Perhaps some of 
them are. My purpose is only to note that insofar as these theories address the 
horizontal problem, their answers are wanting. 
2.Teleosemantics 
 
There are innumerable ways of assigning contents to mental states. Whether we ought 
adopt one or the other must be decided by whether one assignation facilitates 
explanation better than another. Teleological accounts generally posit that content is 








There are three main variations on this theme. Consumer semanticists, 
exemplified by Ruth Millikan, hold that states’ content is determined by how they 
facilitate the functions other systems in an organism have been selected to perform. 
Tyler Burge has recently been advocating what I shall call an Aristotelian semantics, 
such that the contents of states are fixed by the functions they in fact play in an 
organism’s current environment-- not necessarily the functions they had in the past 
been selected for. Finally, informational teleosemantics, defended by Karen Neander, 
holds that contents are fixed by functions the states themselves have to extract 
information from the environment-- not by functions played by systems that make use 
of the states. 
Underlying these different reductive accounts are different conceptions of just 
what explanatory role intentional contents are needed to play. The following will 
explicate just what these different conceptions are and argue that none of them 
provide an account of intentional states that adequately captures a role for intentional 
content that is required for scientific explanation. 
2.1 Millikan’s Teleological Consumer Semantics 
 
Millikan (1984) argues that the content of intentional states is fixed by functions 
certain parts of the organism were evolutionarily selected to fulfill. The idea is that 
it’s because a mechanism performed a certain function that it has survived the 
selection process. For example, it’s because hearts function to pump blood (and not 








functions that determined a mechanism’s selection are what Millikan calls “Proper 
functions.”  
A bit more neology: “Normal” behavior is behavior in which Proper functions 
are carried out. “Normal” conditions are conditions that must obtain for Proper 
functions to be carried out. Thus, it is biologically Normal that blood have a particular 
viscosity so that a heart can behave Normally-- that is, fulfill its Proper function to 
pump blood. 
Behaviors are not “normal” in the sense that they are the functions that the 
mechanisms commonly or on average perform. Indeed, Millikan is careful to note that 
Normal behaviors and Proper functions are sometimes rarely implemented. 
The content of an intentional state is constituted by the state the world would 
have to be in so that that the mechanism making use of the intentional state could 
perform its Proper function. This is why Millikan’s teleosemantics is a consumer 
semantics: content is determined by the Proper functions of the mechanisms that 
consume, or make use of, intentional states. 
So, for example, consider the states of magnetosomes in magnetotaxic 
bacteria. These bacteria have tiny magnets-- magnetosomes-- that orient the bacteria 
toward magnetic north. Since these particular bacteria are anaerobic, it’s a happy 
circumstance for them that travelling toward magnetic north in their normal 
environment pulls them under water away from toxic oxygen rich surface water. So, 
states of the bacteria’s magnetosomes are consumed by the bacteria’s locomotor 








system to propel the bacteria to anaerobic environments. 
The Proper function of the motor system is to move bacteria toward anaerobic 
environments. This is because the reason current bacteria have the motor systems 
they have is that ancestral bacteria who had motor systems that took them toward 
oxygen rich environments died off: the motor system has been selected to fill the 
function of moving the bacteria to anaerobic environments. Insofar as the motor 
system relies on the states output by the magnetic detection system to fulfill this 
Proper function, the states of the magnetic detection system are about anaerobic 
environments. 
2.1.2 Vindicating Intuitions 
Millikan views it as a virtue of her theory that it assigns content to states of 
the bacteria in line with our intuitions about what content we ought to assign to those 
states. She approvingly notices that “intuition tells us that what the pull of the 
magnetosome represents is the whereabouts of oxygen free water” (1989, p. 290). 
Most informational theories of content will not accommodate this intuition. 
For, all we need do is introduce a bar magnet in toxic oxygen rich waters, and the 
bacteria will flock there, poisoning themselves. Thus states of the bacteria are not 
causally responding to the oxygenation of water, but rather magnetic field orientation. 
The informational theorist will conclude that the magnetosome states are about 
magnetic field orientation rather than anaerobic properties of the environment, 
because they carry more information about the former. Thus, when the bacteria 
suicidally move toward the bar magnetic in oxygen rich water, it is not because they 








strongest at that location. Millikan concludes that “[n]one of this makes any sense on 
a causal or informational approach” (1989, p.290). 
It’s not immediately obvious why an information theory of content could not 
make sense of these data. The bacteria’s magnetosome states counterfactually 
causally co-vary with magnetic field orientation, but not oxygenation. Thus, the 
causal theorist will likely conclude that if the bacteria represent anything, it’s 
magnetic field orientation, and not oxygen levels. This account seems to make perfect 
sense of the data. It does, of course, fly in the face of Millikan’s intuitions of what the 
content of the states ought to be. So, it seems that for a theory of content to “make 
sense” for Millikan, it must comport with our intuitions about what the content of 
states ought to be. 
On this measure, her adaptationist consumer semantics may well make sense. 
To determine the content of an intentional state, a causal role semanticist asks which 
correspondence between the state and the environment is causally robust across 
counterfactual conditions. The consumer teleosemanticist, on the other hand, asks 
which correspondence between intentional states and the environment would disrupt 
the functioning of downstream processing were it to be broken.  
So, by Millikan’s lights, states of the magnetosomes represent oxygenation 
because if the correlation between states of the magnetosome and anaerobic 
environments were to be broken, the function of systems downstream in processing 
would be disrupted. The bacteria’s other systems can best carry out their proper 








magnetosome was selected because more often than not it got the bacteria into 
anaerobic environments. So, the Millikan’s teleo-consumer semantics assigns 
representations of oxygen levels to the bacteria, in consort with our putative intuitions 
that the bacteria represent such things. 
So, one point in favor of Millikan’s teleo-consumer semantics is that it 
accords with Millikan’s intuitions about what the content of mental states ought to be. 
There are several reasons for thinking this is not an adequate criterion for judging the 
plausibility of vertical theories of content. 
First, while Millikan’s theory may accommodate this particular intuition, it 
has other rather unintuitive consequences. The most well known is the swamp man 
(Davidson, 1987): a physical duplicate of me spontaneously materializes from a 
swamp. Because it does not have my evolutionary history, none of its psychological 
states have the content that mine do, even though they are physically and a fortiori 
functionally identical to mine. For, Millikan’s theory assigns contents relative to 
evolutionary history, not physical or functional make up. That swamp man’s 
psychological states don’t share my content strikes many as counter-intuitive. 
Unintuitive consequences are of course not unique to Millikan’s theory. Most 
theories of content reach some unintuitive consequence or another. It thus seems 
misguided to use intuitive plausibility as a criterion on the adequacy of vertical 
theories of content: each one will fail the test to some extent!  Of course, intuitions 
may constitute excellent explananda for a theory-- think of the success generative 








case, though, it takes as explanandum the fact that people have certain patterns of 
intuitions. It does not suppose that linguistic theory must be constrained so as to make 
those intuitions true. 
A deeper worry is that, by using intuitive plausibility as a guide to evaluating 
vertical theories of content, Millikan has taken an untenable position on the horizontal 
theory. As Pietroski (1992) notes, in attempting to give an assignation of correctness 
conditions to mental states in a way that accords with our intuitions, Millikan seems 
to have failed to assign them in such a way that they can underwrite intentional 
explanations. 
If the only thing that content attributions are doing is vindicating the truth of 
our intuitions about how to talk about content, then they’re not doing any interesting 
explanatory psychological work. Therefore, there’s no good reason to posit their 
existence. Doing so is tantamount to characterizing God as the mass-energy of the 
universe to vindicate our intuitions that He exists and takes many forms. Positing his 
existence does not allow us to make any generalizations we’d otherwise be unable to 
make. Vindication is always nice, but I take it that what we want from science is a 
description of the world independent of our interests-- not one that merely confirms 
our convictions.   
2.1.3 Normalizing Explanations 
Millikan (1995) does claim that her theory does more than just vindicate our 
intuitions. It provides what she calls, following Philip Pettit (1986), “normalizing 








To explain a phenomenon by subsuming it under norms is to 
exhibit it as an instance of conformity to or departure from proper 
operation of some teleological system (pp. 187-188) 
 
Such explanations explain such phenomena as why a bear is asleep, why the washing 
machine door is closed, why the motor stalled, and why the car went through a red 
light (p. 188).  
Now, I have been operating under the Quinean assumption that there is an 
interesting distinction to be made between ways of cutting up the world that prove 
necessary to do our best science and ways of cutting up the world that do not. I take 
our “best science,” to simply be the best description of the world independent of our 
interests in it. That is, a description of the world, which may ascribe interests to us and 
describe what they are, but which is otherwise insensitive to them. Thus, to ask 
whether intentional states have an explanatory role in our best science is to ask 
whether they are necessary to make generalizations about how the world is 
independent of the interests of those doing the generalization. 
One worry I have for Millikan’s account, then, is that, while intentional states 
may well feature in “normalizing explanations,” such normalizing explanations only 
explain how the world is relative to our pre-theoretical folk psychological conceptions. 
If this is the case, intentional states do not play an explanatory role in our best science 
because they do not help explain how the world is independent of our interests in it. 
For, on the face of it, any norms we might use to describe a given phenomenon 
would seem to derive from our interest in that phenomenon. That is, the norms seem 








in the phenomenon at hand. The washing machine staying locked after the spin cycle 
is over violates a norm only insofar as we want it to open up in order to get our clothes 
out! Similarly, the car’s motor stalling violates a norm insofar as we would rather it 
keep running and get us to our destination. A car that runs a red light violates a norm 
only insofar as we would rather cars (other than our own, at least) not run red lights. 
Now, of course, it is an interesting fact about our environment that cars, as a 
matter of fact, do largely tend to stop at red lights. So, why a particular car bucks this 
trend may well serve as an interesting explanandum independently of whether it 
matters to our interests qua drivers as to whether cars run red lights. In that case, the 
phenomenon such that most cars do stop at red lights is not to be explained by 
referencing anything that’s special about cars-- let alone anything having to do with 
teleofunctional norms that govern them. Rather, we should appeal to the people 
driving the cars and their desires to stop cars at red lights. Cars stop at red lights 
because the people driving them want them to. 
But, Millikan’s suggestion is explicitly that we not take such deviations from 
de facto regularities as an explanandum. Rather, the normalizing explanation is to 
characterize the explanandum in terms of the car deviating from some teleofunctional 
norm that abstracts away from usual, common or even counterfactually characterized 
behavior.  
The worry is that given Millikan’s examples of normalizing explanations, any 
norms we ascribe will merely record our interests in a particular phenomenon. Thus, 








relative to our interests in it. Instead of explaining why a car stops at a red light by 
referencing the causal influence of the desire its driver has to stop it, we are to explain 
it in terms of the violation of the norm that cars ought to stop at red lights. But, it 
would seem, to say that cars ought to stop at red lights is only to note that we generally 
have an interest in them doing so. To say that the washing machine door ought to 
unlock after the spin cycle is merely to note that we’d rather it would. So, if the 
normalizing explanations that invoke intentional states are of a similar kind, then 
Millikan will have failed to carve out a notion of intentional state that does real 
scientifically explanatory work. 
2.1.4 Explicating Proper Functions 
 
Of course, there may well be instances in which characterizing phenomena in terms of 
conformity with some teleofunctional process does indeed allow us to make 
generalizations about how the world is independent of our interests. Presumably, 
Millikan believes that many biological explanations have this characteristic, as do 
intentional explanations. She writes: 
Now to study how an entity as falling within a biological category 
‘works’ involves (1) understanding what functions are proper to it 
and to its constitutive systems, parts and states and (2) 
understanding how these functions are Normally performed (1986, 
p. 55) 
 
So, extrapolating, to explain the operation of the heart is to explain that it’s 
because it circulated blood that it was evolutionarily selected, and that, historically, it 
did so via a certain configuration of atria, ventricles, and valves. Atria, ventricles, and 








Normal Proper functioning of hearts.  
By Millikan’s own lights, such an explanation does not facilitate any 
predictions: after all, just because this is how hearts Normally function entails nothing 
about how they actually function in most cases. For recall, Normal function is just the 
function evinced under the conditions in which it was selected. Neither does it, 
according to Millikan, subsume a phenomena under laws. Again, to note that, 
historically, some hearts have functioned a certain way in particular environmental 
contexts says nothing about whether the operation of any particular heart, or the 
operations of most hearts, obey any law governed process. 
So, how does the above explain how my particular heart works? Prima facie, 
it seems only to note the fact that my heart is the descendent of previous hearts, which 
themselves worked in such a way so as to circulate blood. But, it says nothing about 
whether my heart works in this way or in some much different fashion. I’ll have to 
speculate about the sense in which the above account is an explanation because 
Millikan leaves it rather unclear precisely how such explanations do their explaining. 
One thing the above account might do is provide criteria that licenses 
categorizing what I’ve been calling my “heart” as a heart. Millikan certainly thinks 
that this is one use for Proper functions: 
“the categories "heart," "kidney" and "eye," as naming parts of 
both crayfish and people, are carved out by reference to their most 
obvious proper functions.” (64) 
 
It may well be that what makes my heart, a lizard’s heart, and a fish’s heart all 








evolutionary etiology such that they were selected to fulfill the same Proper function. 
It does not follow from this fact alone that the Proper function of hearts can be 
invoked to make any interesting generalization about how particular hearts work. 
Perhaps Millikan is correct that an appropriate analysis of the concept, ‘heart’, 
makes use of Proper function as a necessary condition. But, we should take care to 
distinguish this constitutive use of Proper function from the explanatory use we are 
currently searching for. The natural language question, “why is John a bachelor?” is 
multiply ambiguous: one thing we may be asking is what properties of John qualify 
him to fall under the concept, ‘bachelor’ (he’s a marriageable single man, of course!). 
Another thing we may be asking is what is the process by which John came to possess 
those properties, whatever they may be (he dropped out of seminary and never 
married)5.  
So too, we should be careful to distinguish two explanations we might be after 
when we set out to explain “how my heart works.” We might, I suppose, be asking 
why my heart qualifies as a heart in the first place. If that’s the case, then Millikan’s 
account of the constitutive conditions on being a heart counts as an explanation 





5 This is essentially the objection Fodor (1975, pp. 6-7) levels against Ryle’s conception of 
psychology. Fodor insists that psychological science, like breakfast science, give explanations in terms 
of causal etiology. Just as we explain why Wheaties is the breakfast of Champions by describing the 
campion-making effects of its vitamins, we explain psychological capacities by describing the causal 
properties of mental states. We could instead answer that what makes Wheaties the breakfast of 
champions is the fact that many people we consider to be Champions eat it. Such an explanation, 
however, does not justify the claim that these Wheaties eaters are in fact champions. Likewise, we 
could explain how it is that organisms have intentional states by pointing out that they have many 
states that we consider to be intentional. But, such an explanation is not sufficient to justify our claim 








(correct or not). But, I take it Millikan would agree with me that biologists are after 
more than just conceptual analyses of concepts like heart and kidneys. They also want 
to explain how my heart works in some other sense. They want to explain what it’s 
doing and how. If that’s what we’re after, it’s hard to see how a normalizing 
explanation is going to help. 
Of course, it could be that the biologist is not concerned with how hearts are 
currently working, but with how they have worked at particular points in the past. The 
explanations they are searching for just are accounts of which functions caused hearts 
to be evolutionarily selected, and which did not. Delineating the heart’s Proper 
functions and Normal conditions for those functions would certainly constitute an 
answer to this question. So, it seems the sorts of explanations Millikan takes 
biologists to be looking for are simply accounts of which functions are Proper and 
which are not. As such, these explanations are not so much explanations of why 
something has happened, as explications of particular historical facts. 
No doubt, these are quite interesting historical facts that we’d want our 
science to capture. The question we must raise, though, is whether assigning content 
to mental states is necessary to understand which are the Proper functions of any 
system. 
Crucially, for our purposes, it seems that intentional content is superfluous to 
any account of Proper function. Consider the case that Pietroski (1992) brings against 
Millikan. Back in the mists of time, a creature, a kimu, develops a mental state that 








moves toward the red flowers growing on the top of a hill. Doing so moves himself 
away from the predation the snorfs perpetrate on his fellows in the valley below. He 
thus survives and propagates his red detecting genes such that now all kimu detect 
and move toward red things.  
By Millikan’s lights, the Proper function of the kimu’s red detector is to get 
the kimu away from predating snorfs. Thus, the content of the mental state it produces 
is something like ‘snorf free zone’. Pietroski’s observation is that whatever content a 
cognitive scientist would assign to this state, it certainly would not be that. Ergo, 
Millikan’s account of content is not consonant with current practice in cognitive 
science and therefore flawed. 
I press the deeper point that assigning content using Millikan’s method cannot 
help further any explanation-- be it one a typical cognitive scientist might offer or the 
sort of explanation Millikan says biologists are after. Suppose that a biologist wants 
to explicate which of the kimu’s operations are Proper functions and which are not. 
She’ll want to note that the Proper function of the kimu’s detector is to get the kimu 
away from snorfs under Normal conditions in which there are red flowers atop hills 
and snorfs only hunt in the valleys. 
Now, we could of course go ahead and say that the content of the kimu’s red 
detector state is ‘snorf free zone.’ But, this certainly doesn’t tell us anything more 
about what the Proper functions of the kimu are. It merely records information that 









You might object that any vertical reduction of content is going to result in 
contentful states merely recording antecedently available information. For example, if 
content is constituted by asymmetric dependency relations á la Fodor, then saying 
that a mental state is about trees just is to record the information that there is an 
asymmetric dependency between that state and trees. The whole point, after all, of a 
vertical reduction is to demonstrate how intentional content can be redescribed in 
non-intentional terms. 
The difference is that Fodor assumes that the postulation of contentful states 
will buy him generalizations and predictions about how the mind works that can’t be 
captured merely by listing out asymmetric dependencies. Millikan explicitly denies 
that psychology is in the business of making generalizations and predictions over and 
above recording which functions are Proper and which conditions are Normal: 
The happenings that either folk psychology or a developed 
scientific psychology could be expected to explain are strictly 
limited to those that occur in accordance with proper functions of 
the body's systems (or that occur as common aberrations of these 
functions-- abnormal psychology).  
... 
Hence it is not likely to be the business either of folk  
psychology or of scientific psychology to attempt to explain why I 
move my right hand 20 inches northwest or why I hand you a 
picture of Washington. (1986, pp. 60-61) 
 
So, positing that mental states have contents corresponding with the Normal 
conditions under which consumers of the states perform their proper functions does 
not help buy her any additional generalizations. It merely provides a convenient 








the use of intentional properties.  
2.1.5 Explaining Malfunction 
 
Now, perhaps I’m wrong and Millikan does have an account of 
generalizations intentional contents can buy us over and above generalizations about 
the Proper functions they get reduced to. It may be that biopsychology admits of 
explanations other than simple explications of Proper functions. 
Indeed, sometimes Millikan writes as though some of the chief explananda of 
biopsychology are malfunctions. She writes that to explain a phenomenon is to 
“exhibit it as an instance of conformity or departure from proper operation of some 
teleological system” (1993, pp. 187-188). Thus, to explain how the heart works is not 
simply to record what the Proper function of the heart is, but also to give an account 
of why any particular heart is failing to fulfill its Proper function. So, perhaps the 
blood is too viscous or the valves are stenotic relative to their Normal conditions, and 
that’s why the heart is not functioning Properly.  
Again, however, it’s hard to see how attributing content to mental states 
facilitates explanations of this type. Suppose we want to explain why the Kimu’s red 
detector is not functioning Properly. Perhaps there’s a situation in which a red weed 
begins growing in the valleys. The kimu flock to the valleys, where they are 
decimated by snorfs. The red detector is no longer playing its proper function of 
getting kimu away from snorfs. In explaining why it’s malfunctioning, we might say 
something like: “the kimu falsely believe that there are no snorfs in the valley.” 








valley being snorf free. Unfortunately, the valley is crawling with snorts. So, it does 
make sense to say that the kimu falsely believe the valley is snorf free. But the 
question is whether attribution of this false belief helps explain anything that couldn’t 
be explained otherwise. 
In this case, there is an explanation that explains perfectly well the 
malfunctioning of the red detector without attributing false beliefs to the kimu. The 
red detector causes the kimu motor systems to move them toward red things. There 
are red things in the valley. Therefore, the kimu move there. Unfortunately, there are 
also snorfs in the valley. So, the kimu sensory motor system fails to perform its 
Proper functions of getting the kimu to snorf free zones. Attributing intentional states 
to the kimu just is not necessary to explain their deviation from their proper 
functioning. 
So, we’re left back where we started. If intentional attributions are supposed 
to explain deviations from proper functioning, then at most all they do is regiment our 
way of using intentional language to describe malfunctions. They do not buy us any 
explanations we’d otherwise be unable to get. Moreover, Proper functions seem like 
the only teleological processes around that are not characterized in terms of our 
particular interests in the world. So, if intentional states were going to explain 
anything about how the world is independent of our interests, it would be Proper 
functions. But, while intentional idiom may provide a convenient way of talking 









Perhaps Millikan does have a correct account of content constitution: how it is 
that states come to possess intentional content. I leave aside whether she has the 
correct answer to this vertical question. What the foregoing does make clear, 
however, is that the explanatory work she takes such content to do is redundant. Her 
explanations work whether or not we assign intentional content to states of the 
creatures whose functions we are explaining. Thus, Millikan’s answer to the 
horizontal problem of what explanatory work intentional content does within science 
is unsatisfactory. 
2.2 Neander: Teleo-Informational Production Semantics 
 
Neander disagrees both with Millikan’s answer to the Vertical and the 
Horizontal questions. Her alternative Vertical theory is that some systems function to 
carry information about the world, and it is these functions that determine the content 
of mental states. Her approach is therefore often characterized as a production 
semantics. Whereas Millikan believes that the functions executed by systems that 
consume intentional states fix the contents of those states, Neander argues that 
intentional states are produced so as to function to carry information about things in 
the world-- and it is these distal stimuli that fix the content of the states. 
While this way of fixing content is supposed to be able to do more work 
within cognitive science, Neander’s strategy ends up falling prey to the same sorts of 
objections as Millikan’s. In particular, the intentional ascriptions her theory prescribes 








themselves, do no explanatory work. 
One reason Neander thinks a production teleosemantics is a better fit with 
cognitive science is that she takes it to obey what she calls the “coherence constraint”: 
if the contents of mental representations are to play a role in 
explaining cognitive capacities, they must cohere with the relevant 
information processing (2006, 180). 
 
Insofar as cognitive science couches its explanations in terms of information 
processing, intentional contents that play a role in such explanations must “cohere” 
with them.  
Thus, commitment to the coherence constraint is not so much a substantive 
difference, but rather a methodological difference between Neander and Millikan. It’s 
meant to assert that it’s at least prima facie misguided to abstract away from the 
information processing going on in cognition and look only at the adaptive functions 
being performed by an organism when we go about fixing its contents, as Millikan 
does. We can’t read “coherence” as a gloss on some substantive way in which 
intentional content must be fixed by information processing. Rather, it’s just an 
injunction that we look closely at the information processing explanations we give of 
organisms so that we are sure that the contents we assign to their states at least do not 
conflict with these explanations. 
Neander of course argues the further substantive point that once we conduct 
such a survey, we’ll find that the contents assigned by her production semantics 
comport better with the cognitive science than those assigned by Millikan’s consumer 








contents her story assigns to mental states play any more an explanatory role than do 
those assigned by Millikan’s. 
Neander (2006; forthcoming, Ch. 7, pp. 20 ff.) identifies excitation of T5(2) 
cells in a toad’s optic tectum as a representation. These cells tend to fire when there is 
a stimulus in the cells’ distal receptive field. Therefore, T5(2) excitation carries 
information about the presence of distal stimuli in this receptive field. But, of course, 
it also carries information about distal stimuli in larger areas encompassing that 
receptive field. And, in a token instance in which a particular distal stimulus-- a 
worm, say-- is stimulating the T5(2) cells, they are carrying information about the 
specific location of the distal stimulus-- a location smaller, but still within, the cells’ 
receptive field. So, Neander asks: does the excitation of T5(2) cells represent a 
location consisting of their distal receptive field, an area larger than that field, or the 
smaller portion of that field where a worm is in fact located?  
Neander answers that the representation has as part of its content the location 
of the cells’ distal receptive field. Otherwise, she claims, we’ll be unable to explain 
aspects of the toad’s behavior. Toads tend to orient themselves toward the distal 
receptive fields of their T5(2) cells when they receive certain stimuli. Our explanation 
of this behavior would be inadequate if we claim that the T5(2) cells represented an 
area larger than their receptive field: it would leave it a mystery as to why the toad 
tends to orient only toward the receptive field of the cells, and not as frequently to 
locations outside of those fields. Were the T5(2) cells to represent the precise location 








toad frequently orients to some other location within the distal receptive field rather 
than the precise location of the stimulus.  
By process of elimination, it must be that T5(2) cell activation represents the 
distal receptive field of the cells. Assigning content to T5(2) excitation as of a smaller 
region of the of the distal field, or a larger region encompassing the distal field not 
only would be explanatorily impotent, but would seem to interfere with explanations 
of why the toad orients itself as it does. 
However, it’s not clear to me that assigning representational content as of the 
distal field of the T5(2) cells helps with any explanations either. Neander seems to 
think that it may explain why the frog orients itself toward the distal field of T5(2) 
cells when they are stimulated. I suppose the explanation is supposed to be something 
like the following. 
The explanandum is that ceteris paribus, the frog orients toward the distal 
field of its T5(2) cells when there is something in that field. The explanans is that It is 
because the frog represents that something is located in the receptive field of the 
T5(2) cells that it orients itself toward that space. So, T5(2) representations with 
contents as of the distal field explain the frog’s orientation behavior. 
2.2.1 Motivating Intentional Attribution 
 
There’s a worry that this argument relies on a false trichotomy. Just because 
attributing representation of extra-receptive-field locations or precise locations within 
the receptive field proves explanatorily fruitless, it does not follow that attributing 








want a reason as to why we should attribute any intentional content at all to the T5(2) 
excitation. 
To this worry, Neander writes:  
if...brain states have the function of carrying information, then they 
have intensional states insofar as they are not extensional.“ (2006, 
p.169).  
 
It’s not immediately clear why informational states must be intensional (with an “s”!). 
After all, the sort of “natural information” Neander has in mind here, coming from 
Dretske (1981) often doesn’t individuate information intensionally. In this sense, 
smoke carries information about whatever has caused it in extension-- under whatever 
description that may be. 
To understand why Neander takes such informational states to be individuated 
intensionally (with an “s”!), we need to take a further look at her account of toad 
visual systems. Neander (2006; forthcoming, Ch. 7) recounts that toads orient toward 
“worm-like” stimuli with elongated, rectangular shape moving parallel to their long 
axis, but not to such shapes moving perpendicular to that axis, or to other shapes, 
such as squares.  
Since elongated shapes moving parallel to their long axis are usually worms, 
centipedes, and other foodstuffs in the toad’s usual environment, responding to such 
shapes functions to allow toads to capture their prey. Presumably, this capacity to 
orient toward such shapes was selected because of its ability to get nutritious things in 
the toad’s digestive tract. Orienting the frog toward food is the Proper function of 








have a representation with the content ‘food’ or ‘nutrient package’ or something 
similar. 
Neander however, argues that we should instead take the toad to represent 
something like ‘oblong shape moving parallel to its long axis.’ After all, the toad can 
fail to identify food when relying on this strategy of orienting and snapping at such 
shapes. Experimenters get the toad to orient toward non-nutritious cardboard shapes, 
and nutritious millipedes would fail to evince the response were they stunned and 
dragged perpendicular to their long axis. Thus, Neander writes: 
the capacity that is possessed by the toad, as opposed to the 
capacity that is merely approximated, is what must be explained by 
a functional analysis of the relevant capacity. What the toad 
possesses is a capacity to recognize a certain configuration of 
visible features. What the toad does not possess is a capacity to 
recognize nutritive potential. (forthcoming, Ch.7, p. 31) 
  
The virtue of Neander’s account seems to be that she is able to capture 
counterfactual generalizations about the toad. Counterfactually, the toad responds 
differentially to a particular configuration of visual features, but not to properties of 
being nutritious. The ability to respond systematically to nutritious stimuli is only a 
“capacity that is merely approximated” in virtue of nutritious things contingently co-
varying with certain configurations of visual features. 
It must be this ability to track counter-factual generalizations that Neander is 
pointing to when she argues that states with the function of carrying information are 
intensional (with an “s”!). Sure, any given instance in which a worm causes T5-2 








counterfactually, T5-2 firings carry information about a particular combination of 
visual features, and information about worms only incidentally. Thus, we can specify 
the information the firings function to carry intensionally (with an “s”!) as the 
property of oblong shapes moving parallel to their long axes. 
Specifying the information carrying functions of the toad’s states in these 
terms allows Neander to give a description of the toad that coheres more with the 
counterfactual generalizations of cognitive science than our folk psychological 
intuitions. She writes: 
Price [2001] appeals to the Davidsonian claim that rationalizing 
behavior is the purpose of intentional ascriptions in folk 
psychology, and claims that a frog (and by extrapolation a toad) 
would be irrational if it were to eat a dummy stimulus if it did not 
think that it was food. Perhaps rationalizing behavior is the point of 
content ascriptions in folk psychology, but the point of content 
ascriptions in cognitive neuropsychology is not to rationalize 
behavior. The point is to explain cognitive capacities. And, 
whatever the folk might think, the toad does not need to know 
about food as such, and nor does it know about food as such. As 
Jerry Fodor puts it, ‘[t]he mathematics of survival comes out 
precisely the same either way.’ (forthcoming, Ch. 7, p. 32) 
 
Thus, she avoids simply assigning intentional content in a manner that simply 
comports with our folk psychological intuitions, or the interest-relative norms we 
might ascribe to the toad, as Millikan’s strategy seems to.  
2.2.2 Intentional Attribution 
 
Nonetheless, it’s unclear what explanatory benefit there is in attributing 








“s”!) characterization of the information that they carry counterfactually. To see why, 
we should look to Neander’s key claim that “normative aboutness is born [by] 
inheriting its norms from… functions and the aboutness from… natural, factive 
information” (forthcoming, Ch.4, p. 36). 
Here, functions are attributed to organisms as a solution to what Neander calls 
the “generalization problem”: the “need to find useful general descriptions of the 
operation of kinds or types of living systems” (Ch.3, p.23). For Neander, an ideally 
functioning organism is 
a system in which all of the traits (parts, entities or structural 
elements) that were selected for doing something can (i.e., possess 
the disposition to) do what they were selected for doing (Ch. 3, 
p.24) 
 
Thus, organisms with a diverse range of physiological variety can be described in 
terms of their deviation from this ideally functioning exemplar. For example, the 
function of the T5-2 cells in toads  is to co-vary with certain stimuli. But, they may 
fail to fulfill that functions in an abnormal toad that, for example, has an ablated 
thalamus. So, functional characterizations of creatures do have a normative 
component. A toad with an oblated thalamus would be failing to function correctly 
relative to an ideally functioning toad.  
Insofar as we can specify that states of the toad carry information about 
worm-like shapes, intensionally specified (with an “s”!), the information carrying 
properties of mental states also have aboutness in some sense. So, combining these 








2 states have intentional content (with a “t”!). 
As we’ve seen, T5-2 cells have the capacity to carry a diverse variety of 
natural information. In different circumstances, they may carry information about 
worms, about cardboard cutouts, about millipedes, etc. If the intentional content of a 
T5-2 state is going to inherit its aboutness from the natural information it carries, we 
need some way of privileging some of this information over others. As we’ve seen, 
Neander points out that, in general, the T5-2 states co-vary counterfactually with 
particular visual features more robustly than any of the other things they contingently 
carry information about. Thus, we can take the aboutness of the information T5-2 
states carry to be something like ‘worm-like shapes moving parallel to their long 
axes.’  
In an ideally functioning toad, T5-2 states function to carry this information. 
So, if a toad’s T5-2 states fail to carry information about those visual properties, they 
are falling short of the normative strictures on their function. 
Putting the aboutness of information and normativity of function together, 
then, we can say that T5-2 states have intentional content as of ‘worm-like shapes 
moving parallel to their long axes.’ Attributing such an intentional content to the toad 
allows allows us to capture the generalizations that (1) counterfactually, T5-2 states 
tend to co-vary with particular worm-like visual properties and (2) T5-2 states that 
fail to covary with such properties are in error insofar as they don’t comport with 
their ideal function. 








intentional content. We can generalize that T5-2 states respond differentially to 
particular visual stimuli simply by, as we did earlier, noting that fact! We can explain 
why sometimes this co-variance breaks down by noting that sometimes a particular 
toad falls short of its functional ideal for various reasons (e.g., an ablated thalamus). 
Indeed, if attributing intentional content amounts to attributing a function to 
carry information across counterfactual circumstances, it’s unclear what explanatory 
role it might have that can’t be filled simply by the conjunction of functional 
explanations and natural information explanations. Toads capture prey by having 
states that function to process the retinal information that tends to co-vary with the 
shape their prey. That is, ceteris paribus, the states of the frog co-vary with worm-
like stimuli impinging on the retina. If saying that toads capture their prey because 
they represent the oblong shapes of their prey is just a way of glossing the previous 
sentence, it’s unclear how the intentional idiom is any more than just that: a manner 
of speaking. 
If the intentional attribution is doing any explanatory work, the error states it 
attributes to the toad should enable generalizations that we couldn’t otherwise get. 
But, again, it’s hard to see what these would be. A toad that has its T5-2 cells 
stimulated in just the right way, by whatever means, will orient in a certain direction. 
Whether that stimulation was the result of some distal worm, some worm-like shape 
projected on the retina, or direct electrical stimulation of the T5-2 cells themselves 
makes no difference to this generalization. Yet, Neander’s theory would have it that 








because in that case (arguably) the toad was not functioning ideally. It’s not obvious 
what this nomenclature does for us beside being a useful notation for instances in 
which the toad is functioning ideally and those in which it’s not. 
Actually, the situation is more complicated. I’ve until now been glossing over 
an ambiguity in what Neander means when she says the toad represents “a certain 
configuration of visible features”. This gloss on the content is ambiguous between a 
distal and a proximal reading. On the distal reading, the “visible features” are features 
of the distal stimulus itself. Under this reading, T5-2 states carry information that 
worms, cardboard cutouts, etc. themselves have the property of being rectangular and 
moving parallel to their long axes. Under the proximal reading, “visible features” are 
properties of the proximal retinal stimuli. Under this reading, T5-2 states carry 
information about such proximal properties. I’ve been assuming the proximal reading. 
But, Neander (2012, pp.33-35) argues for a “distality principle” such that a 
given state represents distal worm-like motion rather than proximal worm-like 
stimulation of the retina. This is because, she argues, T5-2 states are sensitive to such 
proximal stimuli only in order to thereby be sensitive to distal worm-like motion6. 
Therefore, only situations in which T5-2 firings are occasioned by actual distal worm-
like motion are “correct” tokens: states caused by direct stimulation of the retina or 





6 This prescription, Neander argues, does not require the Millikan reading that the toad represents 
nutritious foodstuffs as such because it is sensitive to worm-like motion only insofar as to thereby be 
sensitive to nutritious foodstuffs. This “distality principle” is only to be applied to disambiguate distal 








direct stimulation of T5-2 cells themselves are “incorrect.” 
But, again, it’s unclear how this change in attributing correctness and 
incorrectness to T5-2 states buys us any explanatory power. We know that worm-like 
movements projected on the retina will have the same effect as distal worm-like 
motions presented to the retina. Yet, we call one instance correct and the other 
incorrect. This asymmetry in intentional idiom doesn’t seem to track any asymmetry 
in the actual operations of the toad. Whether the toad’s system tokens T5-2 states 
correctly or incorrectly doesn’t seem to make any difference as to how the toad 
operates. We can give a description of the toad’s behavior in complete abstraction 
from whether its states are correct or incorrect-- merely applying these as labels 
according to Neander’s prescriptions after the fact.  
Now, one thing that’s problematic with Neander’s account of toad vision is 
that the state to which she’s assigning intentional content has already been type-
individuated independently of its intentional content-- in neurophysiological terms as 
the firing of T5-2 cells. Thus, since our description of the toad in this instance seems 
to be done entirely at the neurophysiological level, we might expect that of course 
whatever content we assign to the T5-2 cell firings will be inconsequential for the 
purposes of the explanation at hand. But, that in itself is not reason to reject 
Neander’s theory of content. It may be that her theory of content constitution is 
correct-- even if the content assigned to T5-2 states just happens to be inefficacious in 
the context of the current explanation. 








individuate in neurophysiological terms. Perhaps it’s implemented by different neural 
structures within and across subjects. Does Neander’s theory of content constitution 
help explain the workings of M? 
We may once again assume that M has a counterfactually robust, though not 
perfect, disposition to co-vary with, as Neander puts it, “a certain configuration of 
visible features.” Thus, we may take this as the content Neander would have us 
attribute to M. Again assume that the distality principle holds, so M represents distal 
instances of these features, even though it could be tokened by the projection of such 
features on the retina. Moreover, M was selected for its ability to covary with such 
distal stimuli. 
So, any instance in which M activates in the absence of such stimuli will be an 
incorrect tokening of M. So, instances in which M fires in the presence of a square 
cardboard cutout will be incorrect, but instances in which it fires in the presence of a 
worm-like cardboard cutout will be correct. Nonetheless, we know by stipulation that 
M will usually fire in the presence of worm-like-motion-- but sometimes will not.  
Whether those firings are correct or incorrect has no bearing on explaining 
any other aspects of the toad’s behavior. M firings will evince the same behavior in 
the toad whether they are correct or incorrect. We can even type-individuate M states 
as such without appeal to their intentional content. We can just point to the ability of 
M states to robustly counterfactually co-vary with worm-like stimuli (whether 
proximal or distal). A toad has M states iff it has such states.  








in terms of the information that a state functions to counterfactually carry does not in 
seem like the most explanatorily useful characterization. Just as they do for Millikan, 
the ascription of intentional states in Neander’s semantics seems merely to note, post 
hoc, generalizations that have been made without recourse to intentional properties.  
As such, this notion of content does not seem suited to explaining many 
phenomena that on their face seem amenable to an intentional explanation. For 
example, Georges Rey (2012) has noted that if explanations of the early visual 
system employ representations of geometric objects, or explanations of language 
processing employ representations of words and phonemes, then these states never 
carry natural information about the things they represent-- to do so is impossible, as 
cylinders and phonemes just don’t exist! It’s in just these cases in which we can’t 
appeal to the natural information that mental states carry that it seems like attributing 
intentional content would be helpful. Neander’s account can’t explain how we can 
have representations of such inexistent objects.7 
So, while Millikan’s consumer teleosemantics focuses on the functions for 
which certain mental states were selected, and Neander’s production teleosemantics 
focuses on the counterfactual causal antecedents of mental states, both give an 
account of intentional states that robs them of explanatory power. Both accounts 





7 If Rey’s examples are too outré for your taste consider representations of souls and God. Only highly 
abnormal, educated humans represent these things as extant iff they actually are. Normal humans 








ascribe intentional content to states in such a way that the ascription merely takes note 
of generalizations that can be made independently of any actual intentional properties.  
2.3 Burge: Neo-Aristotelian Teleo-Ethological Semantics 
 
Tyler Burge enunciates a variation of the teleosemantic view in his latest 
(2010) tome. Unlike Millikan and Neander, Burge is explicitly concerned with 
ensuring that the intentional properties of representations play an ineliminable role in 
psychological explanation. Because he is so sensitive to this issue, it’s remarkable 
that his account of intentional states seems on the face of it not to allow for such an 
explanatory role. 
Burge also is unique in not giving a reductive account of intentional content. 
Moreover, he thinks that the vertical problem is not a problem at all, and 
consequently disparages attempts at solving it. But, while he does not have a fully 
fledged theory laying out the constitutive conditions of having a state with a 
particular content, he does lay down some curious strictures on how the contents of 
perceptual states are to be individuated. 
Burge writes: “Psychological explanation is framed to fit with explanation in 
zoology and ethology” (322). Insofar as his claim is that psychological explanation 
aims to be consistent with other levels of scientific explanation, the claim is 
uncontroversial. But, Burge means something much stronger. His claim is that 
organisms can only represent in perception properties that feature in zoological and 








fly parts, bee-bees, holograms, or shapes moving on a screen as such because these 
things: 
are clearly outliers in the environments in which the perceptual 
systems evolved. They are not among the typical causal agents 
interacting with individuals’ perceptual systems in fulfillment of 
individual biological functions. (p. 465) 
 
Thus, psychology must mesh with biology by only attributing representations 
of entities that play a role in fulfilling biological functions.8 Why Burge supposes 
this, and indeed, just what sort of “biological functions” count for these purposes is 
unclear. 
His motivation seems to be an attempt to dissolve the “gavagai” problem 
raised by Quine and the disjunction problem raised by Fodor and other theorists of 
intentionality that Burge denigrates as working in the “deflationary tradition.”9 The 
disjunction problem is the seeming difficulty of discerning the appropriate correctness 
conditions from amongst a disjunction of possible conditions. Thus, given that frogs 
snap at both flies and bee-bees, we might wonder whether the frog incorrectly tokens 
“fly” representations in the presence of bee-bees, correctly tokens “fly or bee-bee” 
representations in the presence of both, or whether it has representations with some 





8. Burge does not deny that humans, or frogs, for that matter, can represent things at a  conceptual level 
that do not help them fulfill biological functions. His claim is only that such representations never 
feature in early perceptual states. If they do pop up, it is in in downstream, global, conceptual 
processes. See p. 101.  
9. It’s odd that Burge applies this deflationist label to Fodor, who has, far from deflating problems of 








other correctness conditions.  
Burge wants to circumvent the problem by claiming that the frog represents 
flies because only they are “among the typical causal agents interacting with 
individuals’ perceptual systems in fulfillment of individual biological functions” 
(465). In the normal environments in which frogs evolved, flies serve as prey and 
provide nutrients for frogs, whereas bee-bees do not. Therefore, it’s appropriate to 
ascribe “fly” representations, but not “fly-or-bee-bee” representations to the frogs. 
Therefore, we should explain why frogs snap at bee-bees by claiming that they are 
incorrectly representing the bee-bees as flies.  
But, it just doesn’t seem to be the case that states that have correctness 
conditions that are true of flies but not bee-bees allows us to make any generalizations 
or predictions we would not otherwise be able to make. The frog in fact snaps at both 
flies and bee-bees. Counterfactually, it would seem, the frog will snap whenever it 
receives proximal stimuli of the kind provided by flies and bee-bees. To call some of 
these snappings correct and others incorrect does not allow us to capture any 
generalizations beyond these.  
To be sure, any explanation of an organism’s cognition should explain how it 
is that it behaves as it does in its normal environment. It’s not prima facie obvious, 
however, that doing so requires that organisms only represent things that tend to crop 
up in their normal environments.  
Moreover, Burge seems worried that fixing content via counterfactual 









The range of objects of perception, and the environmental grounds 
for explaining constitutive conditions for a state's having the 
perceptual content it has, are constrained by factors beyond the 
animal's discriminative capacity (which leaves open too wide a 
range to determine what an animal perceives and how). The range 
is also constrained by the needs and activities of whole 
individuals—eating, predating, mating, navigating, fleeing, 
parenting, nesting, and so on. The science of perception explicitly 
leans on such a constraint. (319-320) 
 
It’s unclear again why we should suppose perceptual science is committed to such a 
constraint, or indeed why relying on general counterfactual discriminative capacities 
won’t fill the bill. 
3. Cummins, Gallistel, & Ramsey: Functional Homomorphisms 
A second family of answers to the vertical question has it that the content of 
intentional states are constituted by functional homomorphisms between those states 
and objects in the environment. Proponents of this view have done an admirable job 
pointing out the ways in which structural correspondence between mental and 
worldly states can explain how creatures get around in the world. However, they fail 
to establish that intentional properties add any predictive or generative power to our 
explanations over and above what mere correspondence itself provides.  
Cummins (1989) begins with the assumption that “mental representation 
explains how systems manage to get into states that covary with states of the world” 
(87). This assumption immediately faces two challenges. First, on the face of it, it 








at. If people like Rey (2012) and Mendelovici (2013) are correct, there may be many 
phenomena representations explain even though the representations are not about 
anything that actually exists! If the objects of representations don’t exist in the first 
place, it’s hard to see how they would be useful explaining how we come to covary 
with non-existent states of the world! But, perhaps theorists of intentional inexistents 
are just wrong: perhaps representational states without existent objects are not 
required by our best psychology. In any case, Cummins is burdened to argue that they 
are not. 
Secondly, Given that there are on the face of it lots of ways for two systems to 
co-vary with one another, Cummins also owes us an account of the particular sort of 
covariance that requires the positing of intentional states for its explanation. As we’ve 
noted, the mercury in a thermometer comes to covary with the ambient temperature-- 
but this sort of covariation doesn’t seem to require explanation in terms of intentional 
states.  
In any event, it’s unclear that Cummins ever actually sets about defending the 
above claim that intentional states explain the covariation of mental states with states 
of the world. Most of his work goes into showing that thinking of the intentional talk 
used in cognitive science as talk about functional homomorphisms can account for 
how that talk is deployed. He does not demonstrate how thinking about functional 
homomorphisms as instantiating intentional properties can add to the explanatory 
power of cognitive science. 








conditions obtain. There is a mental system of operations and an interpretation, I, that 
maps each component of that system onto some object in the world. There’s further a 
function, f, that ranges over these worldly objects. If there is a function, g, which the 
mental system satisfies, and which is isomorphic to the function, f, then the 
components of g represent the components of f to which the interpretation maps them. 
So, for example, the buttons and display states of a calculator represent numbers 
because there is a function, g, that maps button presses onto display states, and that 
function is isomorphic to the addition function that obtains between numbers.  
Gallistel (1990) picks up largely the same notion of representation in his 
explanation of animal cognition. An animal represents a domain when there is an 
isomorphic mapping between entities and relations in the animal’s brain and entities 
and relations in its environment. So, for example, if the firing rate of a neuron 
covaries with an animal’s velocity along the north-south axis, and that of another 
neuron covaries with velocity along the east-west axis, the neurons represent the 
animal’s velocity in cardinal space (31).  
Thus, the Cummins/Gallistel view is a version of inferential role semantics. 
It’s only when the relations amongst mental states isomorphically mirror the relations 
amongst things in the world that those states represent anything. However, it’s 
unclear how ascribing intentional properties to such states increases the explanatory 
power of our accounts of cognition. 
Cummins writes that interpreting a computational system so as to ascribe 








mere state crunching (button-pressing-to-display-transitions) and addition” (94). He 
gives the example of a mechanical artefact discovered by an archaeologist. 
Discovering that states of the artefact can be isomorphically mapped onto the function 
for addition explains what the machine does: it’s an adding machine (95).  
Of course, in this example, the discovery of an interpretation under which 
states of the machine map isomorphically onto elements of the addition function does 
not explain how the machine itself works. Presumably, in order to discover the 
isomorphism in the first place, the archaeologist would need a complete description 
of the machine’s operations independent of the interpretation mapping its operations 
onto the addition function. What the interpretation allows the archaeologist to do is 
explain why a person designed the machine to work as it does. The existence of the 
isomorphism is a clue that the designer of the machine intended that the machine be 
used as an adding machine. 
So, there’s a crucial disanalogy between the explanatory role of intentional 
states as ascribed to the archaeological artefact and the intentional states ascribed to 
psychological systems. The archaeologist ascribes intentional states to the artefact by 
way of explaining the behavior of the machine’s creator. The intentional properties do 
not add any generalizations or predictions about the behavior of the machine itself.  
When psychologists assign intentional states to mental processes, if they are to 
do any explanatory work at all, they are to make just these generalizations and 
predictions about the behavior of the mental processes themselves. Psychologists do 








putative creator! Cummins’ archaeology example does not illuminate how intentional 
states qua states of isomorphic functions are to add to the explanatory power of 
cognitive psychology. 
If there is no account to be had of how intentional states qua states of 
isomorphic functions are to increase the explanatory power of psychology, then 
Cummins has deflated the horizontal question: intentional states do no explanatory 
work in psychology. Sometimes Cummins himself seems to allow as much: 
“Representation, in this context, is simply a convenient way of talking about an 
aspect of successful simulation” (95). That is, attribution of intentional states is 
merely nominal. What’s doing the real explanatory work is the correspondence 
between structures of the mental process and structures in the world such that one can 
be said to “simulate” the other. 
It’s merely a way of noting that a correspondence obtains between states of 
the world and a computational system. It does not explain how the computational 
system comes to covary with the system to which it corresponds. It’s merely a 
convenient way of thinking about the correspondence. There may well be an 
interpretation under which states of magnetotaxic bacteria correspond with states of 
water oxygenation. By Cummins’ lights, this is sufficient to constitute states of the 
bacteria as representations of the oxygenation of the water. But it’s unclear how 
ascribing intentional properties to them in this way does any explanatory work. It 









3.1 Ramsey’s ‘Job Description’ 
William M. Ramsey (2007) advances two additional arguments for thinking that 
isomorphic accounts of representation play an explanatory role in cognitive science. 
First, they make sense of how complex computational processes decompose into 
more simple computational processes. Secondly, they explain how creatures with 
such isomorphic states successfully navigate their environments. 
Unlike the figures examined above, Ramsey is explicitly committed not to the 
vertical project of reducing intentionality to non-intentional terms, but to the 
horizontal project of describing the explanatory role representational states play in 
cognitive science. He calls this project the “job description challenge,” viz.: 
some account of just how the structure’s possession of intentional 
content is (in some way) relevant to what it does in the cognitive 
system (p. 27) 
 
Nonetheless, his considerations of the role of intentional content fail to meet his own 
challenge. 
3.1.1 Explaining Compositionality 
 
The first way in which homomorphic representations are supposed to meet 
this challenge is to account for the decompositional structure of computational 
processes. Consider a system that takes pairs of inputs and outputs single states such 
that these states homomorphically map onto the process of multiplication. That is, 
there is a homomorphic mapping from states to numbers such that the output state 
always maps to the number corresponding to the product of the numbers the two input 








Ramsey notes that such a machine would have to employ some particular 
algorithm in order to instantiate this function. For example, suppose it receives the 
states mapped to 7 and 3 as input. It might, for example, then instantiate the state 
mapped to 7 twice, output a state mapped to 14, and then instantiate the 7 state a third 
time before outputting a state mapped to 21. We can best make sense of how the 
output of the machine corresponds to the product of the input by understanding that 
intermediate states of the machine correspond to the process of repeatedly adding the 
inputs.  
Ramsey claims that unless we take states of the above system as being about 
numbers, “we couldn’t understand how the system succeeds by breaking a large 
computational operation down into related sub-operations” (pp.75-76). Attributing 
intentional content to computational states in some way makes sense of how certain 
computations can be interpreted as carrying out processes (like multiplication) in 
virtue of carrying out other computations (like adding). Thus, 
It is both explanatorily useful and informative to see a sub-system 
of a multiplier as an adder. It is not so useful or informative to see 
it as a mere syntactic shape shifter (p. 76, my emphasis) 
 
This formulation of Ramsey’s conclusion is ambiguous. On the one hand, it 
may be that without intentional content, we would not be able to explain how 
computational processes that are homomorphic to the multiplication function over 
integers in virtue of being homomorphic over the addition function. Alternatively, the 
claim could just be that it’s pragmatically useful for scientists to “see” the 








Ramsey recognizes this ambivalence in the formulation of his conclusion. He 
puts the dilemma this way: 
It seems these notions of representation serve as representations 
not for the system, but for the psychologists attempting to 
understand the system in a certain way (p.98). 
 
It may be that psychologists stand in the same relation to psychological 
systems as we stand toward, say, compasses. States of the compass have intentional 
content insofar as we interpret them as such-- but the states don’t have any original 
content independent of our activity. If that’s the case, Ramsey doesn’t have a solution 
to our problem-- namely, what is the role of original content in cognitive science? 
Ramsey maintains, nonetheless, that the intentional content he attributes in 
virtue of these homomorphisms is original in this sense. He points out that we could 
not explain how intentional accounts of cognition are intentional unless they make 
use of intentional states: 
There is no discernible way that something could serve as, say, an 
adder, without it also being the case that it converts representations 
of numbers into representations of sums. Without such a 
conversion of representations, it simply wouldn’t be doing addition 
(p. 100). 
 
Ramsey’s claim is indubitably correct, such as it is. But, it begs the question. 
Ramsey seems to be arguing that the explanandum attributing intentional content to 
computational states is supposed to explain is the fact that computational processes 
operate over intentional states. But, precisely what is under question is whether 
computational processes must be characterized in intentional terms. We saw in 








Ramsey makes similar claims multiple times. For example: 
computational processes treat input and output symbolic structures 
a certain way, and that treatment amounts to a kind of job 
assignment-- the job of standing for something else (pp. 76-77) 
 
This job description for intentional content again begs the question. Being about, or 
standing in for, something else just is what it is to be an intentional state. If we 
characterize the job of computational states as being go stand in for other things, we 
have merely assumed that they have intentional content. But, we haven’t given an 
account of what explanatory work-- if any-- that content itself performs. 
3.1.2 Explaining Simulations 
 
So, Ramsey’s above account of the explanatory role of representations begs 
the question. But, he does have another account of how intentional content plays an 
explanatory role in cognitive science. Here, he again points to the ability of 
computational structures to be mapped homomorphically to relations between states 
of the world. 
He asks us to consider Bob (p. 81 ff.), who is trying to figure out who Alice’s 
brother-in-law is. To do so, he consults a family tree diagram that has symbols such 
as “Alice” and “Jim” that map onto people, and other symbols, such as arrows and 
dotted lines, that map onto relations between people, such as being married or 
siblings. In this case, Bob presumably takes the symbols to represent people and the 
familial relations between them. 
Ramsey then (p.84) asks us to suppose that we put Bob in a Searle-style 








to are symbols in a language he doesn’t understand and a series of rules telling him 
how to manipulate the symbols according to their shape. He thus implements a 
computational process that recapitulates the relational structure of both the family tree 
diagram and the familial relations holding between actual persons. Only, in this case, 
Bob himself does not realize that the symbols he’s manipulating bear this 
homomorphism to the world. Nonetheless, he is able to manipulate the symbols 
according to the rules in order to output the symbol that maps to Alice’s brother-in-
law. 
Ramsey argues that we cannot explain Bob’s successful performance on this 
Chinese room style task without appealing to the intentional content of the symbols 
he manipulates. He writes: 
if told only that familial relations were discovered through focused 
attention to shapes and marks on paper, we would find this 
explanation of Bob’s performance grossly inadequate… [W]e 
would still want to know how he was able to achieve success. We 
would want to be told what this arrangement of marks could 
possibly have to do with a familial connection between two people, 
and how it is that making marks on a piece of paper, and focusing 
on their shape, could lead to a discovery of that relationship. (p. 
85) 
 
To me, it seems we could satisfy these wants simply by pointing to the 
fact that the computational structure Bob implements is homomorphic to the 
familial relations holding between Alice and her brother-in-law, Jim. That is 
what the arrangement of marks “has to do with a familial relation.”  








why those markings eventually provide mindless-Bob with a 
solution when he uses them in accordance with the instructions… 
is that the marks on the paper do, in fact, accurately model the real-
world family tree… His scribblings on the paper help generate 
answers because those scribblings share a structural similarity to 
the relevant state of affairs (p. 85). 
 
But, Ramsey then argues that simply noting the homomorphism between the 
computational states and familial relations is not sufficient to explain Bob’s 
performance on the task. He claims: 
We can’t fully understand how mindless-Bob performs the 
operation of figuring out how two people are related unless we 
understand his operations as involving the implementation of a 
model. And to understand his operations as an implementation of a 
model, we need to look at the elements of these operations-- in 
particular, the marks on the page-- as representations of people and 
kinship relations. (p. 85). 
 
Again, this appeal to representational content is ambiguous between an 
instrumentalist and a substantive reading. On the instrumentalist reading, we 
would acknowledge that it’s useful for us, qua theorists, to understand states 
of the model as being about states of the world, just as it’s useful for us, qua 
navigators, to understand states of a compass as being about states of the 
world. But, just as we need not attribute original intentionality to the compass 
to explain its behavior, we need not attribute original intentionality to the 
model to explain its behavior. 
But Ramsey and I are both after a substantive role for intentional 
content in cognitive processes. The above instrumentalist view won’t suffice 








Indeed, Ramsey writes: 
It should not be conceded that the only sense in which classical 
symbols serve as representations in computational processes is the 
artificial “as if” sense that is only metaphorical… a notion of 
representation can do explanatory work, qua representation, even 
in a purely mechanical problem-solving system (p. 90). 
 
So, what is this substantive explanatory work that this homomorphic  
representational content does? Ramsey has two different answers to this 
question.  
The first seems to once again beg the question. The idea seems to be 
that it is in virtue of corresponding homomorphically to states of the world 
that computational systems serve as models or simulations of the world. Since 
being a model or simulation is an intentional notion, we must ascribe 
intentional content to states of the model in order to explain how it is that the 
model is about the phenomenon it models. Ramsey seems to be making this 
argument the passage quoted above in which he claims that we must “look at” 
computational states as representations in order to “understand his operations 
as an implementation of a model.” In a similar vein, he also writes: 
The content of the symbols is explanatorily relevant for their job 
because if the symbols don’t stand for anything, the system in 
which they function can’t itself serve as a model of simulation of 
the target domain. (p. 87) 
 
If all that were meant by “model” or simulation” was the property of 
corresponding homomorphically to a target domain, it seems we could explain how a 








such a homomorphism. So, it would seem, Ramsey takes models and simulations to 
be intentional structures that are essentially about their target domains. In order to 
understand the way in which the model itself is about a domain, we must understand 
how its component parts are about parts of that domain. 
But, if the job of the intentional content of computational states is to constitute 
the intentional content of a computational system as a whole, we have merely pushed 
the key question up one level. We want to know what role intentional content plays in 
cognitive processes. If the answer is that the intentional content of computational 
states explains how it is that computational processes are intentional, then we need an 
account of what role the intentional content of these processes plays in cognitive 
explanation. Ramsey doesn’t offer such an account. Thus, his description of the job of 
intentional content begs the question. It assumes that computational systems have 
intentional content that plays a role in cognitive processes but does not tell us what 
that is. 
Ramsey offers an alternative description of the job of these homomorphic 
representations that is not so question begging, but is nonetheless unsatisfactory. The 
idea here is that the intentional content of computational states explains how it is that 
the processes that use them do so “successfully.” 
Ramsey writes in reference to the Chinese-style room Bob is in: 
[T]he room produces appropriate outputs in response to the inputs 
it receives. Thus, a computational account of the room would need 
to include an explanation of how it consistently does this. Syntactic 








explanation that tells us what it is about those manipulations that 
produces continued success (p.89) 
 
Presumably, the intentional content of the states might help us in this regard. 
Indeed, Ramsey further writes: 
A syntactic story would reveal the process whereby the symbols 
come to be shuffled about in various ways. But it would not tell us 
what it is about those symbol shufflings that leads the system to 
consistently produce the appropriate responses. (p. 90). 
 
Now, no doubt, we must say something else about the syntactic symbol 
manipulation to explain how it interfaces with the external world in a reliable manner. 
But, it’s unclear how intentional content will be any help in this regard. Indeed, as we 
noted before, the homomorphic relation between the computational system and the 
world is sufficient to explain this correspondence to the world. It’s because, ex 
hypothesi, there is a homomorphic mapping between the states of the system and 
familial relations that explains why states of the system can reliably be mapped onto 
states of the world. 
Again, as we’ve seen, much of what Ramsey writes seems to concur with this 
view, e.g.: 
the overall system succeeds by exploiting the organizational 
symmetry that exists between its internal states and some chunk of 
the world (p. 89). 
 
But, if it’s the homomorphic symmetry that explains the success of the system, 
it’s unclear what extra job intentional content is doing. Ramsey might say that it’s in 
virtue of instantiating such a homomorphism that the computational states possess 








plays in explaining the operation of the system. To this, he might retort that ascribing 
intentional content to the computational states explains how the system as a whole is 
about the domain to which it’s homomorphic. But, this is just return to his first job 
description of intentional content, which we saw was question begging. 
So, like Cummins and Gallistel before him, it’s unclear that Ramsey has given 
an account of the role of intentional content that cannot simply be played by the 
relational homomorphic properties of the states to which he assigns it. 
4. Conclusion 
The above attempts at the horizontal project largely falter in that they take intentional 
idiom to merely gloss explanatory roles that have already been characterized 
independently of any appeal to intentional content. If intentional content is to buy us 
explanatory power, it must make available to us explanations that we cannot 
otherwise have. But, none of the accounts we’ve surveyed here give us that. 
For Millikan, intentional idiom records information about Proper functions 
and Normal conditions. But, it does not buy us any explanations that these notions 
themselves couldn’t give us. Similarly, Neander’s teleosemantics tracks 
counterfactual dispositions to carry information had by ideally functioning organisms, 
but doesn’t by explanations that can’t be had simply in terms of natural information 
and ideal function.  
Burge, in contrast, has a notion of intentionality that accords with the things 
organisms interact with as a matter of fact in their normal environments. But, again, 








terms of de facto interactions organisms have with their environments. Similarly, the 
functional homomorphism accounts of Cummins, Gallistel, and Ramsey seem merely 
to record de facto correspondence between computational structures and the 
organism’s environment. The intentional idiom doesn’t buy us explanations we 
couldn’t have simply by pointing to this structural homomorphism. 
Now, for all that, it may be that the vertical, reductive proposals of any one of 
these accounts is in fact correct. Perhaps mental states come to possess intentional 
content in virtue of fulfilling a teleological function or instantiating a functional 
homomorphism to their representata. I don’t take the considerations I’ve raised above 
to have damaged the vertical projects of any of the above accounts beyond repair. My 
argument here is simply that the explanatory work that these theorists have put this 
content to is otiose. If the intentional content they ascribe to mental states is to do 
explanatory work, it must make sense of how the correctness conditions of that 
content buy us explanations we could not have otherwise. 
The next Chapter will examine several putatively intentional systems of 
increasing complexity in order to see at what point an appeal to intentional content is 
useful in explaining a computational system, like a mind. In doing so, we’ll see 
another reason why several of the accounts above fail to offer a useful job description 
for intentional content. 
It will turn out that intentional content is useful in characterizing 
counterfactuals that we could not otherwise. Insofar as Millikan, Burge, and 








relation of a creature to its environment, they will have difficulty characterizing these 
counterfactuals. Alternatively, as we shall see, because theorists like Neander and 
Fodor take intentional content to be sensitive to counterfactuals, they come closer to 








Chapter 3: A Role for Intentional Content 
 
1. Computations Without Representation 
As we’ve noted, given a computational account of a process, we can always abstract 
away from any semantic content and describe the process in merely syntactic terms. 
In Chapter 1, we detailed just how such purely syntactic characterizations might 
work, following suggestions by Piccinini, Stich, Chalmers, and Shagrir. So, if CTM is 
correct, intentional states can play an explanatory role only if they allow us to provide 
explanations or generalizations that we cannot make at this syntactic level of 
description. The theories of intentionality we explored in the last chapter failed to 
provide an explanatory role for intentional states because they failed to give an 
account of generalizations that could only be made by way of positing intentional 
states. The task of the following chapter is to account for just what generalizations 
intentional states can allow us to make that we could not otherwise.  
In what follows, I do not presume to set out the only sort of explanatory 
function that intentional content might play. My goal is merely to demonstrate that-- 
hypothetically-- there are conditions in which intentional content does not add any 
explanatory power to what is otherwise a perfectly good computational explanation of 
cognition. However, there are likewise-- hypothetical-- conditions in which 
intentional content can indeed add real explanatory power to computational 








So, our task is merely to demonstrate that some explanations that employ 
intentional idiom nonetheless do not require intentional content, while others in fact 
do. We want to discover roughly some of the factors that separate the first sort of 
explanations from the second. So, let’s start with an instance of cognition that clearly 
does not require intentional explanation and see how we can modify the case until we 
get to a phenomenon for which positing intentional explanation is illuminating. 
The conclusion we’ll come to is that intentional content is explanatorily otiose 
in processes that can be counterfactually generalized over in terms of properties of 
their proximal input. Intentional content does play an explanatory role, however, in 
making generalizations over systems that are counterfactually sensitive to an 
indefinite disjunction of proximal inputs. 
1. 1. Magnetotaxic Bacteria: Stimulus/Response Mechanisms   
Recall that Millikan’s magnetotaxic bacteria are single cell bacteria with magnetically 
responsive magnetosomes. In the northern hemisphere, these magnetosomes orient 
the bacteria toward magnetic north, which takes them toward the deeper, more 
anaerobic water in which they thrive. 
On the face of it, there are several possible explanations of the bacteria’s 
behavior. It may be that they move in the direction they do because they represent the 
direction North as such, or because they represent the property of being low in 
oxygen, and have a desire to move to places with these properties. Alternatively, it 
may be that the bacteria don’t represent anything at all. We may be able to explain 








Just which explanation in fact applies depends on whether we can generalize 
the bacteria’s behavior in non-intentional terms. If all there was to the bacteria’s 
behavior was this tendency to move toward geomagnetic north, where there happens 
to be more anaerobic water, then of course there would be no need to appeal to 
intentional properties. By hypothesis, the only generalization to make would be the 
one just stated in non-intentional terms!  
But, of course, there are more generalizations to be made about the bacteria’s 
behavior. In the first place, generalizations about the bacteria’s mobility depend on 
counterfactual circumstances. Sometimes, they move toward geomagnetic north even 
though the water there is not more anaerobic. If a bar magnet is introduced in their 
environment, they will swim toward its south pole10, regardless of its orientation 
relative to geomagnetic north. In the second place, there are generalizations 
concerning how the bacteria generate this behavior. It is not a fundamental physical 
fact of the universe that magnetotaxic bacteria swim as they do. They all swim as they 
do because they all instantiate some common mechanism that causes their behavior.  
So, in order to capture these generalizations about the counterfactual 
supporting aspects of behavior, and generalizations about the implementation of that 
behavior, it may indeed be necessary to appeal to intentional states. It all depends on 













just what these generalizations are. So, we need to look more closely at just what 
generalizations there are to make about these magnetotaxic bacteria. 
The magnetosomes in such bacteria are simply chains of magnetic crystals 
(usually iron oxide or sulfide) embedded in their cytoplasm11. These magnets orient 
the bacteria along geomagnetic field lines (or local field lines, if, say, a bar magnet is 
introduced in their environment). When the bacteria move by means of their flagella, 
they therefore move only parallel to magnetic field lines. It is as though they have 
tiny compass needles embedded in them that determine which direction they move. 
The bacteria are not drawn to areas of increasing magnetic force: their magnetosomes 
merely determine the direction that their mechanical movement will take them. 
So, in general, the bacteria swim in a direction parallel to geomagnetic field 
lines because the magnetic crystals embedded in them orient them in that direction. 
We can thus make all the generalizations we want about the bacteria’s magneto taxis 
without appealing to intentional states. We can make the generalization solely in 
terms of the proximal magnetic field stimulus impinging on the bacteria and the 
physical properties of the crystals embedded in the bacteria. 
However, the reason that intentional properties are not required in this 
explanation is not because there is an explanatory level at which we can explain the 
behavior of an individual bacterium in terms of its physiology. Any particular 













instance of a physiological organism’s behavior can be explained physiologically---- 
or quantum mechanically for that matter---- without adverting to intentional 
properties. If intentional properties are to explain anything, it will be generalizations 
that hold across individual behaviors within or amongst organisms. I am not making 
the relatively facile argument that the mere existence of an account of behavior at a 
physiological or brute physical level obviates the need for intentional properties.   
  Rather, what’s striking in the case of the magnetotaxic bacteria is that there 
don’t seem to be any such generalizations that require intentional explanation. Any 
generalizations about magnetotaxic behavior occurring within one bacterium or 
amongst many can be captured in terms of the physiological makeup of the 
magnetosomes. The reason why at different times the same bacterium moves parallel 
to magnetic field lines, and its conspecifics do the same, is that they all have 
magnetosomes with a physical makeup that position them parallel to magnetic field 
lines.  
Compare the bacteria’s behavior to that of a human walking toward magnetic 
north. Of course, for any given instance of this behavior, there will be some physical 
story to tell concerning the physiological effects of stimuli impinging on the human’s 
body. However, it seems on the face of it that this story will be very different in 
different cases. The human could be walking north because she’s looked at a compass 
needle, the stars, moss growing on the side of trees, or an indefinite disjunction of 
different stimuli. Presumably, each of these relations to distal stimuli involve 








physiological changes within her. If we are going to explain, in each case, how it is 
she travels toward magnetic north, we’re going to have to make generalizations over 
something other than the proximal stimuli impinging on her.  
Contrasting the cases of the bacteria and humans suggests a hypothesis. In the 
case that generalizations about an organism’s behavior can be made in terms of the 
proximal stimuli impinging on it (as with the bacteria), then intentional states won’t 
be explanatorily efficacious. If, however, generalizations about its behavior cannot be 
made in terms of proximal stimuli, then intentional properties may help to do so. 
To examine the first part of this hypothesis, let us look at some more complex 
cases of behavior that can nonetheless be generalized over in terms of proximal 
stimuli. In all cases, we’ll see that although the behavior effected by the proximal 
stimuli may be much more complex than that evinced in the bacteria, as long as it can 
still be characterized in terms of the proximal stimuli that eventuate it, there will be 
no unique contribution for intentional states to make. 
In section 2, we’ll look at some examples of behavior that cannot be 
generalized over in terms of the proximal stimuli bringing it about and lay out an 
account of how intentional states can help to make generalizations over such 
behavior. 
1.2. Physarum: proximal problem solving 
An example of a creature with slightly more complex and flexible behavior that can 
nonetheless be explained without invocation of intentional content is the slime mold 








without a central nervous system. It moves by way of small oscillating units of its 
membrane that help distribute its cytoplasm. When attractants, such as food 
molecules, bind with receptors on its membrane, the surrounding oscillators vibrate 
more quickly, causing cytoplasm to flow toward them, and moving Physarum in that 
direction. When detractors, such as light and salt, bind with the membrane, the 
surrounding oscillators reduce the frequency of their vibration, preventing Physarum 
from moving further in the direction the detractors were detected.  
Physarum’s navigational abilities not only allow it to generally acquire food 
and avoid aversive stimuli, but to navigate a U-maze! Imagine a petri dish containing 
a well of attractive sugar solution at the bottom that diffuses through agar on the dish, 
so that the concentration of sugar molecules decreases radially as distance from the 
well increases. If Physarum is placed at the upper end of the petri dish, its chemotaxis 
should take it directly toward the sugar well, as its oscillators oscillate with greater 
and greater frequency the closer they get to the sugar solution.  
If, however, a U-shaped barrier is placed between Physarum and the sugar, we 
should expect it to get trapped in the U, unable to reach the sugar. Physarum would 
head in the direction of increasing sugar concentration before running into the bottom 
of the U. It then might move to the left or right only to be stopped by the arms of the 
U. Any attempts to get out of the U would require it to move back up, in the direction 
of decreasing sugar concentration. But, its chemotaxis mechanism, as we’ve 
described it thus far, only allows it to move in the direction of increasing attractive 








But, that’s not what happens. Physarum is able to get around the U-maze and 
continue toward the sugar. It so happens that Physarum leaves in its wake an 
extracellular slime, to which it itself is averse. So, Physarum tends not to return to 
places it has been before because they are coated in this slime, which inhibits the 
oscillation of its oscillators.  
Suppose Physarum enters the U from the left. Once Physarum has explored 
the bottom of the U-maze, it can move up and out of it on the right side, avoiding its 
own slime trail. Even though the chemical attraction of the sugar is not as great 
toward the top of the U, the detraction of the slime Physarum leaves at the bottom of 
the U is sufficient for what little oscillation the sugar molecules toward the top 
engender to be greater than that had by parts of Physarum close to the slime at the 
bottom of the U. 
Because they have shown that Physarum can navigate a U-maze, Reid et al. 
claim that it has a “spatial ‘memory.’” Their own use of scare quotes around 
“memory” may indicate that they in fact balk at actually attributing intentional states 
to the slime mold. But, it’s clear that we can use intentional idiom to describe the 
slime mold’s behavior. Why is it able to solve the U-maze? Because it represents 
where it has been and decides not to go back. The question before us is whether that 
intentional idiom is picking out any intentional properties that actually do play a role 
in explaining Physarum’s behavior, or whether it’s just a convenient figure of speech. 
Can we make all the generalizations we want about Physarum’s behavior in 








known about the precise details of the mechanism by which these chemical stimuli 
influence the rate of oscillation in Physarum. One hypothesis (Whiting et al., 2014) is 
that the various stimulants variously inhibit and promote the production of the 
chemicals cAMP and Ca2+, which may determine the rate of Physarum’s membrane 
oscillation. There may be separate types of oscillator corresponding to different 
stimuli, or just one type, which can be manipulated in different ways by various 
stimuli. There’s some reason to think the latter hypothesis is correct because of the 
way in which attractive and repulsive stimuli interact (ibid.). When Physarum is 
stimulated by both an attractant (oat flake) and a repellant (light) at the same location, 
it tends to generally cease oscillating. Because the two stimuli seem able to cancel 
one another out, a possible explanation is that the light stimuli somehow blocks the 
mechanism by which the oat flake could cause the oscillation to increase (ibid.). 
Despite not knowing the precise physiological mechanism mediating proximal 
stimuli and the response of Physarum’s oscillators, we can characterize the 
counterfactual generalizations between them without resorting to intentional states. 
Physarum will always move in the direction of the greatest oscillation of its 
oscillators, where that oscillation is determined by the molecular make-up of the 
oscillators and the stimuli. This generalization describes how Physarum gets around 
in normal environments, and how it navigates the somewhat outré environments with 
U-mazes. No intentional properties are needed to explain its navigational capacities.  
So, if we want a case in which intentional properties are doing some 








about organisms’ behavior that seem to obtain despite differences in the underlying 
physical conditions of the behavior.  
1.3. Cataglyphis: Computational Explanation 
For such an example, look to the desert ant, Cataglyphis fortis, referenced by Burge 
(2010). More recent research than that Burge references (e.g. Steck et al. (2009) and 
Wittlinger et al. (2007))  indicates that the behavioral capacities of the ant may be a 
bit more complex than Burge makes them out to be. But, for present purposes, let’s 
look at the behavior of this ant as characterized by Burge, as a useful thought 
experiment for examining the conditions under which intentional explanations 
become efficacious. 
The ant takes a circuitous, random walk from its nest. Upon finding food, it is 
able to walk in a direct line back to its nest, rather than simply retracing its steps. 
Thus, the theory has it that the ant is able to compute a global homing vector by 
adding together the vectors constituting its outward walk.  
Thus, we have a behavior we can make generalizations about despite 
differences in the physical conditions underlying different instances of it. In general 
these ants are able to walk in a straight line back to their nest from a food source, but 
they are able to do so despite changes in the route from their nest to the food source 
and the location of the food source relative to their nest. We cannot therefore make a 
physiological generalization about the ant that captures this generalization about its 
behavior. 








according to the number of steps the ant takes. Because the ant’s steps generally 
traverse uniform distances, these states usually correlate well with the distance the ant 
has travelled. Other states change in response to changes in the polarity of the light 
hitting the ant. Because such changes usually result from a change in direction, these 
states usually correlate well with the direction the ant has turned from its previous 
heading. The ant instantiates a computational system that transforms these states that 
correlate with distance and direction so as to generate a state that causes the ant to 
walk in a straight line that corresponds to the addition of the distance-direction 
vectors that describe its outward walk. 
So, we can account for the generalizations about the ant’s behavior by 
positing a computational system that integrates states corresponding with the distance 
and direction of the outward walk, and transforming them to form a motor command 
that in most circumstances gets the ant in a straight line back to its nest. The question 
is whether positing states with intentional content in addition to this computational 
process is necessary to explain the behavioral generalization. Burge argues that it is 
not: 
Path integration in itself requires no spatial representation. It 
computes and utilizes information that correlates with spatial 
properties. The capacities evolved and function to enable an animal 
to find its way in space. But the information states need not 
represent spatial properties or relations as such. Veridicality 
conditions play no non-trivial role in explanations of the natures or 
formations of the states (p. 502). 
 
The question before us is precisely why the ant’s behavior does not require 








properties were not required to explain the behavior of Physarum or the magnetotaxic 
behavior applies to the desert ant. In both those cases, we could generalize 
counterfactually about their navigational capacities solely in terms of the proximal 
stimuli impinging on them. We can do the same thing with the ant. Given certain 
proximal stimuli of its polarized light detectors and step counters, we can predict how 
these states will be combined to create a motor instructions for a return walk12. 
Once we describe how states of the any correspond with spatial properties of 
its environment and how those states transform via a computational process that 
corresponds to vector addition, we can explain why the ant is able to get back to its 
nest in a straight line over an indefinite number of scenarios. We don’t need to posit 
states that can be tokened correctly or incorrectly to explain the behavior. We merely 
need states that reliably correlate with distance properties in the ant’s normal 
environment.  
We can further see why assigning intentional contents to the ant’s states 
doesn’t do any explanatory work by noting that whatever intentional content we could 
assign the ant’s states would not change the explanation of the ant’s behavior. 
Whether the states generated by the ant’s leg movements represent leg movements, 
distances, or unicorns, what explains why those states reliably get the ant home is that 





12 This is not to say that the ant does not represent lots of other things. It may, for example, represent 
its burrow and its food as such. The claim Burge makes, and with which I concur, is merely that the 
navigational capacities of Burge’s idealized ant can be explained without attributing to it intentional 








they reliably correlate with the distance it’s traveled. This correlation explains 
everything there is to explain about the ant’s behavior, so there is no further 
explanatory work for intentional content to do.  
We’re now in a position to diagnose more precisely why we can explain both 
the bacteria’s and ants’ behavior in non-intentional terms. Burge gets it right when he 
claims about his idealized ant:  
Explanation of formation of the vector and navigation according to 
the vector can remain strictly in terms of summing and updating 
proximal stimulation, and combining it so as to produce states that 
cause movement of specific parts of the body. (506)  
 
Indeed, for both the ants and the bacteria, the same proximal input will always 
lead to the same behavioral outcome. In the case of the bacteria, magnetic fields 
impinging on their magnetosomes will always cause them to orient toward the 
strongest northern polarity. In the case of the ants, the same proximal stimulation of 
their leg receptors and polarity detectors will cause them to issue the same motor 
routine upon being properly stimulated by food. Therefore, as Burge notes, we can 
generalize their behavior solely in terms of the proximal stimulation impinging on 
them. 
Given what we have said about the ant’s navigational mechanisms, we should 
expect that were we to turn it over on its back, move its legs to and fro, and stimulate 
its polarized light detectors in just the right way, we could induce it to walk from any 
one position to another in a straight line. All we need to know are how the states 








motor output. The relevant experiments have not been done, but taken as a thought 
experiment, this would suffice to show that we can make all the generalizations we 
want about the ant’s counterfactually supported navigational capacities solely in 
terms of proximal stimuli and computational transformations that take place on 
them.13 
In retrospect, we can see the project the behaviorist psychologists were 
engaged in as an attempt to demonstrate that all behavior could be explained in terms 
of counterfactual generalizations over proximal stimuli. I hope to have given good 
reason to presume that if they had been successful at that project, they would have 
succeeded in eliminating intentional properties from psychological explanation. What 
examination of the foregoing bacteria, slime molds, and ants teaches us is that 
intentional properties are not necessary to make generalizations that can otherwise be 
made solely in terms of proximal stimuli. 
2. Early Perception 
Burge believes that whereas the desert any does not employ intentional states in its 
navigation, perceptual psychology nonetheless makes use of intentional properties in 
making generalizations characterizing early visual processing. This case is interesting 





13 As noted before, there is some evidence that Cataglyphis exhibits more complex navigational 
capacities than those characterized here and by Burge. So, it’s an open empirical question whether 
actual Cataglyphis has intentional states. What is clear, however, is that our idealized ant does not 








for our purposes because on the face of it, the generalizations of early visual 
processing seem just as easily cached out in terms of proximal stimuli as the 
navigational capacities we’ve surveyed above. So, it’s initially unclear whether Burge 
has found generalizations made by this early perception that cannot be accommodated 
in the terms of proximal stimuli, or whether he believes there is a need for intentional 
explanations despite the availability of generalizations made over the proximal 
stimuli alone. 
2.1. Burgean Constancies 
Burge argues that intentional states play a role explaining the formation of perceptual 
constancies. Roughly, perceptual constancies are the capacity of perceptual systems 
to map multiple proximal stimuli onto the same mental state. For example, we exhibit 
a capacity to see a white sheet of paper as uniformly white even though the light 
reflected from its surface may give rise to varying proximal stimuli of our retina. The 
paper itself has a constant reflectance property-- its disposition to reflect light.  
However, the proximal stimuli it provides to the retina are variable. The retina 
will experience intense stimulation from the side of the paper in the light, and weak 
stimulation from the side of the paper in shadow. Thus, the proximal stimuli 
impinging on the retina covary with luminance properties of the paper-- the amount 
of light illuminating the paper.  
So, from an input of varying proximal stimuli, we are nonetheless able to treat 








effects this mapping from variable proximal stimuli onto a state that co-varies with 
one stable property of the world is the process of perceptual constancy. 
Burge claims that the process by which the early visual system effects this 
constancy formation requires states with intentional content. At the outset, this 
conclusion must seem obvious-- indeed trivial. If constancy formation is described as 
the process by which we create a stable representational state as of the paper having 
constant reflectance, then of course constancy formation involves intentional states. It 
at least involves the intentional state that represents the paper as having uniform 
reflectance! 
However, Burge’s claim is not merely that because perceptual discrimination 
tasks seem to involve representational states that people with such perceptual systems 
have intentional states that represent, e.g. reflectance properties. I suspect it may well 
be true that people are able to represent reflectance properties. Indeed, it is just this 
ability which on the face of it would seem  to allow perceptual psychologists to make 
hypotheses about them! But, Burge’s point is more provocative: that intentional 
properties are involved in the explanation of the process that takes proximal stimuli 
as input and maps it onto representations as of constant reflectance. 
This latter claim, I contend, is false-- at least if the process of visual constancy 
formation operates as Burge claims that it does. It’s interestingly false, however, 
because it is another example of how intentional explanation is unnecessary as long 
as we can make all the interesting generalizations in terms of proximal stimuli alone.  








formation in a way that remains agnostic to any intentional attribution. It may be that 
states of the constancy mechanism (including its output) have intentional content. The 
question before is whether that content plays any role in explaining the operation of 
the constancy mechanism itself. I contend that it does not, whereas Burge claims that 
it does. 
At base, a constancy must be an ability to sort proximal stimulations into 
equivalence classes. If constancies allow us to treat distal particulars as the same 
despite changes in proximal stimuli, then the deployment of constancies must at least 
require the ability to group different sorts of proximal stimulation all under the same 
equivalence class.  
So, suppose we have a mechanism that takes in diverse proximal stimuli as 
input, and outputs computational states. Proximal stimuli of type P7, P3, and P5 all 
produce state S0 and proximal stimuli of type P2, P4 and P6 all produce state S1. 
Thus, all the proximal stimuli are segmented into one of two equivalence classes 
picked out by the computational state to which they give rise. 
Further suppose that things are set up just so that state S1 tends only to arise in 
the presence of squares in the organism’s normal environment, and state S2 tends 
only to arise in the presence of triangles. That is, there is a correlation between states 
S1 and S2 with squares and triangles, respectively. 
Can we thereby say that S1 is a constancy that represents squares despite 
differences in proximal stimulation, and S2 is similarly a constancy that represents 








require explanation in terms of intentional content. So, by Burge’s own lights, the 
answer would seem to be, “no.” 
We could give an affirmative answer if these constancies played some further 
role in our psychological explanations. From Burge’s discussion of the desert ant, it 
seems that at least a necessary condition on computational states having content is 
that the truth conditions of the states play some role in explaining the organism’s 
behavior. But, it’s not clear that any intentional content the S1 and S2 states might 
have explains how they come to be activated by the constancy mechanism.  
A similar process is at play in the account Burge gives of lightness constancy. 
Many different patterns of photon stimulation on the retina will cause us to perceive 
an object as having the same lightness. For example, we can perceive a sheet of white 
paper as having the same whiteness both in direct sunlight or when it’s lit obliquely 
by a lamp indoors, even though the two situations will cause very different proximal 
registrations of information on the retina. Burge notes that this capacity to map many 
proximal stimuli onto the same perceptual constancy does not depend on background 
knowledge or conceptual capacities (p. 351). It is all bottom-up, as we say14. 
Moreover, it requires that the perceptual system somehow discriminate cases in which 
different proximal stimuli are caused by differences in illumination on an object with 





14 Chapter 4 examines recent research indicating that early perception may not be so encapsulated. I 
argue there that the evidence against at least some degree of encapsulation in at least some perceptual 
processes is not decisive. For now, however, my purpose is just to trace out some in-principle 
conditions on intentional explanation. Whether those conditions are in fact met or not is of course a 








uniform lightness, or reflectance, and situations in which these differences are caused 
by differences in the reflectance of the surface of an object, though it is illuminated 
uniformly. Namely, the perceptual system must distinguish between a zebra and a 
white horse lit by a projection of stripes of light and shadow. 
It is a happy fact about our normal environment, Burge tells us, that sharp 
changes in light intensity are usually caused by differences in the reflectance of a 
surface, whereas more gradual changes in light intensity are usually caused by 
differences in the illumination of a surface. It is a further fortuitous fact that our 
perceptual system maps proximal registrations of sharp changes in light intensity onto 
one sort of perceptual constancy, and maps proximal registrations of gradual changes 
in light intensities onto another type of perceptual constancy. Thus, under normal 
conditions, our perceptual system is usually able to distinguish pretty well between 
changes in luminance across a surface of uniform reflectance, and changes in surface 
reflectance under uniform illumination.  
I take all this to be straightforward psychological fact about how our 
perceptual systems work. Burge goes further to assert that such facts give reason to 
think that our perceptual states have representational contents that have veridicality 
conditions. This inference is not warranted. Burge writes:  
The formation principle that I cite in this example describes and 
explains a law-like process that tends to yield veridical perceptions 
of distal conditions. (p. 354) 
 
The “formation principle” is simply the principle whereby our visual system 








discontinuities onto another. Insofar as the distinction between these two constancies 
correlates well with differences between changes in reflectance on the one hand, and 
changes in illumination on the other, early vision has a computational system that 
maps homomorphically onto differences between luminance and reflectance. 
So, here’s our explanation of lightness constancy computation in early vision: 
1) Our perceptual system is able to map proximal stimuli onto one of at least two 
different perceptual constancies, call them “A” and “B.” 
2) The proximal stimuli the system maps to A tend to be caused by changes in 
the luminance properties of a distal percept. The proximal stimuli the system 
maps to B tend to be caused by changes in the reflectance properties of the 
distal percept. 
3) Thus, in environments like ours, the system can reliably discriminate proximal 
stimuli caused by changes in reflectance from proximal stimuli caused by 
differences in illumination. 
 
But, as Burge should well know, an ability to reliably discriminate distal 
causes neither requires nor entails an ability to represent those distal causes in such a 
way that the veridicality conditions of the representations play a role in explaining the 
behavior of the system. The desert ant can reliably discriminate between a random 
walk with one trajectory from a random walk with another trajectory. But, this 
discriminative ability is not enough to ascribe representations to the desert ant. 
So, it’s not obvious to me that an ability to reliably discriminate distal causes 
in the manner described above requires representations of those distal causes that 
have veridicality conditions. Now, of course, we might presume that the outputs of 








outside of the constancy mechanism itself. But, what Burge has not established is that 
any intentional content these states might have are playing a role in explaining the 
operation of the constancy mechanism. Burge, however, begs to differ: 
The explanatory principle that describes and explains the process 
makes non-trivial reference to representational states with 
veridicality conditions. (p. 354) 
 
I’ve searched in vain for these references to these representational states with 
veridicality conditions. Moreover, given the explanations above, I don’t see why such 
states would be required to explain our perceptual capacities. 
Let’s look at some potential places at which Burge might think 
representational states with veridicality conditions may need to be invoked. Burge 
notes that the formation principles used explain our ability to discriminate proximal 
stimuli caused by differences in luminance from proximal stimuli caused by 
differences in reflectance of distal surfaces “can yield illusions” (353). Perhaps Burge 
thinks that since the perceptual system can generate illusions, it must generate some 
representations that are veridical, and others that are not veridical, and thus illusory. 
Insofar as we can have illusions such that we perceive differences in 
luminance as differences in reflectance, or vice versa, there is no doubt that we 
experience illusions. Insofar as our perceptual capacities to discriminate distal 
differences in reflectance and luminance help determine whether we represent a 
surface as having a difference in luminance or reflectance, the perceptual process 
described above can indeed “yield illusions.”  








veridicality conditions is necessary to explain the formation of representations of 
reflectance and luminance. Even if constancy mechanisms eventuate in the output of 
representations as of reflectance and luminance, the mere fact that we experience 
illusions does not determine that early perceptual systems themselves utilize these 
intentional properties with veridicality conditions.  
In any case, the mere process by which we discriminate lightness differentials 
from luminance differentials in early vision does not seem to require states with 
intentional content any more than does the desert ant’s navigational system. So, by 
Burge’s own lights, it’s not the case that representations are needed to explain the 
process of constancy formation.  
So, Burge’s account of representations in desert ant navigation is at odds with 
his account of representations in constancy formation. In the former, he demonstrates 
how we can explain the correlation between mental states and properties of an 
organism’s normal environment without appeal to correctness conditions. In the 
latter, he seems to argue that mere correlation between mental states and distal stimuli 
requires explanation in terms of representational states with correctness conditions.  
In the end, it does seem that the process of reflectance constancy formation 
can be explained without appeal to intentional states. It’s consonant with the working 
hypothesis that intentional states are not necessary when all the generalizations we 
want to make about a system can be done in terms of properties of their proximal 
stimuli. We should now start refining the hypothesis a bit. 








are to play an explanatory role, they must allow us to make generalizations that we 
could not otherwise. If all the generalizations there are to make can be captured by 
rules ranging over the properties of proximal stimuli, then there will be no additional 
generalizations for intentional states to explain. Therefore, any process that can be 
explained solely in terms of proximal stimuli does not admit of intentional 
explanation. 
2.2 Natural Constraint Inference 
This conclusion, of course, flies in the face of Fodor’s (1983) claim that it is precisely 
encapsulated perceptual systems where we should expect to find intentional 
inferences at work. In this contention, he follows in the long tradition of Helmholtz 
(1867) and Rock (1983) in characterizing early perceptual processes as “unconscious 
inferences.”  
Fodor’s reasons for thinking that these processes are intentional seem simply 
to be a corollary of his view that computations are essentially intentional. Insofar as 
these early perceptual processes are computational, they must also be intentional. So, 
for example, in noting that the operations of the language faculty are computational, 
Fodor argues: 
...the notion of computation is intrinsically connected to such 
semantical concepts as implication, confirmation, and logical 
consequence. Specifically a computation is a transformation of 
representations which respects these sorts of semantic relations… 
such semantic relations hold only among the sorts of things to 
which content can be ascribed (1983, p. 5) 
 








intentional as well. But, we saw in Chapter 1 that there are good reasons not to buy 
into this premise. 
Fodor gives a more detailed sketch of the sort of intentional processes he takes 
to be operating in early perception: 
...the character of the energy at the transducer surface is itself 
lawfully determined by the character of the distal layout. Because 
[of this] it is possible to infer properties of the distal layout from 
corresponding properties of the transducer output. Input analyzers 
are devices which perform inferences of this sort. (p. 45) 
 
This is just the sort of characterization that Burge gives of the lightness constancy 
mechanism. There’s a lawful relation between the sharpness in changes of retinal 
stimuli and changes in the distal layout due to either reflectance or illuminance. Marr 
(1982) talks about these sorts of processes as relying on what he calls “physical” or 
“natural” constraints on the one hand, and “matching constraints” on the other. 
Natural constraints are regularities in the distal world-- such as the tendency of 
differences in reflectance to be sharp and differences in illumination to be graded. 
Matching constraints are constraints on computations that track these physical 
constraints-- such as the constraint that maps sharp and gradual changes in retinal 
stimuli to two type-distinct computational states. 
As we saw above, absent Fodor’s appeal to the essentially intentional nature 
of computation, there seems to be on the face of it no good reason to attribute 
intentional content to states involved in these processes. Talking about them as 
unconscious “inferences” seems to be merely metaphorical. Given our own 








stimuli, we, qua theorists, can infer what distal phenomenon caused a particular 
retinal stimulus. But, it does not follow that our early vision systems themselves 
engage in such inference. 
Silverberg (2006) provides additional argument for the view that perceptual 
processes that make use of such matching constraints involve intentional states. He 
argues that because parts of Marr’s theory of vision make use of assumptions about 
the external world, the computations described by the theory must have content. He 
takes Marr’s account of stereoptic vision as an example. Somehow the early visual 
system must match up states generated by the left eye that are due to some external 
feature with states coming into the right eye that are due to the same external feature.  
To do this, Marr says that three constraints determine which states may be 
matched with each other from eye to eye. An “edge” state in the left eye can be 
matched with an “edge” state in the right eye if and only if these three constraints are 
met. If the process of matching states obeys these three constraints, Marr claims that 
the “correspondence is physically correct” (114–15). That is, Silverberg writes, each 
state in fact corresponds with the same feature in the external world. As Silverberg 
points out (510), this claim that the process yields “physically correct” states is part of 
Marr’s computational theory. The theory is supposed to explain how vision 
processing connects up with the external world, and this is one way in which it does 
so: in our normal environments, states in each eye will in fact co-vary with the same 
distal stimulus. 








input is still in terms of “correspondence” and co-variation. Neither of these sorts of 
relations between external features and computational states require that the states 
represent the external features. The desert ant has states that correspond and co-vary 
with spatial properties in its normal environment. But, Burge and I both argue that 
this fact alone is not sufficient to attribute representations of space to those states. 
Of course we would need a notion of representation if the constraints 
appealed to in the above account needed to be represented by the early vision system. 
But, that’s not what the theory proposes. It merely claims that the early vision system 
respects the constraints. So, we can’t conclude from the fact that the system respects 
constraints that is representing something.  
But, neither can we conclude from that fact that the system is not 
representational. Silverberg chides Egan (1992) for jumping from the observation that 
the vision system does not explicitly represent the constraints to the conclusion that 
the relations between external features and computational states are not part of Marr’s 
computational theory (511). He critiques her for then inferring that because the 
relations between the external states and external features are not part of the 
computational theory, then even if those relations are representational, the 
representational states would not be part of the computational theory. Silverberg’s 








and external features are indeed part of the computational theory15. But again, just 
because relations between external features and internal computational states are part 
of the theory does not entail that the relations are representational. Silverberg needs to 
give us a further argument as to whether the computational states are representational 
or not. 
Of course, if the constraints themselves ranged over representations, we’d 
need representations in early visual processing. Examples of such constraints would 
be what Marr calls “physical constraints,” such as, “a given point on a physical 
surface has a unique position in space at any one time” (112–13). If these physical 
constraints were the constraints early vision operated under, it would indeed need to 
represent such things as “physical surface,” “point,” and “position in space.” But, 
Marr says these physical constraints are not the constraints used by the vision system. 
Rather, he writes: 
We can therefore rewrite the physical constraints as matching 
constraints, which restrict the allowable ways of matching two 
primitive symbolic descriptions. . . . For the matching constraints 
to be valid, the elements of the matched descriptions must 
correspond to well-defined locations on the physical surface being 
imaged. (p. 114, my italics) 
 






 Of course, even if we did not include the relations between the computational states and external 
features as part of whatever we denominated the “computational theory” it would not obviate those 
relations altogether. If they exist, and are representational, then the system is trafficking in 
representations, whether or not they are described in the computational theory or some other 
theory! Just because we can abstract away from mind-world relations or intentional content does not 








So, the states of visual processing must merely respect constraints on which 
state can match with which other state. These matching constraints are happily 
constituted such that in most conditions, only states that correspond to the same 
physical feature will be matched with each other. But, since the constraints range over 
symbolic primitives, they need not represent the physical features these symbolic 
primitives correspond to.  
So, when Silverberg claims that Marr’s theory “contains descriptions of 
aspects of the physical environment that are external to the perceiver” (512), we can 
grant that he’s right in regard to the meta-language of Marr’s theory. Marr indeed 
provides an account of how the internal processing of the visual system links up to 
the external environment, and, in doing so, he describes that external environment. 
However, the object language of the theory, the computational process being 
described, does not possess descriptions—qua intentional states—of the external 
environment. 
Pylyshyn (2003) presses a similar point about constraint based approaches to 
vision in general. He notes, as we have, that constraint based accounts of early 
perception have historically been thought of as “inferential” processes, but claims: 
...there is another option… [a]ll that is needed is that the 
computations carried out in early processing embody (without 
explicitly representing or drawing inferences from) certain very 
general constraints on the interpretations it is allowed to make (p. 
96, my emphasis). 
 
Now, such proclamations are largely obiter dicta on Pylyshyn’s part. He does 








intentional. Most of his work is devoted to arguing that such early perceptual 
processes are cognitively impenetrable. In fact, we might be prone to interpreting the 
above remarks as merely a recapitulation of the claim that such processes are 
encapsulated from global cognition-- not that they are non-intentional tout court. In 
fact, Pylyshyn at times stipulates that by “inference” he simply means a cognitively 
penetrable process: “I prefer to reserve the term ‘inference’ for a process that Stich 
(1978) calls ‘inferentially promiscuous’-- i.e. that is not restricted in a principled way 
to what information it can use” (p. 124, n.4). 
But, Pylyshyn does make other remarks that seem to indicate he does 
understand these early, encapsulated processes as non-intentional. In reference to 
such processes as lightness constancy, the construction of Kanizsa triangle percepts, 
and others traditionally seen as “intelligent,” he writes: 
...no additional regularities are captured by the hypothesis that the 
system has knowledge of certain natural laws and takes them into 
account through “unconscious inferences.” Even though in these 
examples the visual process appears to be “intelligent,” it may be 
carried out by prewired circuitry that does not access encoded 
knowledge. Notions such as knowledge, belief, goal, and inference 
give us an explanatory advantage when sets of generalizations can 
be captured under common principles such as rationality or even 
something like roughly semantic coherence (Pylyshyn 1984). In 
the absence of such over-arching principles, Occam’s Razor and 
Lloyd Morgan’s Canon dictate that the simpler or lower-level 
hypothesis… is preferred (pp. 119-120). 
 
Here, Pylyshyn seems to be recapitulating the claim I’ve argued for above. 
Appealing to states with correctness conditions in otiose in explaining the operations 








All that is necessary to explain such systems is a computational description of the 
system’s states, and the observation that, ceteris paribus, there tends to be a 
correlation between those states and features of the distal environment.  
3. Bayesian Constancies 
Even if Burge’s and other constraint based accounts of constancy formation do not 
require appeal to intentional content, some, such as Rescorla (2013; forthcoming), 
and Gładziejewski (2015), have argued that Bayesian processes of constancy 
formation do require intentional content. After all, Bayesian accounts make at least 
nominal appeal to “hypothesis testing,” a paradigm intentional process. 
Bayesian models of perception model the processes governing early constancy 
formation in terms of Bayes’ theorem. It is an open question whether Bayesian 
theories merely do a good job characterizing the inputs and outputs of constancy 
formation in extension, or whether the theorem models the process of constancy 
formation in intension as well16. Most Bayesian theorists seem not to wrestle very 
much with the distinction. You might expect that if Bayesian models accurately 
model the process of constancy formation in extension, they are a good working 
hypothesis of how the process should be characterized in intension. 
In any case, I’ll remain agnostic on the question of whether or not Bayesian 
theories characterize the process of constancy formation in intension or not. More 













precisely, for the purposes of argument, I’ll presume that they do. For, if the process 
of constancy formation is indeed described in intension in terms of Bayes’ theorem, 
then on the face of it, it would seem to require intentional (with a “t”!) states. For, 
Bayes’ theorem requires hypothesis testing. Insofar as hypothesis testing is an 
intentional procedure, if the early visual system implements it, it would seem to 
require intentional states.  
Nonetheless, I contend that even if Bayesian procedures accurately 
characterize the process of constancy formation in intension, it nonetheless does not 
require intentional states. For the type of hypothesis testing implemented by Bayes’ 
theorem is not the sort of hypothesis testing that requires intentional properties. 
Seeing just what sorts of hypothesis testing require intentional descriptions and which 
do not will help us further refine the types of psychological processes that require 
intentional explanation. 
 
3.1 Overview of Bayes Theorem  
Bayes’ theorem is  just a corollary of the standard definition of probability: 
 
P(A|B)= [P(B|A) * P(A)] / P(B) 
 
Simply, the probability of some A, given B, is equal to the product of the probability 









If we take A to range over properties of the world and B to range over 
evidence for those properties, then we can imagine a creature who uses Bayes’ 
theorem to fix her perceptual beliefs. That is, given her beliefs about the likelihood of 
available evidence occurring given some hypothesis about how the world is, and the 
likelihood of that hypothesis being true, she can update how likely she believes the 
world is in a certain state given certain evidence. 
On this interpretation, P(A) is canonically called the prior and P(B|A) the 
likelihood. The prior is simply an hypothesis of how likely it is that A is the state of 
the world prior to collecting any evidence. The likelihood is the probability that the 
evidence would occur given that A is the state of the world. 1/P(B) just ends up being 
a constant corresponding to the probability that the evidence should show up at all. 
The probability on the other side of the equation, P(A|B), is called canonically the 
posterior-- the probability calculated after the prior and likelihood have been set. 
On most psychological applications of Bayes’ theorem, the theorem is applied 
across an entire hypothesis space. So, rather than considering only the probability of 
one possible state of the world, the procedure computes the probability that each of a 
set of states of affairs obtain. For example, instead of calculating the probability that a 
surface has a particular reflectance property, the Bayesian procedure would calculate 
the probability that the surface has each possible reflectance property. Thus the 
calculations involve setting probability distributions for the prior and the likelihood as 








reflectance property. The likelihood function computes a probability distribution 
across different possible occurrences of the evidence. 
Allred (2012) gives a nice toy example to see how this would work. Suppose 
again that a creature is trying to establish a reflectance constancy. Here, we can take 
the evidence to be proximal stimuli on the retina. So, the creature is trying to establish 
the probability that an object has a given reflectance property given the proximal 
stimuli impinging on its retina. 
Recall that the same proximal stimuli could result from an indefinite 
combination of reflectance properties and illumination. An object could have very 
high reflectance under low illumination or very low reflectance under high 
illumination and yet provide the same proximal stimuli to the retina. So, the 
probability that the object has any given reflectance will depend on the probability 
that it is illuminated highly or not. 
If all we are given is the proximal stimulation of the retina, there is no way to 
tell whether it is the result of a surface with low reflectance under high illumination 
or one of high reflectance under low illumination. The Bayesian procedure gets rid of 
this ambiguity by hypothesizing that some combinations of illumination and 
reflectance are more likely than others. It sets a prior distribution that assumes, for 
example, that surfaces with higher reflectances are more likely to be encountered than 
those with lower reflectance. It sets a likelihood distribution that considers surfaces 
with reflectance properties consistent with the proximal stimulation to be highly 








reflectance property that could give rise to the proximal stimulus given some likely 
illumination would have a likelihood close to 1, whereas one that would not (say, one 
with zero reflectance) would standardly have a likelihood of 0. 
The procedure can also account for noise in the system by assuming, for 
example, that sometimes the proximal stimulus is brought about in a fashion other 
than being stimulated from light reflecting off an object. For example, if the proximal 
stimulus in question sometimes results from spontaneous firing of retinal cells, then 
the likelihood that it occurs despite the target surface having a reflectance inconsistent 
with that stimulus can be assumed to be non-zero. 
After applying the Bayesian calculations across the probability distributions of 
the prior and the likelihood, we get as output a probability distribution ranging over 
different possible reflectance properties of the surface. Insofar as one of those 
reflectance properties is most probable, we can choose to believe that this is in fact 
the reflectance property of the surface we’re looking at. 
As I’ve described it thus far, the Bayesian procedure sounds highly 
intentional. Given hypotheses concerning the probabilities of possible reflectance 
properties and retinal stimulation, we can calculate the probable reflectance property 
of the surface before us. Hypotheses are paradigm intentional states: to be an 
hypothesis is to be about something. 
Nonetheless, I contend that whatever is meant by “hypothesis” in the idiom of 
some Bayesian perceptual theories, it is not an intentional notion. This view is not 









Bayesian probabilities are not necessarily psychological beliefs. 
Instead, they are better thought of as tools used by the researcher to 
derive behavioral predictions. The hypotheses themselves are not 
psychological constructs either, but instead reflect characteristics 
of the environment. (p. 175) 
 
Jones & Love’s characterization is a criticism of the evidence often provided 
for Bayesian models of psychological systems. Their contention is that there is often 
little evidence that postulated Bayesian models are actually implemented 
psychologically by subjects. Rather, the Bayesian accounts just accurately describe 
subjects’ behavior in extension, abstracting away from whatever psychological 
mechanism actually drives the behavior. 
In any case, Jones & Love’s word does not establish the non-intentional 
construal of Bayesian perception any more than the ostensibly intentional idiom used 
by Bayesian theorists establishes the intentional construal. In what follows, I’ll 
assume that Brainard et al.’s (2006; 1997) Bayesian account of color constancy17 is 
actually implemented psychologically. Nonetheless, I argue it can be given a non-
intentional construal while preserving all its generalizations.  
3.2 A Non-Intentional Bayesian Process 
Brainard’s model goes beyond mere lightness constancy to model the process of color 
constancy. As with lightness constancy, the perceived color of an object is a function 













both of its reflectance properties and the illumination. The reflectance and luminance 
properties affect not just the intensity of light impinging on the retina, but the 
wavelength as well. An object that appears white when illuminated by white light will 
appear red when illuminated by red light. That same object illuminated by red light 
can provide the same proximal wavelengths to the retina another that is illuminated 
by white light, provided that their reflectance properties are different.18  
Therefore, if we know the luminance properties of a scene and the properties 
of the light reflected off a surface in that scene, we can determine the reflectance 
properties of that surface. This would be difficult for the early visual system to do, 
however, because all it has access to are states that correlate with properties of the 
light reflecting off of surfaces onto the retina.  
Brainard et al.’s proposal is that the visual system uses a Bayesian algorithm 
to estimate the luminance properties of the scene from the information about the 
reflected light and hypotheses about the luminance likely to have caused such 
reflected light. Put this way, of course, the proposal is rife with intentionality, but as 
we detail its operations, we can see how it can be cached out solely in terms of 
generalizations operating over proximal stimuli. 





18 The situation is further complicated by the phenomenon of metamerism, in which two different 
surface reflectance properties generate the same proximal stimuli under one illuminant, but different 








To start off, let’s characterize more precisely the proximal stimuli used by the 
algorithm. Three different cone cells in the retina contain different pigments that 
change from one molecule to another-- or isomerize-- in response to contact with 
different wavelengths of light. Rates of isomerization co-vary with the wavelength 
and intensity of light impinging on the retina. Assuming Burge’s principle that co-
variation does not entail representation, there’s no reason at this stage to assume that 
any properties of the light are represented in the early visual system. States of retinal 
cells simply co-vary with these properties. 
Brainard et al. first estimated the rate of isomerization of the three different 
color cones when they are struck by different wavelengths at different intensities. 
They then created a probability distribution that describes the likelihood that any 
given light stimulation of the retina caused any particular rate of isomerization for 
each cone. For example, each cone is likely to isomerize at a particular rate when 
exposed to lightwaves of 650 nm. They will isomerize at this rate whether or not the 
light is coming from a white object illuminated by light of 650 nm or from an object 
illuminated by white light that only reflects back light of 650 nm. Thus, the likelihood 
that this particular isomerization rate of the cones is the result of either of these states 
of affairs is equally high. By contrast, the likelihood that the cones isomerize at this 
rate when, for example, being stimulated by light of 300 nm would be quite low on 
the probability distribution. 
Thus, this probability distribution of isomerization given proximal wavelength 








have just described it, this probability distribution just is a description of the actual 
probabilities of cone isomerization as estimated by Brainard et al. They do not detail 
how precisely such a distribution would factor into a constancy mechanism 
implemented by an actual visual system. So, it is up to us to consider how this could 
be done. 
Obviously, the visual system does not rely upon the estimation of cone 
isomerization provided by Brainard et al.! There are two alternatives that seem more 
likely. The first is that the early visual system represents a probability distribution of 
cone isomerization rates given properties of light impinging on the retina. That is to 
say that there would be a state of the early visual system that represents cone 
isomerization rates as such, and further, represents wavelengths of light and the 
probability that any one of them caused the isomerization. This would be in line with 
the reading that the likelihood function constitutes an hypothesis in the intentional 
sense.  
A second possibility is that the early visual system has states that are 
homomorphic to the probability distribution described by Brainard et al. Given that 
the output of the constancy mechanism is a representation of a particular luminance 
property, there could be states of the early visual system that tip the scales more in the 
direction of particular outputs than others. Under the intentional interpretation, the 
visual system would represent a probability distribution such that that, say, an 
isomerization rate of 5 units is believed to have a .98 probability of being caused by 








nm. Under the non-intentional, homomorphic construal, an isomerization rate of 5 
units would cause the system to go into a state that would weight the system toward 
outputting a representation of 650 nm by .98 units, and weight it toward outputting a 
representation of 300 nm by .01 units. This would be consonant with the “vote-
counting” interpretation given by Jones & Love.  
There is no reason at this stage to think that the intentional implementation of 
the algorithm is correct. However, we can’t rule it out until we consider how the 
likelihood function interfaces with the rest of the Bayesian algorithm. For now, 
suffice it to note that there is no reason to prefer the intentional construal unless the 
further operations of the algorithm require us to do so. 
The second element of the Bayesian algorithm is the prior. To determine this 
probability distribution, Brainard et al. estimated the probability that different 
illuminations would be encountered by a typical human subject. They relied on data 
gathered by DiCarlo and Wandell (2000), who sampled the illuminant properties of 
light outside a window at Stanford every minute from dawn to dusk over 20 days in a 
variety of weather conditions. The prior distribution set the probability of given 
illuminant being present in line with the frequency with which it appeared in this 
sample.  
Again, there are two ways in which we could imagine the prior functioning in 
the psychological implementation of Brainard et al.’s model. It could be that visual 
system represents many possible illuminants as such and the probability that each of 








probabilities. Alternatively, the visual system could implement a series of states that 
is homomorphic to the structure of the probability distribution described by Brainard 
et al. 
Again, the idea would be that different states of the visual system count more 
in favor of outputting some illuminant judgments than others. Before, any proximal 
stimuli have been received, the visual system is more disposed to treat them as 
coming from some illuminants than others. The question before us, then, is whether 
we can combine these non-intentional descriptions of the likelihood function and the 
prior in a way that describes how the visual system can generate a representation of 
illuminant properties (other than the intentional output, of course). 
Suppose that the early visual system is composed of a series of tubes that can 
be filled with water. Since the Bayesian explanation of the visual system abstracts 
away from its physical implementation, we need not worry how realistic such a 
supposition is. There is one tube corresponding to each possible illuminant value.  
Suppose now, that when lightwaves of 400 nm impinge on the retina, they 
cause the three cone types begin isomerizing at rates of units 1, 3, and 5 units, 
respectively. This isomerization causes water to be pumped into the tubes. There is a 
bijective mapping between the quantity of water pumped into the tubes and the 
probability values in the likelihood distribution described by Brainard et al. Suppose, 
for example, that the likelihood function ascribes a probability of .9 to these rates of 
isomerization being the result of either 400 nm illuminance and white light 








illuminance. Then the tubes corresponding to the 400 nm and white light illuminance 
will be filled with .9 units of water, and the tube corresponding to 500 nm 
illuminance will fill with .2 units. Thus, the amount of water pumped into the tubes is 
homomorphic with values of the likelihood function described by Brainard et al.. 
Each tube is designed such that a certain percentage of the water pumped into 
it leaks out each time19. Again, there is a bijective mapping from the amount by 
which the water in each tube decreases and the probability values of the prior 
distribution described by Brainard et al. For example, suppose the prior assigns a 
probability of .01 to illumination of 400 nm, a probability of .9 to white light 
illumination, and .05 to 500 nm illumination. Then the water in the tube 
corresponding to 400 nm will always decrease by 1-.01=99%, that in the tube 
corresponding to white light by 1-.9=10%, and that in the 500 nm tube 1-.05=95%. 
At the end of the process, different tubes will hold different amounts of water. 
That corresponding to illumination of 400 nm will have .01*.9 units=.009 units; that 
corresponding to white light illumination will be filled with .9*.9=.81 units, and that 
corresponding to 500 nm illumination will have .05*.2=.0125 units. Hence, the water 
in the tubes at the end of the process will be homomorphic to the posterior probability 
distribution calculated by Brainard et al.’s formula, where 





19 You could imagine, for example, a system by which the weight of the water in the 
tube depresses a spring that lifts a gate on a hole in the bottom such that the opening 
of the gate, and hence the amount of water released, is proportional to the quantity 









posterior(Hi)= prior(Hi) * likelihood(Hi) 
 
such that Hi ranges over different possible illumination values. 
Posterior(400nm)=.01*.9=.009, posterior(white light)= .9*.9=.81, and 
posterior(500nm)= .05*.2=.0125. The values of posterior(Hi) can be mapped onto the 
same values as those of the quantity of water in each tube. 
The foregoing thought experiment is not intended to establish that because 
there is some possible physical instantiation of this Bayesian algorithm that 
intentional properties are not needed for it to be explanatorily efficacious. In fact, it’s 
premised on the idea that the Bayesian explanation abstracts away from any particular 
physical implementation. Rather, the point of the thought experiment is that for any 
arbitrary physical implementation we choose, we can make the generalizations of the 
Bayesian explanation without attributing intentional states to the early visual system 
itself.  
Bayesian accounts of early perception can be thought of just as the 
explanations of desert ant navigation that point out homomorphisms between states of 
the target system and some mathematical description of states of affairs. In the case of 
the ant, researchers represent spatial properties in terms of a vector algebra, and then 
demonstrate that states of the ant are homomorphic to states of that representation. In 
this case, researchers can represent the probabilities of various illuminance properties 
occurring in the world, and then point out that the early visual system could operate 








formal homomorphisms entail that these states are themselves intentional. But, the 
homomorphisms do account for how the states of the system interact and how they 
are able to produce output that co-varies with distal states of the world. There are no 
further generalizations that further appealing to intentional properties might hope to 
explain. 
 
4.Intentional Explanation of Isotropic Processes 
The point of this examination of Bayesian perception is not merely to provide another 
instance of an ostensibly intentional process that can nonetheless be construed non-
intentionally. It also gives us insight into what sort of processes would require 
intentional states. The Bayesian explanation of perception just is to show how the 
process of constancy formation can be modeled as formally homomorphic with an 
intentional process of hypothesis confirmation. So, we can look to see what makes the 
process of Bayesian hypothesis confirmation intentional, while leaving the perceptual 
processes it can be used to model non-intentional. 
It’s true that when we use Bayesian reasoning to calculate the probability of 
something, we take the prior and the likelihood to be hypotheses about the probability 
of certain illuminant occurring in the world. For example, suppose a satellite imaging 
analyst is trying to figure out the color of some object from the light sensed by a 
satellite camera. He could make an hypothesis about the probability that any given 
light is the illuminant of the scene in question. He might start out just assuming that 








and revises his hypothesis to reflect their findings that there is a probability 
distribution over a variety of illuminants for outdoor scenes. He might then realize 
that the conditions at the location of the object are relevantly different from those at 
Stanford where DiCarlo gathered his data. Because of red soils and pervasive cloud 
cover around the location of the object, he concludes that the probability distribution 
of various illuminants is different for the location of the object than in Stanford. Thus, 
his hypothesis concerning the probable illumination of the object is open to revision 
in light of a variety of data. 
Contrast this case of the satellite analyst with that of the early visual system. 
The Bayesian account of illuminant constancy formation does not include an account 
of how the prior probability distribution is set, let alone how it could be revised. The 
assumption is that the prior is fixed to be roughly homomorphic to the actual 
probabilities of various illuminants occurring in typical environments. All that’s 
necessary for the explanation to go through is that this homomorphism obtains. 
The same contrast holds for the likelihood. In the model of the early visual 
system, there is no mechanism to revise the values assigned to the likelihood. An 
analyst using a camera, however, can revise his hypotheses concerning how likely 
certain proximal stimuli are to occur on the camera sensor given a particular distal 
state in light of new information about how precisely the sensor works. So, while the 
prior and the likelihood can be thought of as hypotheses, they are not open to testing 








This contrast between the intentional construal of the Bayesian formalism in 
the case of the satellite analyst and the non-intentional construal in the case of the 
early vision system suggests a possible role for intentional explanation. On the face of 
it, the analyst’s use of Bayes’ theorem involves intentional states, whereas the 
Bayesian account of early vision does not. In the first case, the prior and likelihood 
are open to revision, whereas the latter is not. So, it may be that a sufficient condition 
on intentional processes is that they involve states that are open to revision. 
Rescorla (2015b) adopts something like this view. For somewhat different 
reasons, Nico Orlandi (2014) also comes to the conclusion that early visual Bayesian 
processes are non-intentional. Rescorla (2015a) raises an objection to her view. He 
writes: 
If we adopt a realist perspective on priors, we can explain why 
various changes in environmental conditions yield various changes 
in the mapping from sensory stimulations to percepts. 
 
By a “realist” perspective, Rescorla means an interpretation that priors 
are in fact intentional. So, for example, a prior in the Brainard et al. model 
would represent that light of such-and-such wavelength is 88% likely to be 
illuminating a scene. Such an intentional interpretation is supposed to explain 
data about changes in the response of the visual system in light of experience. 
The data Rescorla has in mind here is that such as Adams, Graf, & 
Ernst’s (2004) finding that priors can be altered in response to exposure to 
novel environments. Whereas most humans seem to assign high prior 








consistently exposed to haptic feedback that’s at odds with what they initially 
expect given their visual perception of the object. 
He contends that it’s not obvious how a non-intentional Bayesian 
algorithm could explain this phenomenon. He complains that Orlandi’s 
contention that the early vision system simply “rewires” itself in response to 
such stimuli does not explain “why a given stimulus history yields a given 
mapping from retinal inputs to percepts.” Presumably, the puzzle here is why 
distal stimuli from haptic feedback causes the visual system to rewire itself in 
just such a way so as to assign lower weight to the state associated with light 
coming from above . Given the novel proximal stimuli it’s receiving, the 
visual system could have rewired itself some other way or not at all. The 
negative evidence wants explanation.  
An intentional construal of the Bayesian processes could explain this 
by simply noting that the visual system lowers the probability of downward 
projecting light because it represents that light is now less likely to come from 
above. But, there is also a possible non-intentional explanation on the table. 
Take again the Brainard et al. model. Suppose that this system 
increases the prior probability that corresponds with ambient red light upon 
immersion in an environment consistently lit with such red light. This change 
amounts to increasing the resistance of the spring that regulates the outflow of 
water from the tube. The more resistant the spring, the lower the percentage of 








The task Rescorla has set us is to figure out a way to increase the 
resistance of the spring in proportion to the amount of ambient red light the 
visual system is presented with. Suppose that after each operation of the 
constancy mechanism, the remaining water drains out of the tubes. The water 
draining out of each tube coats the spring attached to that tube. Suppose 
further that this water bath causes a change in the chemical composition of the 
spring such that it gains more resistance the more water to which it is exposed. 
If the visual system is consistently exposed to an environment with 
lots of red ambient light, the water in the red tube at the end of each operation 
of the mechanism will be higher than that in the tubes corresponding to, say, 
green and blue light. Upon repeated exposure to this red ambient light, 
therefore, the resistance of the spring associated with red illumination will 
increase relative to other springs (save that associated with white). This effects 
an increase in the state corresponding to the red illumination prior in response 
to repeated exposure to red ambient light. We need not have supposed that any 
of the states represent the frequency of that red light in order to effect the 
change. 
Now, this is a just-so story and I don’t begin to suggest that it remotely 
explains the particular data concerning prior change given by Adams et al. and 
others Rescorla cites. I leave it open whether a more detailed analysis of the 
Adams et al. results do require intentional characterization. The point of the 








in which the prior states are responsive to changes in the distal stimuli in the 
right way without appealing to intentional properties. The mere fact that a 
Bayesian algorithm changes in light of experience is not in itself reason to 
suppose that adjustment of the prior must be an intentional process. 
Note, again, the argument is not the facile one that because we can 
give an implementational story that we need not appeal to intentional 
properties at a computational level of explanation. I talk in implementational 
terms only to demonstrate how a feedback loop at the computational level 
between the prior hypotheses states and the output of a Bayesian system could 
in principle adjust those priors in response to the relevant distal stimuli. 
Yang (2002) provides a rather less outré example of how just such a 
feedback loop at the computational level can explain language acquisition. 
Yang’s model proposes a prior hypothesis space of candidate grammars. Upon 
being presented with a sentence, children first analyze it with the grammar 
currently enjoying the highest probability value. If the grammar successfully 
parses the sentence, then it is rewarded with an even higher probability. If it 
fails, it is punished with a lower probability value. The prior hypothesis space 
for analyzing the next sentence is thus set by the posterior distribution of the 
current analysis.   
Yang thus shows how children brought up, for example, in Dutch 
speaking environments can revise their priors so as to afford greatest weight to 








speaking environments gradually accord the greatest weight to hypotheses 
associated with English style idiolects. 
I take it to be an open question to what extent Yang’s story requires 
that things like grammars, sentences, and the like be represented by the 
Language Acquisition Device. What seems clear is that the adjustment of the 
hypothesis space proceeds without needing to represent anything concerning 
the frequency of various E-languages, such as English and Dutch, in the 
environment. It simply responds to a one-off, up or down, ability to parse a 
sentence at hand. In that respect, we can explain how the hypothesis space 
adjusts to be in accord with its language environment without appeal to 
intentional content. 
What Yang’s study also makes evident is the considerable empirical 
research and computational modeling required to argue that such a process is 
in fact psychologically implemented. If we wished to vindicate Orlandi’s 
account of rewiring in the visual system, we’d have to conduct just such work. 
Since we haven’t, Rescorla’s critique of Orlandi may still hold: it’s not 
obvious that we can explain revisions of priors in Bayesian visual systems 
without appealing to intentional states.  
But, my toy example and Yang’s work also demonstrate that the mere 
ability to adjust priors such that they more closely track distal stimuli is not 








hypothesis, then, is that processes open to certain sorts of revision are 
amenable to intentional explanation and others are not. 
The key difference between the revisions open to the hypotheses of the 
satellite analyst and those open to the “hypotheses” of the Bayesian perception 
mechanism are that the latter can be characterized in terms of properties of the 
proximal stimuli impinging on the retina. The Bayesian perception system will output 
a given state if and only if the cones isomerize at a particular rates. Once those 
isomerization rates are fixed, so is the output of the system. 
Therefore, we can generalize how the system works solely in terms of 
proximal stimuli and the relations amongst its internal states. Given any particular 
isomerization rate of the cones, downstream states will be tokened in a manner 
homomorphic to the formal statement of the Bayesian algorithm. This 
homomorphism will ensure that in most contexts the states output by the visual 
system co-vary with the luminance properties of the external world. There aren’t any 
other generalizations about the operation of the system that intentional states would 
be required to explain. 
By contrast, if the prior and likelihood are open to revision by a meddling 
satellite analyst, the states of whatever plays the same role as the cones in the spy 
satellite will not determine what the  output of the satellite is. Therefore, on the face 
of it, we will not be able to generalize about the operations of the satellite’s Bayesian 
system solely in terms of the proximal stimuli impinging on it and the relations 








Nonetheless, there are still instances in which we could generalize about the 
operation of a Bayesian perceptual system even if the likelihood function, for 
example, was open to revision. Suppose, for example, there was a state that covaried 
with the degree of dilation of the pupil. This state in turn determines which of a 
variety of  likelihood distributions will be used in calculation of the posterior. Perhaps 
it’s a happy fact about the world that the likelihood that a particular rate of cone 
isomerization is caused by a particular incidence of light on the retina does in fact 
change depending on how wide the pupil is. For example, light of 500 nm could be 
slightly less likely to cause cone isomerization a particular rate when the pupil is 
highly dilated than when it is not. The last desideratum would of course be that the 
actual differences in likelihood roughly co-vary with the degree to which the 
likelihood function changes as result of pupil dilation. 
In this case, even though the likelihood function gets revised in different 
cases, we can generalize about how it gets revised-- and how the system functions in 
light of that revision-- solely in terms of proximal stimuli. We need only expand the 
proximal stimuli over which we generalize to include the states that co-vary with 
pupil dilation. That is, the output of any state will be determined by the conjunction 
of cone isomerization rates and pupil dilation. There are not any additional 
generalizations about how the system works that would be amenable to intentional 
explanation. 
What is interesting about the hypothesis testing of the satellite analyst is that 








likelihood distributions are not characterizable in terms of the properties of proximal 
stimuli impinging on either him or his satellite. This is not because we imagine him to 
be capricious, changing the probability distributions at random. What’s most 
interesting is the fact that he is very deliberate concerning the circumstances under 
which he changes the prior and likelihood distribution. So deliberate, in fact, that it 
seems that we should be able to make generalizations about the circumstances that 
would cause him to revise them one way or the other. However, what seems clear is 
that we cannot do so simply in terms of the proximal stimuli impinging on him.  
The behaviorist psychologists certainly had hoped that we’d be able to 
account for his behavior in terms of the responses engendered by proximal stimuli. 
But, they turned out to be wrong. It’s not immediately clear how we can characterize 
just what kind of stimuli are relevant to revising his hypothesis concerning the prior 
distribution of probable illuminants. In general, to pick up a Quinean theme, it looks 
as though his hypothesis is isotropically revisable. In principle, just about any 
proximal stimulus could cause him to revise his hypothesis. We therefore cannot 
generalize about the situations under which he would revise his hypothesis in terms of 
the properties of the proximal stimuli presented him in those circumstances.  
Here, then, is a case in which mere computational explanation fails to 
characterize all the generalizations we’d like to make. When we have states that are 
so isotropically revisable there may well be room for intentional states to play an 
explanatory role.  








wrong about intentional properties and the scope of psychological explanation 
generally. What is not always fully appreciated is that they were wrong on at least two 
counts. In the first place, it turned out that psychological explanation could not get 
along without positing internal states that stood in computational relations to one 
another. In the second, it turned out that it could not get along without intentional 
states as well. What cases such as Bayesian explanations of perception demonstrate, 
however, is that sometimes it’s sufficient for psychological explanation to rely on 
computational explanations while eschewing intentional explanations.  
Why this is apparent already in Chomsky’s critique of Skinner’s Verbal 
Behavior20 that helped to launch the cognitive turn in psychology. There are indeed 
two aspects of Chomsky’s critique. First, if human language can be described in 
terms of laws generating output from input, the rule relating the inputs and the 
outputs must be much more complex than the simple Law of Effect posited by the 
behaviorists. The theory of computation provides a nice way of giving nomological 
characterizations of such complex interactions. The best hypothesis, then, is that 
language is the result of a computational mechanism.  
Now, why posit that states of the language-speaking organism are intentional 
in addition to being computational? Chomsky noted that, in the presence of a red 





20 Though, see Collins (2007) for an argument that Chomsky’s review does not endorse intentional 
explanation. I take Collins’ position to be that Chomsky endorses the critique that the framework of 
stimulus, response, and control, etc. are insufficient for psychological explanation, while remaining 








chair, you might either say, “red” or “chair.” If Skinner is to be believed, whether you 
respond with “red” or “chair” depends on whether the redness of the chair or the 
chairness of the chair is the “controlling stimulus.” 
You might explain which stimulus is controlling by appealing to your 
newfound computational theory of mind. Whether the redness or the chairness is 
controlling depends upon your mental state upon encountering the chair. Were you in 
state 1, the redness would become controlling; were you in state 2, the chairness 
would become the  controlling stimulus21. Thus, prima facie, it seems as though we 
could explain why we sometimes say “chair” and sometimes say, “red” by appealing 
only to our computational theory of mind, without adding in any representational 
theory. 
This is precisely why a computational account of the desert ant’s navigation 
works so well. After all, the same leg movement on the ant’s outward walk will 
evince very different behavior on its return walk depending upon whether it has 
occurred after a change of state in the polarized light detector or after. We can explain 
the difference in output behavior in terms of how the input behavior computationally 
interacts with other states of the ant.  
So what are the circumstances that would require an intentional theory in 
addition to this computational theory? There are interesting generalizations we can 





21 Presuming, of course, that redness and chair-ness are distal properties of your environment-- a 








make about the circumstances under which we say “chair” and those under which we 
say, “red,” that cannot be captured by our computational theory alone. It may well be 
that whether we say “red” or “chair” when stimulated by a chair depends on whatever 
computational state we are in upon encountering the chair. However, there seems to 
be an indefinite number of states in which we might either say one or the other. 
Saying “red” might be preceded by a conversation about the color scheme of a room, 
a scavenger hunt for objects of a certain color, or an attempt to escape a charging bull. 
There are thus indefinite computational routes to an internal state that may cause 
someone to utter “red.”  
In any given instance, of course, we could in theory discover just what 
particular computational route took a person from a beginning state, to being 
stimulated by a chair, to uttering “red.” However, it’s not clear that in the general case 
we can make a generalization about what all these computational routes have in 
common such that they engender an utterance of “red.” 
The situation is just the same as that of our satellite image analyst, who will 
revise his hypotheses concerning the prior and likelihood of various illuminants given 
a large set of stimuli that we cannot generalize over. Reading articles about the 
frequency distributions of illuminants, taking his own measurements of such data on a 
spectroradiometer, hearing about the ambient conditions of the sites his satellite is 
photographing; these could all lead him to revise the setting of his prior.  
If we hope to make any generalizations about why he changes the prior 








generalization about the types of computational states that may lead to the behavior. 
A good proposal is that the type of states that get him to revise the prior distribution 
are those that are about the frequency of illuminant properties. Thus, attributing to the 
analyst the ability to represent illuminance and frequency properties allows us to 
make generalizations about his behavior not open to us otherwise. 
The types of computational states that can get me to say “red” are those that 
are about the redness of the chair as such. Attributing to me an ability to represent the 
redness of the chair allows us to make generalizations about my behavior despite 
there being indefinite computational routes to that behavior. 
In the case of the ant, we could individuate the states over which its 
computations operated in terms of their counterfactually supported causal powers 
independent of any intentional properties. Why does the state engendered by a leg 
movement lead to one motor output if it is tokened after a change in input from the 
polarized light detector, and another one otherwise? It’s because the state is one 
individuated in virtue of it having just those causal powers! This buys us all the 
explanatory power we want in the case of the ant. 
This style of explanation does not look to be true of human verbal behavior. 
Why did I say, “red” upon encountering a chair? Well, of course it’s because I was in 
some particular cognitive state that caused me to do so. But, notice, we can’t 
individuate that state in terms of this causal power and still hope to make interesting 
generalizations about the types of states that cause me to utter, “red” in response to 








such behavior in the particular circumstances I happen to be in is vacuous. 
In the case of the ant, we were able to individuate computational states in 
terms of the proximal stimuli that give rise to them in a counterfactual supporting 
way. The state that gives rise to differential motor output depending on whether it’s 
tokened by before or after a change in state of the light detector is one that is caused 
by particular proximal stimulation of the ant’s leg across any manner of contexts. 
However, we cannot type individuate the type of state that causes me to utter, 
“red” in terms of the proximal causes of that state. For, it turns out, an indefinite 
number of proximal stimuli could lead up to the state that causes me to utter, “red.” 
So, there’s something more to be said about the type of state that causes me to utter, 
“red.” It’s not simply a state with the particular causal properties of the particular 
state that caused me to say “red” in this particular instance. We want to individuate a 
state that has the property to cause me to say “red” in response to an indefinite 
disjunction of proximal stimuli. 
We can think of this distinction on analogy with the common distinction 
between implementational and computational levels of explanation. On the 
implementational level, we can explain, say, a particular instance of the ant’s 
behavior in terms of physiological interactions between its parts. But, once we notice 
that there are an indefinite number of physiological interactions that could have 
evinced just the same behavior, we generalize over them by individuating states of the 
ant in terms of computational role. Thus, there is a state of the ant, possibly variously 








particular proximal stimuli and to cause transitions to other computational states. 
Thus, at the computational level of explanation, we can say that what caused the ant 
to evince a particular behavior was not necessarily a state of a particular physiological 
type, but, more generally, a state of a particular computational type. 
In the same way, we can note that there is some state, variously 
physiologically realized, that causes a person on a particular occasion to say “red” in 
virtue of encountering particular proximal stimuli. But, we can further notice that 
there are other states that could evince just the same behavior despite differences in 
the proximal stimulation or computational route that caused the state to be realized. 
So, at a level above the computational level, we can say that it’s not necessarily a 
state of a particular computational type that caused the verbal behavior, but rather a 
state of some higher order type, variously computationally realized, that caused the 
verbal behavior. 
The contention of this chapter is that the higher order type of state we should 
be talking about is a state type-individuated by its intentional properties. The 
explanatory role that intentional properties play is that they allow us to type 
individuate states at a level above computational role in just the same way that 
computational properties allow us to type individuate states at a level above their 
physical constitution. 
What we see in Chomsky’s review of Skinner is a need for two additional 
levels of explanation in psychology that were not acknowledged by the behaviorists. 








generalizations over computational relations holding between states. Further, there 
were aspects of cognition, such as verbal behavior, the generalizations of which could 
not be captured by computational relations alone. Another level of explanation was 
needed to type individuate states independently of their computational role. 
It is only by talking about states that are individuated in terms being about 
redness as such and chairness as such that we can make generalizations about 
conditions under which humans talk about the redness of a chair rather than its 
chairness. An indefinite number of proximal stimuli can give rise to an indefinite 
number of computational routes to an utterance of “red.” We can describe what they 
all have in common by holding that they all at some point token a state that is 
individuated in virtue of it being about redness as such.  
5. Sufficient Conditions for Intentional Explanation 
All this has been rather abstract, so let’s get back to some more concrete examples to 
see how intentional, properties can function to make generalizations across 
computational properties. Let’s go back to our desert ant and start building up its 
navigational capacities until we find intentional properties necessary to explain them. 
Suppose that we increase the type of proximal stimuli that can get the ant to 
revise the motor instructions it outputs for its homeward walk. We could, for 








tokening states that co-vary with its vertical displacement.22 If the states tokened by 
these hair movements enter into the right relationships with those tokened by the 
polarized light detectors and step counters, the ant could instantiate a straight-line 
walk back to its nest despite an outbound walk that took it up and down over hills. 
But, still, we could explain this ability in terms of states individuated in terms of their 
propensity to be caused by particular proximal stimuli and to enter into computational 
relations with other states so individuated. 
In fact, it looks as though we can increase the number of proximal stimuli to 
which the ant’s navigational system is responsive nearly without limit and still be 
able to explain its navigational capacities in non-intentional terms. We need only note 
just which proximal stimuli the ant is sensitive to and how the states those stimuli 
engender combine in order to describe the behavior the ant will exhibit. The only 
reason we’d have to step up to another level of generalization is if there’s no way of 
characterizing the states of the ant in terms of the proximal stimuli they are caused by. 
Now, it might be objected at this point that appealing to intentional properties 
of the ant’s navigational states will help us explain how they interface with other 
aspects of its cognition that are clearly intentional. For example, suppose the ant has a 
desire to go home once it has found food. You might suppose that we can only 
explain why the ant walks in the direction of home after finding the food by 





22 It looks as though something like this might be the case (Grah et al. 2005), though see Grah et al. 








attributing a practical syllogism to it. It wants to get back home, it believes that home 
is in a straight line to the northwest, say, and therefore it walks in a straight line to the 
northwest. In order for the ant to implement such a practical syllogism, it would seem 
that we do need to attribute representations of the spatial layout of its surrounds.  
Now, it is true that the ant does act as if it is relying on such a practical 
syllogism. The question before us is whether the utility of this locution is merely as a 
useful metaphor, or whether it provides us additional explanatory power. There is a 
way of glossing the ant’s behavior such that we can account for how it fulfills its 
desire to travel home without supposing that the ant further represents the direction of 
its home, where it is now relative to its home in allocentric space, or any other spatial 
properties23. 
Think of the ant on analogy with a human riding in an automated car that 
implements the same navigational algorithm as the ant. The car’s onboard computer 
registers rotations of its wheels, and a sensor on top registers changes in light polarity. 
The computer integrates these inputs so as to compute a constantly updated homing 
vector that, once activated, will take the car back to its place of departure. Suppose 
the human riding in the car sits back as it performs a random drive through, say, the 
Atacama salt flats. The human has a desire to see a flamingo, and then to drive back 
home once she has seen one.  













Fortunately, the car as a button marked “Home,” which, upon being pressed, 
will activate the car’s homing vector and drive it back home. Thus, all the human has 
to do to accomplish her desire to get back home is to press the button. We need not 
think of any state of the human, or the car, or their mereological sum, as having 
intentional content as of the spatial properties of its terrain. Yet we can allow that 
there are states of the system, particularly in the human part of the system, that are 
about flamingos and home. 
Here, we have a case of an intentional system (the human) interacting with a 
non-intentional system (the car) in such a way as to produce behavior as if the system 
as a whole is instantiating a practical syllogism. But, we need not actually attribute 
the practical syllogism to the car and driver in order to explain how the two work 
together. In fact, it seems to me, we have a better understanding of how the human 
and car accomplish their task if we recognize how the human’s intentional system 
interacts with the car’s non-intentional system. 
The explanation is better on at least two counts. One, it explains more 
precisely the behavior of the system in this one instance. Simply attributing a 
practical syllogism to the car and driver glosses over interesting details about how the 
car’s navigational algorithm interfaces with the driver’s desire. More trenchantly, the 
explanation generalizes better over counterfactual behaviors of the car and driver 
system. Suppose that the upon seeing the flamingo, the human decides that rather 
than go home, she’d instead like to drive back to see the alpacas she passed on the 








car’s navigational system, has been charting her position throughout the drive and has 
the means to take over and pilot the car manually, she’ll be unable to drive back to the 
alpacas. Neither she nor the car have a representation of where they are! So, the car 
and human system has no general capacity to implement practical syllogisms over 
desires to go particular places in light of beliefs about where anything is. They only 
have a capacity to initiate the homing vector. Nonetheless, they can still satisfy a 
desire to get back home whenever they wish. We thus can think of the ant as being 
able to satisfy its desire to get home without needing to reference any intentional 
content as of spatial properties its states might have.  
Now, you might hold a view such that states that have the ability to fulfill 
desires thereby, in virtue of that ability, have intentional content that matches the 
content of the desire. The foregoing thought experiment strikes me as a good gesture 
at a reductio of this view-- though I take it it’s not decisive. Maybe the car’s states do 
represent spatial properties in virtue of being able to satisfy the human’s desire states. 
In any case, the story I’ve been telling could allow for such a view. Perhaps states of 
the ant’s navigational system have intentional content as of the location of the ant’s 
burrow in virtue of the fact that they are able to satisfy the ant’s desire with the 
content to go to the location of the burrow. What I’m pressing here is that even if 
these states have such content, it doesn’t seem to be doing any explanatory work in 
the context of explaining either how it gets back home, how it may satisfy its putative 
desire to get back home, or its counterfactually characterized capacity to do either of 








But, now, suppose we fortify the ant’s capacities to see when we might need 
to appeal to intentional content to explain its behavior. Suppose, for example, that the 
ant exhibited the following capacity. After being allowed to roam around the territory 
surrounding its nest for a while, we anaesthetize it and place it at some random 
location or another within the territory. Consistently, upon regaining consciousness, 
it’s able to navigate in a straight line back to its home.  
On the face of it, it seems difficult to explain this behavior in terms of the 
proximal stimuli impinging on the ant. After all, it would seem to be getting very 
different proximal stimuli from some sources, and precisely the same stimuli from 
others. If the ground around the territory is flat, the ant could not use stimulation of its 
graviceptors to guide its way home. On the other hand, whatever visual stimulation it 
might be receiving could be so diverse as to prohibit generalizing about its behavior 
in terms of that stimuli.  
Suppose that on one occasion, we place the ant facing north on the east side of 
a rock, and on another, facing south on the west side of the rock. On both occasions, 
the rock will present very different visual stimuli to the ant, yet on both occasions, it 
will navigate successfully from the rock in a straight line to its nest. We can’t make a 
generalization about the type of proximal visual stimulus that is allowing the ant to 
orient toward its home. 
What would seem to be the case in each instance is that the ant is responding 
to some aspect of the distal stimulus-- the rock itself-- and the location of its nest 








about solely in terms of proximal stimuli the rock engenders in the ant. It would seem 
that the rock can give rise to an indefinite number of proximal visual stimuli alone, 
given the ant’s different perspectives on the rock. It would be difficult to characterize 
what all of these proximal stimuli have in common such that they could be used to 
individuate the same type of state in the ant.  
Now, given the ant’s behavior, there is still the possibility that it is relying on 
an easily definable class of proximal stimuli. It could be that the ant has stored in its 
memory a series of “snapshots” of the rock-- visual impressions from different 
perspectives. It could be that we can characterize these snapshots in proximal terms, 
along the lines of retinal intensity arrays. So, when looking at the rock from two feet 
north, the ant receives a particular pattern of retinal stimulation that is stored in 
memory. The ant would thus have a capacity for pattern matching: proximal visual 
stimuli that matched a pattern stored in memory would activate that stored snapshot. 
Such a capacity would be akin to that exhibited by flies, Drosophilia 
melanogaster (Dill, Wolf, & Heisenberg, 1993). These flies are tethered in a flight 
simulator with their heads immobilized, such that their flying motion controls which 
visual stimulus they receive and experimenters can measure quite accurately what 
retinotopic stimuli the flies are responding to. During a training phase, experimenters 
negatively reinforce the flies with infrared heat when, during the course of their 
flight, the flies are looking at particular random dot textures or figures. During 
training, the flies change flight direction when so stimulated. During a testing phase, 








had occasioned heat during training. 
But, the patterns provoke this response in the testing phase only when they are 
presented to the same spot on the flies’ retinas as they had been during training. If the 
same patterns are presented a few degrees below or above the position they had 
originally appeared on the fly’s retina, the fly will not respond. This suggests that the 
flies’ behavior can be characterized in terms of registrations of proximal retina stimuli 
stored in memory. 
This is the sort of retinotopic pattern matching that Burge (2010) also takes to 
be non-intentional: 
...the visual systems of bees respond to retinal impresses from the 
shapes of landmarks, without utilizing shape constancies, or other 
perceptual constancies. The bee flies to a position where it receives 
a stored retinal impress from a landmark. Then a further stage in its 
navigational procedure is triggered. In such cases, even if the 
retinal impress from the landmark is broken in some ways, the 
bee's sensory system will complete the sensory template. In such 
cases, no visual perception need be involved. The bee's visual 
system, in solving this particular task, does not form a visual 
representational model of any aspect of its environment. It relies 
purely on the prototypical retinal registration of proximal 
stimulation. Such reliance could be counted an extraction of form. 
It is not visual perception (p. 419) 
 
So, Burge seems to think such a capacity does not require appeal to intentional 
content, for much the same reason I’ve been pressing: we can make all the 
generalizations we want in terms of the proximal stimuli impinging on the 
bees, the flies, or the ants. 








memory, and that along with these snapshots are stored motor programs that will take 
the ant in a direct line back to its home from the location at which the snapshot was 
taken. Perhaps, then, what the ant is doing upon being released near the rock is 
wandering around a bit before being stimulated in just such a way that matches one of 
the visual snapshots stored in its memory. At that point, the proximal visual stimulus 
activates the motor routine that takes the ant back to its nest. If this were the 
procedure the ant was following, then we could generalize its navigational abilities in 
terms of proximal stimuli. Whenever encountering proximal stimuli of the type stored 
in one of its visual snapshots, the ant will initiate the motor program stored with that 
snapshot.  
Now, it might be objected that in this case, intentional states would be useful 
for generalizing the behavior of the ant. Sure, there may well be a finite number of 
snapshots stored in the ant’s memory-- a thousand, say. But, in the absence of any 
characterization of what’s common to these snapshots in terms of their proximal 
properties, it would be useful to find a property that they all have in common. That 
they are all snapshots of or about the rock-- albeit from different perspectives-- might 
be a useful property by which to type individuate them. 
We could even use the attribution of states that are about the rock to 
generalize across the behaviors of many ants that may make use of slightly different 
snapshots. Suppose ant 1 has a database of one thousand snapshots of the rock, and 
ant two has a database of one thousand different snapshots of the rock. Nonetheless, 








rock. We can describe what’s common to their behavior by noting that both of them 
represented the rock by means of some snapshot or another. 
In the case of the constancy processes described above in Section 1, we could 
make all the generalizations we wanted in terms of the proximal characteristics of the 
stimuli. For example, lightness constancy was explained in terms of the abruptness of 
intensity changes in retinal stimuli. Under our current hypothesis, we can’t 
characterize the snapshots in terms of similarities in their intensity gradients or other 
such proximal characteristics. So, in order to characterize generally the states that get 
the ants back home, it seems like intentional properties might be useful. 
Whether intentional states really would be explanatorily useful here depends 
on what precisely the competence of the ant’s navigation system consists in. For the 
precise operation of the ant’s navigation system will determine in what ways we are 
able to type individuate the snapshot states, and therefore, whether individuating them 
in terms of intentional properties proves necessary.  
Suppose, for example, that the ant’s navigational capacity operates in the 
following manner. As the ant walks around, every half second, its visual system 
stores in memory a snapshot corresponding to its current retinotopic stimulation. 
Concurrently, its step counting system computes the motor instructions that would 
take it in a straight line back to its nest. These motor instructions are stored in 
memory with the snapshot-- in the same file, if you will. The snapshot mechanism 
thus works to get the ant back to its nest in the case described because, given it’s 








from memory that brings with it just the right motor instructions get the ant back to its 
nest. 
So we can generalize over the circumstances that get both ants home in a 
variety of circumstances without positing states that are about the rock that caused the 
snapshots. What the snapshots have in common is that they are associated in memory 
with motor instructions that will take the ant back to its nest from the location the 
snapshot was originally taken. We can generalize over the states in terms of these 
properties rather than assigning intentional properties to them based upon their distal 
causal etiology. 
All this is to say that generalizing over the ants’ behavior in terms of the rock 
itself would be to undergeneralize. There’s nothing particular about the rock itself 
that helps explain the ants’ competence. They would behave the same way whether or 
not the rock happened to be where it is-- or indeed whether or not they happened to 
see it. We can see that an ant equipped with virtual reality goggles that stimulate its 
retina independently of its environment would behave in just the same manner in this 
context as an ant without such goggles. Each of them would walk about, taking 
snapshots and storing them with motor instructions generated by their step counters.  
At a particular location, the snapshot generated by the ant without the goggles 
would be caused by some view of the rock. But, the snapshot for the ant with the 
goggles would be generated by the goggles themselves. In both cases, though, they 
will be able to return to their nests upon returning to the location because returning 








memory, which in turn is associated with motor instructions for getting back to the 
nest. Just what the particular snapshot happens to be, or its distal cause, is irrelevant.  
Indeed, in order to generalize about the similarity of the behavior between the 
two ants-- even the one who does not receive stimulus from the rock-- we do well to 
avoid referencing the rock or states representing it. The more general description 
individuates the states in terms of their function in a computational process rather 
than the distal etiology of the states.  
It might be objected that the better generalization in this case is to say that the 
ants both get home, but do so because one of them veridically represents the rock and 
the other misrepresents whatever has been displayed to it by way of the virtual reality 
goggles (a blade of grass, say). While such a characterization might comport well 
with our folk psychology, it doesn’t buy us any generalizations that can’t be had 
otherwise.  
We explain the ants’ locomotion by generalizing that (a) they have states of 
their visual, motor, and memory systems that are homomorphic to one another. That 
is, there is some state X, realized in ant 1 by a snapshot of the rock, and in ant 2 by a 
snapshot generated by its goggles. And, state X is related to states of other systems in 
ant 1 in a way that is homomorphic to the relations between state X and states of 
systems of ant 2. The generalization works in the particular environment the ants are 
in because (b) the computational relations described in (a) are homomorphic to the 
space the ants are traversing. To say that state X in ant 1 represents a rock and in ant 2 








etiology and physical properties in each ant. But, the intentional ascription isn’t 
necessary to explain this fact. The intentional idiom is merely a way of noting it. 
You might allow that these considerations are enough to suppose that 
appealing to broad content is not necessary to explain the behavior of the ant, but 
nonetheless think that the foregoing account does depend on a notion of narrow 
content, along the lines that Carruthers (1987) construes it. You might suppose, that 
is, the ants don’t represent the rock de re, but that the snapshots have narrow contents 
that serve to refer to the rock when they are embedded in particular contexts. So, for 
example, the ants that are hooked up to the virtual reality goggles fail to represent the 
rock, whereas the ants who have states actually caused by the rock represent it as 
such. In both cases, the ants have states with the same narrow content. 
There are two things to point out here. First, notice that whatever narrow 
content the ants might have doesn’t have correctness conditions in and of itself: token 
deployments of such narrow contents have correctness conditions only relative to the 
context of that deployment. Insofar as the notion of content I’m concerned with is the 
notion concerned with correctness conditions, ascribing such narrow content to the 
ants doesn’t per se entail that content in the relevant sense factors into explaining the 
ants’ behavior. Of course, we could note that each narrow content token would have 
content with correctness conditions: the ants interacting with the rock would have 
states about the rock, and those with the goggles would have states of goggle 
projections. For our purposes, we can allow that the ants may have such contents.  








navigational behavior of the ants. After all, the ants with correct narrow 
representations and incorrect narrow representations would behave the same in the 
same context. The difference in correctness conditions doesn’t track any differences 
in the ants’ behavior or cognition. Thus, the observation remains that we can 
characterize the ants’ behavior quite well solely in terms of the proximal stimuli 
impinging upon them. 
Now, were further cognitive states to influence the ant’s navigational 
capacities, it would become increasingly difficult to describe the ant’s behavior solely 
in terms of its proximal input. Suppose, for example, the ants with the virtual reality 
goggles could revise their route based upon haptic feedback as well as their retinal 
snapshots. Suppose the states of the ants with the virtual reality goggles were 
somehow defeasible in light of a large disjunction of further possible evidence. Then, 
we would be hard-pressed to characterize counterfactually the circumstances under 
which the ants’ states are open to revision.  
Now, in practice, a creature’s states are likely only revisable relative to some 
finite disjunction of possible input. As Descartes made manifest long ago, in practice, 
even our lauded human cognitive capacities seem to give out when trying to figure 
out whether we’re being deceived by an evil demon.24 So, again, when teasing out 





24 I hazard a speculation that it’s the very isotropic nature of our minds that leaves us vulnerable to 
Cartesian skepticism. No matter how good our evidence one way or another, we seem always able to 









whether intentional content is necessary to characterize a creature’s cognitive 
capacity, we should look at its idealized cognitive competence rather than its in-
practice performance. The question is whether the idealized competence of a system 
is in-principle revisable in terms of an indefinite disjunction of input in abstraction 
from contingent performative constraints-- not whether the system is in fact open to 
an indefinite disjunction of input. 
There are lots of evidence that could in-principle get the ant to revise its walk, 
if only it were sensitive to it. For example, if the ant knew all about humans and their 
nasty penchant for experimenting on desert ants, the ants might infer that when they 
are lifted up and placed back down again that they have been displaced by an 
experimenter. Thus, we might expect them not to just start walking along their 
homing vector as though nothing had happened. But, this is precisely what they do. 
After all, as a matter of performance, the cognitive architecture of an ant outside of its 
navigational capacities just doesn’t seem sensitive to properties such as ‘human 
experimenter displacing ants in space.’ So, for all we’ve said here, the ant might have 
some competence to represent its location in space, but in the experimental 
conditions, performance constraints-- such as the inability to represent experimenters 
as such-- restrict it from evincing this competence in practice. 
But, what’s interesting about the ants is that they don’t seem to have even a 
competence to revise the output of their navigational systems in light of other 
evidence that they are sensitive to. Their competence seems to be solely limited to 








don’t seem to have the cognitive architecture to influence the output of their 
navigational system via input from other systems. Indeed, the ants in general seem 
quite sensitive to the position of food-- they stop their random walks upon 
encountering it. But, when they are transported from food they have discovered on 
their random walk to an area in which the food is absent, they still commence the 
same motor routine as they did as when the food was still present. Thus, their 
navigational systems seem insensitive to the absence of food. 
This is all just to note that the navigational competence of the ant seems to be 
encapsulated from input other than the proximal deliverances of its step counters and 
polarized light detector. It’s because the system is so encapsulated that we can 
generalize its counterfactual operations solely in terms of its proximal inputs and 
computational transformation of same. It’s because we can make all these 
generalizations in terms of these proximal properties, that we need not appeal to 
intentional properties in order to generalize about the operations of the ant’s 
navigation system.  
Thus, if we have means for type-individuating mental states independently of 
intentional content, then, prima facie, we have no need to appeal to intentional 
content in our explanations. In all the cases above, we were able to type-individuate 
computational states either in terms of the properties of proximal stimuli that give rise 
to them or in terms of the computational role they play in cognition. In all such cases, 
once we had individuated the states in these terms, we could run all the explanations 








the causal processes linking these computations to the world. There was nothing left 
for intentional content to explain. 
All this is not to argue that modular processes, in some broad sense, are non-
intentional. Indeed, as the next two Chapters will argue, there are many modular 
processes that may well be intentional, including that devoted to phonology. These 
modular processes will be un-encapsulated modules such as those postulated by 
Carruthers (2006), rather than the encapsulated modules of Fodor (1983). 
 These considerations do suggest, however, that highly encapsulated 
processes-- those not open to isotropic revision-- do not, as a general rule, require 
intentional content. Of course, general rules are defeasible, and thus there is always 
the possibility that intentional content may well play an explanatory role even in 
highly encapsulated systems. The foregoing considerations merely suggest that we 
would have to have quite good reason to posit such an explanatory role. It’s not 
immediately obvious what it might be.  
In general, encapsulated systems seem amenable to characterization in terms 
of their proximal inputs and the computational transformations performed on them. In 
contrast, we have at least two good reasons to appeal to intentional states in 
characterizing isotropic processes. Intentional content allows us to type-individuate 
the states these processes operate over, and allows us to characterize counterfactual 
generalizations made over those states. Of course, I leave it an open question as to 
whether there are good empirical generalizations that are only available if we 








admit that intentional properties also play an explanatory role in encapsulated systems 
as well. 
5.1 A Role for Content: State Type-Individuation 
Now, suppose, alternatively, that the ant’s navigation system was sensitive to changes 
such as the absence of food. Or, perhaps it’s sensitive to whether the grains of sand at 
one position are different colors than those of another. Or, in general, suppose that the 
ant was able to navigate back to its nest after being displaced at arbitrary points 
around the nest, but did not rely upon a store of retinotopic “snapshots” to do so. In 
these cases, the ant would seem to have a very different cognitive competence. 
Indeed, the ant’s navigational system would seem to be in principle open to an 
indefinite disjunction of possible influences. Different points of displacement would 
cause very different proximal stimuli. And, it would seem, there would be no way to 
generalize over such an indefinite disjunction solely in terms of the properties of the 
proximal stimuli. 
An ant with such a navigational competence would be very like the honeybees 
studied by Menzel et al. (2005). Unlike Burge’s idealized desert ant, these bees 
exhibit a navigational competence that is only characterizable in terms of states with 
intentional content. Menzel et al. demonstrate that honey bees are able to navigate 
back to their hive after being displaced at arbitrary locations around it. 
Because the bees were displaced from the hive to a release point in the dark, 
they could not rely on path integration capacities. They had no information about the 








opportunity to integrate any such information into a homing vector, as with the desert 
ant. 
Because the release points were arbitrary, Menzel et al. point out that it’s fair 
to assume that in many cases the bees had never before flown from the point of 
release to the hive. Moreover, some of the bees first flew to the locations of feeders 
before subsequently heading back to the hive. Since all flights to the feeders originate 
from the hive, we can be sure that the bees had never flown from their release points 
to the feeders before. Thus, the retinotopic “snapshot” story also fails to explain the 
bees’ homing behavior25. Since we can generally assume the bees had not been at 
their release points in the past, they could not have any stored snapshots from those 
locations that could guide their navigation. 
Indeed, since the bees exhibit a capacity to return to both the hive and to 
feeder sites from any arbitrary release point from their range around the hive, it would 
seem that they can return to the hive from an indefinite disjunction of sites. Of the 
indefinite disjunction of possible release points around the hive, pick any one 
arbitrarily and a bee will be able to navigate from it back to the hive (ceteris paribus). 
Since each release point corresponds to a different set of proximal stimuli that will 
impinge on the bee at that location, the bees exhibit a capacity to return to the hive in 
response to an indefinite disjunction of proximal stimuli. 













Because the bees respond to an indefinite disjunction of proximal stimuli, we 
cannot generalize about their homing capacity in terms of properties of the proximal 
stimuli that gives rise to it. As I’ve argued, we can do this in the case of the 
magnetotaxic bacteria, slime mold, desert ant, and early visual constancy 
mechanisms. In those cases, we did not need intentional content to run our 
explanations since we could make our generalizations in terms of properties of the 
proximal stimuli. But, this route isn’t open to us in the case of the honey bee, so 
appealing to intentional contents may well be useful. 
Since we cannot generalize the behavior of the bees in terms of properties of 
their proximal stimuli, an alternative hypothesis is that all of the bees share some 
other downstream mental state that in each instance causes the bee to return to the 
hive. Our explanation of why all the bees are able to return to the hive will therefore 
depend on characterizing this state.  
We won’t be able to characterize the state in terms of the proximal stimuli that 
give rise to it. After all, ex hypothesi, an indefinite disjunction of proximal stimuli 
corresponding to the various release points are capable of giving rise to the state. 
Since we can’t type-individuate the state in terms of its proximal causes, neither can 
we individuate it in terms of its computational role. After all, part of its computational 
role is constituted by its interaction with proximal states. Insofar as different proximal 








different computational role in each bee.26 So, our hypothesis is that the bees share a 
state that can be type-individuated neither by the proximal stimuli that effect it nor its 
computational role in the bees cognition.  
A solution is to type-individuate the state in terms of intentional content. We 
can attribute to all the bees a state that is about the hive, even though it may, on 
different occasions and in different bees, play a very different computational role. 
Thus, we can offer an intentional explanation of the bees’ homing behavior. The bees 
are able to get back to the hive from arbitrary release points because the stimuli they 
receive upon being released prompts them to represent the hive and their own 
location relative to its location. Since all the bees receive very different proximal 
stimuli upon release, the causal-syntactic processes that will eventuate in them flying 
home may all be quite different. Yet, at some point in these syntactic processes, each 
bee will represent the hive, its location, and the bee’s own location relative to it.  
One way of visualizing such a process is to think of the computational process 
of individual bees as a path through an x-y coordinate space (fig. 1). Suppose that 
each (x,y) coordinate corresponds to a different mental state. The computational path 





26 This account leaves open the possibility that the state is individuated by some particular aspect of 
its computational role along lines of Rey (2009). In this case, some aspects of the state’s computational 
role would remain constant across bees despite changes in its overall computational role. It’s in such a 
manner that we might suppose that a ‘bachelor’ state is essentially one that has a computational role of 
being appropriately connected to ‘unmarried’ and ‘man’ states in every cognizer in which it’s tokened, 
despite the fact that its computational role in regard to other states may be variable. That is, Mary may 
believe that John is a bachelor, whereas Susan may believe John is not a bachelor. In that case, both 
Mary and Susan’s ‘bachelor’ states are connected to ‘unmarried’ and ‘male’ states, but have very 








of each bee’s cognition through this space will likely be very different. They will start 
at different points because they start with different proximal input. They end with 
different output because the motor plan to get back to the hive will be different for 
each bee since they are at different locations. Since they start with different input and 
end with different output, they will likely take different syntactic paths from that 
input to their output. However, each path through cognitive space intersects at the 
same point. We can thus explain that this point plays a key causal role connecting the 
bees’ different inputs with their different outputs. And, we can type-individuate this 
point by pointing to its intentional content as being about the bees’ hive.  
 
(fig. 1) A map of the cognitive processes of three bees, progressing from input  
 
on the left to output on the right. Each cognitive path relies upon a particular state 






























The diagram also allows us to see why we can’t individuate the same point in 
terms of its syntactic role: in each individual bee, the location of the point relative to 
other upstream and downstream states is very different for each bee. For example, in 
bee 1, the hive state is positioned below upstream states and above downstream 
states, whereas the reverse is true for bee 3. Being higher or lower on the y axis 
doesn’t have any particular analogue to any actual feature of cognition. It’s just a 
concrete way of pointing out that the syntactic structure in which the same state is 
embedded in bee 1 is radically different from the structure in which it’s embedded in 
bee 3. Because of this, the state cannot be type-individuated in terms of its relations to 
the other states that make up the respective bee’s cognitive processes. 
In this way, intentional content can play an explanatory role type-
individuating mental states that cannot be type individuated in terms of the totality of 
their computational roles. Intentional explanations can thus abstract away from token 
syntactic processes to describe mental processes shared across individuals that might 
instantiate very different computational routes from input to output. An intentional 
explanation of the bees cognition would type-individuate states that they share in 
terms of intentional content. An intentional explanation of their homing behavior 
would then recount the transitions from one point of intersection to the next, 
abstracting away from the computational details of how each individual bee itself 








Though this method of intentional explanation may at first pass seem a bit 
outré, I think we can see that it is a pervasive feature of many folk-psychological 
intentional explanations. Consider, for example, our explanation of why twice the 
number of people as usual visited the grocery store this Saturday.  
A plausible explanation is that everyone in town believed there was a big sale 
at the store and many of them wanted to buy things at sale prices. But, of course, 
different people came to believe there was a sale at the store via quite diverse 
cognitive routes. Some read an advertisement in the paper, others heard about it from 
friends, and still others saw a lot of people driving to the store and inferred that there 
must be a sale going on. In each case, the proximal stimuli that prompted store-going 
behavior was different. Moreover the interactions with other mental states that led to 
the belief about the sale was different. Hearing about it from a neighbor causes one 
person to activate mental states concerning the trustworthiness and reliability of that 
particular neighbor, seeing many cars headed to the store alternatively interacted with 
beliefs about the number of cars usually on the road and reasons why more might be 
out than usual.  
When we give the intentional explanation that generalizes over the behavior 
of all these different people, we abstract away from these particular details of 
individual subjects to characterize just the states common to everyone: a belief that 
there’s a sale at the store, a belief about where the store is, and a desire to buy things 
on sale. So, one explanatory role for intentional content is to type-individuate mental 









5.2 A Role for Content: Counterfactual Generalization 
As we noted in Chapter 1, correctness conditions are the sine qua non of intentional 
properties. If intentional states are to do any explanatory work, these correctness 
conditions should play a role in explanation. Otherwise, it would seem that whatever 
work intentional states are invoked to do could be done by non-intentional states.  
You might worry that the type-individuating role we’ve opened up for 
intentional states in this chapter won’t require reference to correctness conditions. If 
all we need is some method of type-individuating states, then it seems as though we 
can do that without invoking correctness conditions. Given that we want to type-
individuate a state that’s engendered by indefinite proximal stimuli, we could just call 
it state X and be done with it.  
If intentional properties type-individuate mental states, we should expect them 
to explain something else in virtue of their correctness conditions. So, what we want 
to establish is that intentional properties can help individuate mental states in such a 
way that the correctness conditions of those properties help explain aspects of those 
states’ operations. As Milkowski (2013, p.154) puts it, “error should be system-
detectable”: whether an intentional state is correct or incorrect should make a 
difference to how the system itself operates, not just to how we, qua theorists, 
interpret its operations.  
The most obvious candidate for explanation in terms of the correctness 








we’ve type-individuated those states, what we need is an account of how they interact 
with each other. That is, the semantic properties of mental states would explain the 
interactions amongst them.  
However, explaining the interactions amongst intentional states in terms of 
their semantic properties flies in the face of canonical formulations of the 
computational-representational theory of mind. In these formulations, the interactions 
amongst mental states are supposed to be explained by the syntactic properties of 
those states alone. That the computational theory of mind could explain how truth-
preserving inferences could be effected independently of the semantic properties of 
their constituents was supposed to be the nicest thing about it.  
The proposal now on the table would seem to be that we reverse the direction 
of explanation. Semantic properties of mental states will explain their syntactic 
operations. It’s in virtue of a mental state having particular correctness conditions that 
it interacts with other mental states as it does. 
Fortunately, we can have our cake and eat it too. There is a way in which we 
can still appeal to syntactic properties of mental states to explain their inferential 
relations, while also appealing to the semantic properties of mental states to 
generalize about their interactions. 
The semantic properties of a state determine the counterfactual influence other 
semantically individuated states have upon it. Suppose, for example, you are lost in 
the forest. You’ve been travelling in a direction that you believe is north, but you 








that moss tends to grow only on the north side of trees, you revise your belief. Now 
you believe that you’ve actually been travelling east, and come to believe you must 
turn to your left in order to head north. In this case, the mental states eventuated by 
your spotting of the moss had an effect on your direction of travel because they 
effected a belief about the direction of north. Because this belief was about north, it 
was able to influence your belief about your direction of travel. 
Notice that an indefinite disjunction of proximal stimuli could have influenced 
your belief. Had you seen the north star and believed it appeared in the northern sky, 
this would influence your belief. Had you found a compass with a needle pointing to 
the right, you would have come to believe that north was to your right. There’s no 
way to characterize in proximal or computational terms the disjunction of stimuli that 
could possibly revise your belief in your direction of travel. It is only other beliefs 
about directions that influence your current belief about the direction you’re heading. 
Notice that the correctness conditions of these states determine what sort of 
influence that they have on your belief about your current direction of travel. If you 
believe north is the direction of the north star, and believe that the north star is ahead 
of you, your belief that you are travelling north will not change. After all, the truth 
conditions of your beliefs about the north star are logically consistent with your 
beliefs about your current direction of travel. But, if you find a compass that you 
believe is pointing north and to your right, these beliefs will contradict the belief that 
you are already travelling north. Thus, ceteris paribus, you’ll revise your beliefs in 








actually to your right (or, alternatively that you’ve found a defective compass).27 
Thus, attributing intentional content allows us to type individuate mental 
states independently of their computational role or contingent relations to the external 
world. The correctness conditions of such states allows us to make counterfactual 
generalizations about the type of states to which they are sensitive. States that are 
about the direction north are counterfactually open to revision in light of other states 
that are also about the direction north. 
But, we can say all this while allowing that in each token case it is causal 
syntactic properties that implement these logical operations. It is in virtue of its 
syntactic properties that whatever mental state you use to represent north is causally 
open to revision in light of other mental states that also represent north. Given just 
this individual bit of cognition, we can describe it in purely syntactic terms, just as we 
can describe it in purely physical terms. 
But, as we’ve pointed out, since there are indefinite syntactic routes from 
proximal stimuli to revisions of this state, we cannot counterfactually characterize the 
type of states to which your belief is sensitive in terms of their syntactic roles. Thus, 
the only way to generalize about the type of state to which your belief about north is 





27 Of course, just which beliefs you’ll revise in the face of a contradiction is a subject of perennial 
dispute. Fodor (2000) despairs that computational psychology can give an adequate account of this 
problem. But Carruthers (2006) and others suppose that we can appeal to heuristic processes that 
determine which beliefs to revise. I remain neutral on what is the correct account of this problem. My 









sensitive is to point to the semantic properties of those states. To put this principle 
concisely: states that are about north have the syntactic properties that allow them to 
revise other states that are about north. 
This mode of intentional explanation is not just good for such folk 
psychological accounts. It helps explain phenomena such as the navigation capacities 
of the honey bees. The conclusion that Menzel et al. come to about the bees is that 
they not only represent the hive and its location, but that they represent the location of 
the hive relative to features of the surrounding landscape and feeders. In this sense, 
they have what Menzel et al. call a “map-like” spatial representation of the hive and 
landscape. The bees use their beliefs about the location of the hive relative to these 
landscape features to orient themselves upon being released.  
Often, upon being released, bees initially fly at the same compass bearing they 
had been pursuing upon capture (p. 3042). It’s thus plausible to attribute to the bee an 
initial belief that it is located just where it had been upon being captured. Once it sees 
a feeder and represents it as such, it must square this new representation with the 
antecedent belief that it is still located back where it was captured. Our story would 
have it that the bee changes its flight path once it revises its belief about its own 
location to be consistent with its belief about the location of the feeder relative to 
itself and the hive. 
Attributing intentional states to the bees explains (1) how it is that different 
bees receiving different proximal stimuli can all fly back to the hive, and (2) why it is 








information that’s inconsistent with their beliefs about their current location. 
5.3 Fodor’s Alternative 
Fodor (1994, pp. 51-53) paints a similar-- though, n.b.-- non-identical picture of the 
explanatory role of intentional content. The picture is different enough that I want to 
disavow it here, while borrowing some of its more felicitous insights. The idea is that 
propositional attitudes are relations to mentalese sentences. Intentional 
generalizations hold across creatures that take attitudes toward different mentalese 
sentences by characterizing the sentences as all having the same referent. So, for 
example, three people might variously stand in the relation of desire to the sentences: 
(1) ‘what Lucy’s eating’ (2) ‘the dessert your mother made for you’ (3) ‘Turkish 
delight.’ Fodor talks of these sentences as “modes of presentation” of the same 
referent: Turkish delight. We might generalize over these three subjects by attributing 
to them a desire for Turkish delight. We would explain the success of all three in 
obtaining Turkish delight by reference to an intentional law that, e.g., ceteris paribus, 
one gets what one wants28. Thus, psychological laws range over the intentional 
contents of mental states, while abstracting from the syntactic properties of the 
sentences that possess those contents.  
Fodor’s story is problematic on two counts. First, it makes it unclear how the 
computational theory of mind is to be useful in explaining the implementation of such 













intentional generalizations. Secondly, such intentional generalizations seem to miss 
out on counterfactuals that we can describe only by reference to the compositional 
structure of the mentalese sentences. 
As Fodor constantly reminds us, the computational theory of mind is so 
terrific because it gives us an account of how we can implement transformational 
processes over mentalese sentences in a manner that systematically preserves their 
semantic properties. But, if psychological explanation is generally like the above 
case, it’s hard to see why we need appeal to a process that preserves the semantic 
properties of mentalese sentences. After all, it’s intentional contents that have 
semantic properties, and according to the above picture, intentional explanations 
abstract from mentalese sentences. 
Consider an example. Person 1 wants “what Lucy’s eating.” Suppose he 
further comes to believe: “if there’s any more of what Lucy’s eating, it’s in the 
fridge,” and subsequently, upon Lucy telling him there’s more of what she’s eating, 
he believes: “there is more of what Lucy’s eating.” He thus deduces that he can fulfill 
his desire by going to the fridge.  
It’s clear in this case that the explanation requires an account of how the 
semantic value of “there’s more of what Lucy’s eating” can be transformed in order 
to instantiate the deductive syllogism. The computational theory of thought can take 
care of that for us, presumably. What’s not at all clear is how the semantic value of 
“Turkish delight” comes into play. At no point does a mentalese token with content as 








performed. But, the Computational Theory of Mind is supposed to be useful because 
it explains how the intentional states invoked by psychological laws enter into truth-
preserving relations with one another. But, according to the picture Fodor paints here, 
the mental states that enter into computational relations with one another (e.g., 
“there’s more of what Lucy’s eating”) are distinct from those that figure in intentional 
generalizations (“Turkish delight”).  
Now, you might object to the above account by arguing that there is a higher, 
more abstract level of explanation on which we can give a computational account of 
thoughts with the content TURKISH DELIGHT. Sure, person 1 may instantiate 
syntactic states of the form “what Lucy’s eating,” just as person 2 instantiates 
syntactic states of the form “the dessert your mother made.” But, insofar as they both 
have the same referent (Turkish delight), we should treat them as the same thought 
for purposes of intentional explanation. Thus, on a higher level, we can make the 
computational generalization that both person 1 and 2 want Turkish delight. 
But, giving intentional generalizations on such abstract terms misses crucial 
counterfactual generalizations. Desiring, as she does, some of the dessert your mother 
made (de dicto), upon learning that there’s some Turkish delight in the fridge, person 
2 won’t thereby come to believe that the dessert your mother made is in the fridge. In 
fact, the situation is worse. Should she come to believe (contrary to fact) that your 
mother made the brownies on the counter, she will likely cut herself a brownie, even 









The lesson here is that the better explanation of person 2’s behavior tracks 
such counterfactuals. Attributing to her a desire for Turkish delight simpliciter 
doesn’t do so. A better explanation is that she revises her thoughts and behaviors to 
be consonant with the intentional properties of the states that compose the sentence to 
which her desire relates. It’s because her desire is an attitude toward a sentence with 
contents about your mother and last night that it is sensitive to beliefs with selfsame 
contents, and not sensitive to beliefs about Turkish delight as such. 
Though, as we have seen, Fodor is often quite sensitive to capturing 
counterfactuals such as the above, in the account at hand, he characterizes intentional 
explanation in terms of similarities in the contingent causal histories of different 
subjects: 
[T]he syntax of the mental representations which have the fact that 
P in their causal histories tends to overlap in ways that support 
robust behavioral similarities among P-believers. (p. 53) 
… 
computational-syntactic processes can implement broad-intentional 
ones because the world, and all the other worlds that are 
nomologically nearby, arranges things so that the syntactic 
structure of a mode of presentation reliably carries information 
about its causal history (p. 54). 
 
Thus, besides failing to take into account counterfactuals such as those above, 
Fodor’s account makes it unclear how psychology is supposed to deal with intentional 
inexistents, such as phonemes, triangles, unicorns, etc. We don’t want to say that 
every child wants a unicorn because they all have a similar causal history as regards 
unicorns! What was so nice about Fodor’s (1987) version of asymmetric dependence 








whatever de facto relations a state might bear either to other mental states or to 
externalia. It appealed only to counterfactual relations to externalia. That left us free 
to generalize across subjects independently of their actual holistic mental states or 
contingent environments and histories. 
Why Fodor changes his tune in (1994) is not clear to me. In any case, all I 
want to stress here is that the notion of intentional explanations abstracting up a level 
from computational explanations I’m propounding is not the same as that given by 
Fodor (1994), for good reason. 
Nonetheless, despite its problems, there is quite a bit correct in what Fodor 
says here. In fact, we can give a gloss on the generalization over the three subjects 
above in a way that preserves much of his insight and skirts the problems enumerated 
here. We need only assume that on way to reasoning about their initial desires, each 
subject in fact tokens a desire toward the mentalese phrase, “Turkish delight” (which, 
of course, has the content TURKISH DELIGHT). 
Subject 1 starts with a desire to eat what Lucy’s eating and Subject 2 starts 
with a desire to eat the dessert that your mother made last night. Subject 1 asks Lucy 
what she’s eating. She replies, “Turkish delight.” In light of this evidence, Subject 1 
comes to believe: “Lucy is eating Turkish delight.” So, now he wants to eat Turkish 
delight. Believing that there is some Turkish delight in the fridge, he heads over there.  
Meanwhile, Subject 2 is off on her quest to fulfill her desire to eat the dessert 
your mother made last night. She spots a plate of brownies on the counter and 








brownie package in the trash, and concludes that someone bought the brownies at the 
store, took them out of the package and put them on the plate. 
In the trash, though, she also spots some walnut shells. She recalls your 
mother talking about how she hates shelling walnuts, and so only does so when she 
makes Turkish delight. She thus comes to believe that your mother made Turkish 
delight last night. So, now she wants some Turkish delight. She also believes (counter 
to fact) that Turkish delight melts unless refrigerated, so she reasons it must in the 
refrigerator. So, she heads to the fridge, where, lo, she meets Person 1. 
Why did Persons 1 and 2 both go to the refrigerator? Well, because they both 
wanted Turkish delight and they both believed it was in the refrigerator. This 
explanation relies on the intentional properties of “Turkish delight” in at least two 
respects. First, it allows us to type-individuate states across both persons despite those 
states being embedded in very different computational processes in each individual. 
Secondly, since the state is individuated in semantic rather than syntactic terms, we 
can make sense of how it interacted with each subject’s idiosyncratic mental states in 
each case. It interacted to as to make semantically valid inferences. 
Maybe something like this is the picture Fodor had in mind all along. The idea 
is that intentional explanation abstracts from computational level explanations not by 
supervening on them in the usual sense, but by abstracting away from various intra-








they may have with the external world.29 Thus, intentional content is explanatorily 
efficacious when we must generalize across subjects that have very different intra-
state relations and/or are embedded in very different environments. By contrast, there 
is no need for intentional explanation as long as we can type-individuate 
computational states in terms of properties of the proximal stimuli that give rise to 
them and their syntactic relations to other states. 
6. Conclusion 
Before moving on, there is one last point we should clarify about this latter claim. 
The formulation above, remains ambiguous between two ways of construing the 
claim. On the one hand, there are generalizations we could make in terms of rather 
simple properties of proximal stimuli. The examples we’ve looked at so far have 
made just such generalizations. Early vision responds differentially to sharp versus 
gradual changes of intensity on the retina. The ant registers a discrete state for each 
movement of its leg. I take this Chapter to have given good reason to suppose that in 
all such cases, explanatory appeals to intentional content are otiose. 





29 How to deal with Frege cases? We can perfectly well allow that contents are atomistic and can’t be 
characterized definitionally. It does not follow that propositional attitude states only relate to atomistic 
structures. Fodor is quite right to point out that under the CRT, attitude states relate to sentences, thus 
ipso facto to non-atomistic, structured entities. We can allow that Oedipus wants to not marry Oedipus’ 
mother qua mother of Oedipus, but nonetheless does want to marry Jocasta qua Jocasta. The mentalese 
sentence “mother of Oedipus” has content characterized not by its de facto referent, Jocasta, but rather 
the composition of the semantics its constituent parts: “mother” and “Oedipus.” Had he come to 
believe prior to the marriage that Jocasta was his mother, the latter desire to marry her would 









On the other hand, there could be states that are responsive to some finite, 
albeit very long, disjunction of very different proximal input. We could imagine, for 
instance, a creature that has 13 ways of perceiving a blackbird, all of which will cause 
it to engage in predatory behavior. Its predatory behavior might be occasioned, for 
example, by seeing black, smelling certain odors characteristic of blackbirds, hearing 
various blackbird related sounds, feeling downdrafts of wind often caused by flying 
blackbirds, etc. The creature’s response to all of these proximal stimuli allows it, 
more often than not, to capture blackbirds and eat them. 
Now, we can ask whether it’s explanatorily useful to attribute intentional 
content as of blackbirds to the creature in order to explain its predatory success. In 
this case, we could, in principle, characterize counterfactually the workings of its 
predatory system in terms of properties of the proximal stimuli that serve as input to 
the system. But, it would be rather unwieldy to list out each of the 13 disjuncts that 
could possibly serve as antecedents to its predation behavior. A better explanation, 
one might think, would be one that attributes to the creature a representation with 
contents as of blackbirds and use that state to generalize the behavior of two creatures 
who attack a blackbird under different circumstances. One might have attacked 
because it had certain olfactory stimulation, and another because it had certain visual 









This may seem a more parsimonious explanation than one which says that 
they both attacked because they each received one of 13 possible proximal 
stimulations, namely: 
1. certain olfactory stimulation 
2. certain visual stimulation 
3. ...etc. 
Nonetheless, it’s unclear that intentional content is doing any real explanatory 
work in this situation. For one, the correctness conditions of the blackbird 
representation don’t seem to be playing a role. By hypothesis, if the creature sees 
black, it will pounce, regardless of any additional evidence that the sight of black is, 
in this instance, not caused by a blackbird. Thus, the creature’s predatory system 
doesn’t have a state that is sensitive to other states that might represent that there is 
not a blackbird around. It has no mechanism by which to make sure the correctness 
conditions of its states comport with one another. 
Of course, we could engineer the creature such that its responses to proximal 
stimuli are defeasible in light of some other proximal stimuli. So, for example, it 
could be that the creature pounces when it sees black, unless it concurrently hears the 
growl of a panther-- in which case, its auditory stimuli defeats the visual stimuli and 
suppresses its attack behavior. This merely extends the length of the finite disjunction 
of stimuli to which the creature is sensitive. 
Nonetheless, the competence of the system could still be described in terms of 








thus behave in many cases as if it represents blackbirds as such. But, strictu dictu, 
attributing correctness conditions to a state that results from these stimuli will not buy 
us any counterfactual generalizations. Even, idealizing away from performance 
limitations, the system is ex hypothesi non-responsive to stimuli that outstrip the finite 
disjunction. So, listing out the disjunction captures all the counterfactuals.  
Attributing intentional content as of blackbirds would only serve as a helpful gloss on 
this disjunction, but not buy generalizations beyond those recorded by the disjunction 
itself. 
Nonetheless, you might suppose that this intentional gloss is explanatorily 
useful as it would helpfully allow us to type-individuate the states so caused as a 
common kind. Intentional attribution would thus make our explanation of the 
creature’s behavior more parsimonious. Rather than having to type-identify its states 
by listing out the long disjunction of stimuli to which they are sensitive, we could just 
identify them as “blackbird” states, where “blackbird” serves as a compact gloss on 
the disjunction.  
But, notice, we can achieve similar parsimony without appealing to 
intentional content. We need only coin a term, “H,” say, and type identify “H-states” 
as just those states caused by the long, yet finite, disjunction of proximal stimuli that 
“H” stands in for. Thus, we can have parsimony in our description of the creature’s 
operations without appealing to intentional content per se. 
This is what we do, presumably, when we talk about “smoke detectors” (cf. 








stimuli that are as a matter of fact associated with smoke (e.g., the presence of a light 
beam that may be diffracted by smoke, or a bimetallic strip that contorts in the 
presence of heat that may co-occur with smoke, etc.) . As a result, it tends to beep in 
the presence of smoke. It’s simpler to say that it’s a “smoke detector” rather than “a 
device that enters into an electronic state that causes it to beep when light usually 
incident on a detector no longer is so incident, or when a bimetallic strip is deformed 
in a particular manner, or when…etc... all of which often as a contingent matter of 
fact are co-incident with the presence of smoke.”  
But notice, we may just as well call it an “H-detector” where “H” stands in for 
all the proximal stimuli the smoke detector is sensitive to. To explain the operation of 
the smoke detector, we need just note that it’s sensitive to a disjunction of proximal 
stimuli, H, each of which tends to covary with the presence of smoke. Attributing 
intentional content as of smoke to the smoke detector does not buy us any explanatory 
virtues. 
Thus, intentional content is not on the face of things explanatorily useful in 
explaining the operations of systems that can be generalized over in terms of a finite 
disjunction of properties of their proximal input. It is explanatorily useful to 
generalize over systems that are subject (after idealizing away from performance 
constraints) to an indefinite disjunction of possible proximal input. It is so useful on 
at least two counts. First, it allows us to type-individuate the states of such systems 








allows us to capture counterfactual generalizations that we would not be able to make 
otherwise. 
The next chapter addresses three objections to this account of the explanatory 
role of intentional content. First, it considers the claim that the more pertinent 
distinction between intentional and non-intentional processes is one between finite-
state machines and read-write memory computers, rather than between encapsulated 
and isotropic processes. The second is the worry that my distinction between 
encapsulated and isotropic processes just recapitulates the old idea that the distinction 
between intentional and non-intentional processes maps onto the distinction between 
person-level and non-person-level states. Finally, I consider the objection that while 
my distinction might be correct in principle, it has no empirical bite because, as a 
matter of fact, there just is no distinction between encapsulated and isotropic 








Chapter 4: Architectural Objections 
 
1. Introduction 
Three objections to the picture laid out in Chapter 3 center around how it connects up 
with the overall cognitive architecture of the mind. The first objection concedes that I 
may be correct that explanation of many encapsulated processes requires no recourse 
to intentional states. The objection is that I’ve got the diagnosis wrong. It’s not simply 
because these processes are encapsulated that precludes their intentional explanation. 
Rather, it’s that these processes are instances of finite state computers. Following 
Gallistel & King (2009), you might suppose that it’s computers that employ 
read/write memories are those we should look to for intentional explanation. That is, 
the difference between computational cognitive processes that involve intentional 
states and those that do not is best characterized as a difference between finite state 
processes and processes that rely on read/write memory. It is not, as I have been 
arguing, best characterized as the difference between proximally encapsulated 
processes and isotropic, abductive processes. 
Not to worry, however: the differences between finite state and read/write 
memory machines on the one hand, and intentional versus non-intentional processes 
on the other, double dissociate. Finite state processes can require intentional 
explanation, but can sometimes do without, as can processes that make use of 








The second worry also calls into question drawing the line between intentional 
and non-intentional processes in terms of encapsulated versus isotropic processes. 
The worry here is multifarious. At one level, the worry is that while I insist not to 
have eliminated intentional states from psychology in principle, I may have 
succeeded in doing so de facto. Against the background of a roughly Fodorian 
architecture, the distinction between non-intentional encapsulated modules and an 
intentional global workspace may make some sense. If, however, the architecture of 
the mind is massively modular, as Carruthers (2006) has argued, we might start to 
worry that to the extent that I’m correct, all cognition is in fact non-intentional.  
Even if cognitive architecture is not exhausted by modular organization, you 
might further worry that insofar as my picture allows for intentionality, it burdens it 
with old fashioned restrictions to the effect that intentional states end up being at least 
de facto conscious, person-level, states. Suppose, for example, Carruthers’ recent 
(2015) work is correct and that conscious, System 2, reasoning is co-extensive with 
the only non-modular part of the mind (a sensory-based global workspace), then you 
might worry that intentional states only play a role in conscious, higher level thought 
processes. 
I could, of course, just bite the bullet and allow that given the theory of 
intentional efficacy given here, we would be forced to accept these conclusions if 
Carruthers’ architectural theories are correct. I could also point out that my claim is 








it open in principle that there may be other cases in which intentional attribution is 
required even though the cognitive capacity is not isotropic.  
Both of these responses seem rather unsatisfactory, however. The more 
interesting response is that we can allow for a Carruthers-style architecture and keep 
to my insistence that, generally, it is cognitive capacities that are open to isotropic 
revision that require intentional attribution-- all without having to de facto eliminate 
intentionality from human cognition, or accept that intentional states cannot be 
unconscious or part of “sub-personal” level processes. In section 3 below, I’ll argue 
for this claim. Then, in Chapter 5, I’ll give an example of a Carruthers style modular 
process that is nonetheless intentional: speech perception. 
One last worry is that if the distinction between intentional and non-
intentional explanations hinges on a distinction between isotropic and non-isotropic 
processes, it may turn out to be without any practical consequence. After all, if it 
turns out that people like Gary Lupyan and Andy Clark are correct, human cognition 
might not implement any bottom-up, encapsulated processes. Perhaps I am right that 
encapsulated processes can often be characterized non-intentionally. But, that 
observation, you might think, becomes uninteresting if there just aren’t any 
encapsulated processes in the human mind as a matter of fact. In that case, my thesis 
amounts to showing that human cognition is intentional, end of story. That, it would 
seem, is old news. The response here is just to observe again that we might allow for 








this way, we could well have mental capacities open to lots of top-down revision that 
are nonetheless non-intentional. We’ll see how that can be in Section 4 below. 
2. Finite State versus Read/Write Architecture 
Gallistel & King (2009) propound a view that “representations” figure into cognition 
once it comes to rely on an addressable read/write (ARW) memory. A machine with 
an addressable read/write memory system, “must be capable of symbolizing its own 
memory locations (addresses) using encoding symbols” (p. 149). The idea is that the 
machine must represent that the ‘1’ digit in the symbol, ‘10,’ stored in memory, 
represents the product of the number one and the number two raised to the first power 
in virtue of its position to the left of the ‘0’ digit. If further computations change the 
‘1’ symbol to a ‘0,’ presumably the machine must represent that the ‘0’ now occupies 
the same location as the ‘1’ and therefore represents the product of the number zero 
and two to the first power. In this sense, ARW machines represent the syntactic 
relations amongst binary symbols. 
Gallistel & King contrast such ARW machines with finite state architectures. 
Finite state architectures, they claim, do not rely on “representations” in the same 
sense as ARW architectures. Thus, Gallistel & King have a possible competing view 
as to what marks the difference between computation with and without 
representation: the latter occurs in finite state architectures, whereas the former occurs 
in ARW architectures. 
At first glance, this alternate diagnosis does seem compatible with some of the 








in the previous chapter implemented a finite state architecture. That is, each 
subsequent state of the machine was determined entirely by the immediately 
preceding state. Recall, for example, that the level of water in the tubes depended 
entirely upon the level of water in the tubes immediately before new water input was 
pumped into the system. As long as the water level was as it was, the machine would 
transition to a new state regardless of what particular history of state transitions had 
caused the water levels to have the particular prior distribution they had. 
Gallistel & King explain the notion of a finite state architecture as that 
implemented by a Turing machine that can only move its tape in one direction. It can 
produce outputs by writing on its tape, but the outputs are determined entirely by the 
current state of the machine head and whatever input it has just read off of the tape. 
That is, just like our Bayesian color constancy mechanism, such a finite state 
automaton will produce the same output whenever it is in the same state and given the 
same input, regardless of differences in the causal history of how it came to be in that 
state, receiving that input.  
A fully fledged Turing machine, on the other hand has an ARW memory in 
the form of a tape that can move in two directions and be written upon by the 
machine head. Such a device has the ability to write to its tape, store what it has 
written, and then advance the tape so as to make use of this stored symbol in later 
computations. The output of such a device is not fixed entirely by its present state and 








may change based upon what it has written on its tape in the causal history leading up 
to its current position.  
Devices with such an architecture, Gallistel & King argue, makes use of 
representations, whereas the finite state architecture does not. Gallistel & King put the 
difference in representational content between these two architectures by writing that 
there is: 
a distinction between knowing in the symbolic sense and the 
“knowing” that is implicit in a stage (state) of a procedure. This is 
in essence the distinction between straightforward, transparent 
symbolic knowledge, and the indirect, opaque “knowing” that is 
characteristic of finite-state machines, which lack a symbolic 
read/write memory (p. 100).  
 
Precisely what they mean by these two senses of “knowing” requires some 
explication: 
We put the state-based form of knowing in quotation marks, 
because it does not correspond to what is ordinarily understood by 
knowing. We do not place the symbolic form of knowing in 
quotation marks, both because it corresponds to the ordinary sense, 
and because we believe that this symbolic sense of knowing is the 
correct sense when we say such things as “the rat knows where it 
is” or “the bee knows the location of the nectar source”30 (100) 
 
Gallistel & King take these two senses of “knowing” to correspond to 
a nominal, anti-representational sense utilized by behaviorists on the one 





30 Of course, the premise of the present work is that it’s not perfectly clear whether the “knowledge” of 








hand, and the representational kind utilized by cognitive scientists in the post-
Chomskian tradition31: 
The anti-representational tradition, which is seen in essentially all 
forms of behaviorism… regards all forms of learning as the 
learning of procedures… At least in its strongest form (Skinner, 
1990), this line of thinking about the processes underlying 
behavior explicitly and emphatically rejects the assumption that 
there are symbols in the brain that encode experienced facts about 
the world (such as where things are and how long it takes food of a 
given kind to rot). By contrast, the assumption that there are such 
symbols and that they are central players in the causation of 
behavior is central to the what might be called mainline cognitive 
science (Chomsky, 1975; Fodor, 1975; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; 
Marcus, 2001; Marr, 1982; Newell, 1980) (101) 
 
Of course, just what this distinction amounts to and whether there is just one 
distinction to be made between the sense of intentional terms used by these two 
traditions is the central question of the present work. Traditionally, it has been 
assumed that cognitive accounts of behavior have differed from behaviorist accounts 
on at least two fronts. First, they posit internal mental states that are related 
computationally to one another and mediate between input and behavior. Secondly, 
there is the further hypothesis that these states have correctness conditions that feature 
in the explanation of behavior. 





31 Though, of course, as we’ve seen, Chomsky himself intends to use “knowledge” and 








Gallistel & King have here carved out some conceptual space in the middle 
that corresponds to the gloss we saw Collins (2007) give to Chomsky earlier. This is 
the position that many cognitive processes rely on computational states that mediate 
input and behavior, but that these states are not “representations” in some sense of the 
term. Collins argues that the computational states posited by generative linguistics are 
not “representational” in the sense of having correctness conditions that feature in 
linguistic explanation.  
Gallistel & King are not entirely explicit on how they take these 
internal computational states to be non-”representational,” but I suspect they 
do not have quite the same distinction in mind as Collins. Recall that for 
Gallistel (1990), a “representation” just is a state of an organism that 
instantiates a functional homomorphism with respect to some feature of the 
world, in much the same way Cummins (1989) thinks of representations. This 
is a convention Gallistel & King carry forward to their present work (2009, p. 
55 ff.). 
The distinction between finite state and ARW memory architectures 
they appeal to in distinguishing between capacities that can exhibit “knowing” 
in some pertinent sense seems, then, to be a distinction between architectures 
that can instantiate such functioning homomorphisms and those that cannot. A 
machine with an ARW memory can hold symbols in that memory that can 
bear relations to one another such that there’s a mapping from those symbols 








the other hand, a finite state machine may well be able to function well in a 
world inhabited by such objects, but it simply won’t have symbols and 
relations that satisfy a mapping onto the objects and relations in the world 
they serve to help the machine cope with. 
For example, they point to a finite state automaton that instantiates a 
function mapping binary numerals onto the properties odd and even: 
1 Read bit 1. If it is a ‘0’, go to state 2. If it is a ‘1’, go to state 3.  
2 Read bit 2. If it is a ‘0’, go to state 4. If it is a ‘1’, go to state 5.  
3 Read bit 2. If it is a ‘0’, go to state 6. If it is a ‘1’, go to state 7.  
4 Read bit 3. If it is a ‘0’, output ‘1’. If it is a ‘1’, output ‘0’. Halt.  
5 Read bit 3. If it is a ‘0’, output ‘0’. If it is a ‘1’, output ‘1’. Halt.  
6 Read bit 3. If it is a ‘0’, output ‘1’. If it is a ‘1’, output ‘0’. Halt.  
7 Read bit 3. If it is a ‘0’, output ‘1’. If it is a ‘1’, output ‘0’. Halt. 
 
In this instance, they write: 
State 5 “knows” that the first bit in the input was a ‘0’ and the 
second bit was a ‘1’, not because it has symbols carrying this 
information but instead because the procedure would never have 
entered that state were that not the case. We, who are gods outside 
the procedure, can deduce this by scrutinizing the procedure, but 
the procedure does not symbolize these facts (p. 100). 
 
So, in this finite state architecture, there is not a single symbol that co-varies 
(homomorphically or otherwise) with the digits of the input binary numerals. 
Therefore, there is no homomorphism (hence no functional homomorphism) between 
the binary digits and symbols of the algorithm that computes whether the numerals 
are odd or even. Thus, by Gallistel’s lights, there are no “representations” of the 
binary digits. Perhaps Gallistel & King would concede that the output of this finite 








co-vary with the evenness and oddness of the numbers symbolized by the input 
numerals. But, they argue that no representations (in their sense) figure in the 
procedure converting the input to the output. 
By contrast, they point to a ARW architecture that outputs sums given the 
input of two numerals: 
It knows what the carry bit is because that information is carried 
forward by a symbol (the bit) placed at the top of the current 
column earlier during the computation. f+ can be in State 3 with a 
‘0’ in the carry position or a ‘1’ in the carry position. This 
information is known explicitly. (100) 
 
Here, the “carry position” can be put into different states such that those states 
differentially covary with the results of computations carried out earlier in the 
process. The state that the carry position is put into may not influence further 
computations until several steps after it gets set.  
But, as we saw in Chapter 3, Gallistel & King’s notion of “representation” just 
isn’t the notion that this work is concerned with. In particular, we argued that mere 
homomorphic correlation is never sufficient to instantiate intentional states with 
correctness conditions that pull explanatory weight. Such states may be explanatorily 








explanatory power. Any description of this correlation in terms of correctness 
conditions is otiose.32 
It’s for this reason that Gallistel & King’s further contention that having a 
read/write memory architecture is a necessary and sufficient condition on 
implementing “representations” doesn’t contradict the thesis I’ve been propounding 
here. They may well be correct that such systems necessarily rely on 
“representations” as they understand them. That is, states that can stand in 
homomorphic relations to things in the world, but do not necessarily have intentional 
content as of those things. But, I argue that some such systems can be understood 
without appeal to intentional states, in my preferred sense of states with essential 
correctness conditions.  
For, notice that having a finite state versus ARW architecture double 
dissociates with the property of having states that are isotropically open to revision. 
We’ve already seen an example of an ARW architecture that I’ve argued is not 
intentional: the navigational capacities of our idealized desert ant. In order to 
navigate, the ant must store states that correlate with the number of steps it has taken 
since leaving its home. These states are then later accessed and transformed in 
accordance with a vector algebra in order to generate a motor procedure that takes the 
ant in a straight line back to its nest. Here, the states are stored in memory and indeed 





32 Moreover, homomorphisms can’t account for the ability of intentional states to be about things that 








bear homomorphic relations to geographic distances. So, they are “representational” 
in Gallistel & King’s sense of instantiating a homomorphism. But, as argued in 
Chapter 3, they are not intentional in the sense that concerns us-- despite being states 
of an ARW architecture. 
We can also modify the finite state Bayesian procedure used to implement 
color constancy in the previous chapter so as to create a finite state architecture that 
does rely on intentional content. Recall that in that procedure, particular states (which 
we modeled as water levels in tubes) co-varied with the probability that light waves 
of certain illuminances were present in the environment. The procedure was finite 
because the water level in the tubes at any given stage depended on what the water 
level in the tubes had been immediately beforehand. There was no way to siphon off 
water from the tubes, store it in “memory,” and only later allow it to interact with the 
system. 
We can preserve this same basic finite state architecture while opening the 
system up to isotropic revision simply by expanding the number of influences on the 
water level in the tubes. In our example, the only input that altered the water level 
was the deliverance of cone cell isomerization that pumped additional water into the 
tubes. If instead of just cone isomerization, some indefinite disjunction of inputs 
could possibly cause more water to be pumped into the tubes, we’d have just the sort 
of isotropically revisable system I’ve argued is a sufficient condition on requiring 








If input from just about any system could possibly cause more water to be 
pumped into the tubes, we’d have no way to generalize across the type of proximal 
stimuli that cause the water levels to revise. Positing that the tubes represent the 
likelihood that light of certain wavelengths is present, however, allows us to posit that 
the type of input stimuli that cause changes in the water level is just that of being 
about light waves of certain wavelengths. Notice that despite this alternation, we’ve 
preserved the finite state architecture of the constancy mechanism: the water level in 
the tubes is determined entirely by the level immediately before it receives input from 
some other system. 
So, Gallistel & King’s distinction between finite state and ARW architectures 
maps nicely onto their notion of “representation” as a functional homomorphism. 
ARW architectures are better able to implement such homomorphisms that finite state 
systems. However, the architectural distinction does not seem to have much bearing 
on whether a system makes use of intentional states. Both architectures can 
implement procedures that are open to isotropic revision and those that are not. Thus, 
drawing a distinction between mental processes that rely on intentional content and 
those that do not cannot be better drawn along the distinction between finite state and 
ARW architectures. My distinction between isotropic and non-isotropic processes still 
seems relevant. 
3. Massive Modularity & Isotropy 
My distinction between intentional and non-intentional computations in terms of 








Fodorian picture that the mind has a natural division between early encapsulated 
modules arrayed around an isotropic, Quinean global inference system. But, the 
distinction should hold up no matter what the actual architecture of the mind turns out 
to be. I stake no claim on the correct architecture, and would like for my account of 
intentional content to apply ecumenically.  
What if it turns out that the mind just does not have a global isotropic belief 
fixation system? For example, Carruthers (2006, p. 356 ff.)) argues that the mind does 
not make use of isotropic belief fixation processes of the kind described by Fodor 
(2000). If Carruthers is right, then my argument seems to be a de facto case for 
intentional eliminativism vis a vis human minds.33 I could bite this bullet, but 
fortunately I don’t have to. For, the notion of isotropy that Carruthers attacks is just 
not the sort of isotropy that I’ve advanced as a condition on the efficacy of intentional 
states. 
In the first place, as Carruthers is at pains to point out (p. 357), the modules 
that feature in his architecture are not the strongly encapsulated sort proposed by 
Fodor. Carruthers distinguishes between “wide-scope” and “narrow-scope” 
encapsulation (p.57 ff.). Narrow-scope modules are those that are counterfactually cut 
off from certain mental inputs: Pylyshyn-style early vision is just never open to input 





33 Strictu dictu the conjunction of Carruthers’ claim and mine wouldn’t entail eliminativism, even for 
actual human minds. For, recall, I only advance the present proposal as a sufficient condition on the 
efficacy of intentional states. But, absent a plausible additional sufficient condition, you might still 








from global belief states. Wide-scope modules are counterfactually, in principle, open 
to revision from a wide variety of sources. But, any particular operation of a module 
may access only a subset of the information it is in in principle privy to. Carruthers’ 
wide-scope modules are thus in principle perfectly compatible with the sort of 
counterfactually openness to isotropic revision I’ve argued is a sufficient condition on 
the operation of intentional content. 
Indeed, when Carruthers describes the process of belief fixation regarding 
whether Dusseldorf or Munich is the larger city, he seems to rely on a capacity that is 
isotropic in the sense germane to my argument. He proposes that such a capacity 
could be implemented by a “Take the Best” heuristic borrowed from Gigerenzer et 
al., 1999. This heuristic “searches for the piece of information concerning the two 
target items that has most often been found in the past to discriminate between items 
of that type along the required dimension” (55). 
Any given application of the Take the Best heuristic may access only a small 
subset of beliefs. But, it does seem capable of accessing just about any belief in 
alternate applications-- and thus sensitive to an indefinite disjunction of different 
intentional states. 
For example, it may well be that in this particular application, the heuristic led 
me to access my belief that having a top-division soccer team has been the most 
reliable guide to a city being large, which in turn caused me to search my beliefs 
about top-division soccer teams. But, had some other property-- say, the presence of a 








heuristic would then have searched my University beliefs. In this way, the heuristic 
seems sensitive to representations of whatever I deem to be the most reliable guide to 
city size. Prima facie, the disjunction of such properties appears indefinite: I could 
come to believe that any number of properties have been most reliable guides to city 
size. 
A module making use of the Take the Best heuristic is also open to revision in 
another respect. Insofar as the Take the Best heuristic is sensitive to my beliefs about 
soccer teams, universities, and the like, it also is going to be sensitive to all the states 
that influence my beliefs about soccer teams, universities, etc. My belief that Bayern 
Munich is in a higher division than Fortuna Dusseldorf is open to revision from a 
seemingly limitless number of sources-- things I read, what my friends tell me, what I 
see on television, etc. So, the disjunction of states to which the heuristic is sensitive 
becomes even more indefinite. 
Thus, application of the Take the Best heuristic seems to require precisely the 
condition on intentional explanation set out in Chapter 3. We can characterize the 
mental states the heuristic is sensitive to only in terms of the intentional content of 
those states. Which mental states is the heuristic sensitive to? Well, an indefinite 
number, as individuated in terms of their computational relations to other mental 
states. But, we can generalize over this disjunction by simply referring to 
computational states that are about properties that are reliable guides to city size, such 
as the presence of a top-division soccer team. It’s thus because one of my states is 








division soccer clubs being reliable guides to city size that explains how the heuristic 
uses them to come up with a belief that Munich is larger than Dusseldorf.  
Now as a matter of fact, as Carruthers points out, any token application of the 
heuristic need not access all of my mental states, let alone an indefinite disjunction of 
possible states! In any particular instance, the heuristic needs only access one 
particular mental state. In this sense, the heuristic is not Quinean, in that it is not 
sensitive to holistic properties of a set of mental states, such as coherence, simplicity, 
and the like. But, it is nonetheless still isotropic in the sense germane to making 
intentional content explanatorily efficacious. The heuristic relies on states, the 
constitution of which cannot be cached out in terms of their relation to other mental 
states. For, their relation to other mental states varies indefinitely in counterfactual 
situations. 
 If all we had to explain was this one-off instance of cognition, we could just 
identify this state with whatever physical substrate realizes it this once. But, if we 
want to explain this bit of cognition as one instance of a larger competence of 
implementing a heuristic, we’re going to have to expand the properties that constitute 
the states to which its sensitive. We can’t individuate these states in terms of their 
computational roles, because any number of states with indefinite computational roles 
could counterfactually modify the output of the procedure. The suggestion then is that 
we take having particular contents  
This consideration is thus also a nice illustration of my suggestion we think of 








explanatory levels. Intentional explanation generalizes over multiple computational 
routes just as computational explanations generalize over multiple physical 
realizations. Given any particular application of the heuristic, we could individuate 
the states involved via their syntactic relations to other states used in the operation. 
But, the fact that the computational routes that can be used to implement the heuristic 
are counterfactually indefinite makes it such that we can’t individuate the states 
employed by the heuristic in terms of their counterfactual role. When characterizing 
the competence of the heuristic, we can thus truly claim that the heuristic makes use 
of a particular state because it is about, say, Bayern Munich: it is just those states with 
such contents that the heuristic is sensitive to. 
This is all just to recapitulate and sum up points made earlier. But, it goes to 
show that, yes, isotropic revision and hence intentional content can play a role even in 
heuristics implemented by Carruthers-style modules. So, even if the mind is 
composed entirely of such modules, there will still be room for intentional 
explanation. In Chapter 5 we’ll examine in greater detail another case study that 
might be seen as being run on a Carruthers-style module that nonetheless requires 
intentional states for explanation: phonological perception. 
For now, suffice it to say that we can grant Carruthers’ claim that global 
cognitive capacities are not implemented by a Fodor-style global workspace subject 
to Quinean principles of revision that require assessment of beliefs as a corporate 
whole, such as coherence, simplicity, and the like. Nonetheless, the architecture he 








the isotropy that I’ve argued is a condition on intentional explanation. So, the 
hypothesis I’ve defended should be compatible with the architecture Carruthers 
defends in his 2006 work.  
3.1 A Sensori-Motor Workspace 
Carruthers has updated his architectural theory in his most recent book (2015) so as to 
allow for a global isotropic workspace, which (for him) is uniquely sensory-based34. 
The picture here is that mental contents become globally available to any module that 
may use them when they are embedded in sensory format and enter into working 
memory. Carruthers’ thesis is that the contents of this global workspace and the 
contents of conscious thought are co-extensive: a state is conscious if and only if 
attention is brought to bear on it, bringing it into the global workspace.35 
Thus, according to the picture, the inferentially promiscuous states are 
conscious states. Insofar as I’ve been claiming that cognition that makes use of 
inferentially promiscuous states is cognition that’s intentional, you might worry that 
I’d be committed to claiming that within Carruthers’ architecture, intentional 
processes are co-extensive with globally available, conscious cognition. 
But, as we saw in the last section, the modular systems Carruthers takes to be 
arrayed around and open to input from the sensori-motor workspace could well be 





34 Again, I prescind from endorsing any particular cognitive architecture.I consider Carruthers’ latest 
account to demonstrate that my account of intentional content is compatible with it. 








intentional insofar as they are in principle open to revision from any state that might 
possibly become available to them in the global workspace. Once such a module 
takes up information from the global workspace, the operations it performs on it may 
be closed off from consciousness.  
In fact, the central claim of Carruthers’ recent work is that attitudinal states do 
not enter into the sensori-motor workspace. So, if any attitudinal psychology takes 
place, it must occur off in the wings within individual modules. The previous section 
demonstrated just how such intramodular reasoning might occur in a way that does 
indeed utilize the intentional contents of attitude states. 
So, the massively modular architecture championed by Carruthers does not 
entail that all cognition is of the strongly encapsulated non-intentional sort I’ve 
hypothesized takes place in early vision. Neither does the addition of a sensori-motor 
global workspace to this architecture entail that the only intentional processes are 
conscious, System 2 operations. 
4. Lupyan and Clark: Top-Down Perception 
The flip side of these worries is that all cognition is of the isotropic sort I’ve 
associated with intentional processes, leaving no room for encapsulated non-
intentional processes. Gary Lupyan (2015) argues that the sort of cognitively 
impenetrable early perceptual processes posited by Pylyshyn and others don’t exist. 
Instead, early perceptual processing is often influenced by mental processes 
traditionally thought of as downstream of perceptual processes. If Lupyan is right, 








intentional processing and more global, isotropic intentional processing has little 
practical significance.  
This section will argue, however, that in the first place, the evidence for 
Lupyan’s view is by no means decisive. As Firestone & Scholl (2015) have recently 
argued, there are interpretations of the evidence he cites that are consistent with at 
least some mental processes being relatively cognitively impenetrable. Further, I’ll 
argue that there is a reading of Lupyan’s claims that is actually consistent with the 
distinction between isotropic and non-isotropic processes I’ve been drawing attention 
to. 
4.1 Global Penetration 
Lupyan’s claims that perceptual processes are penetrated by higher level 
representations when doing so minimizes global predictions error. The claim is not 
that it is because certain episodes of penetration will so minimize prediction error that 
they do so. Rather, the claim seems to be simply that we should expect to see such 
penetration occurring when it would help minimize global prediction error: “There is 
no gatekeeper deciding how far down a cognitive state should penetrate perceptual 
processes” (6). 
Lupyan first points to some of the evidence that phonological perception is 
penetrated from a variety of channels to exhibit his claim. In the next chapter, I 
expand upon this example, arguing that Lupyan is indeed correct that phonological 
perception is subject to isotropic revision and therefore makes use of intentional 








my distinction between intentional processes operating in these isotropic capacities 
and non-intentional processes operating in strongly encapsulated processes practically 
useless, even if it is an interesting theoretical distinction. 
There is a deeper worry about using phonological data to demonstrate the 
cognitive penetrability of linguistic perception pointed out as early as Fodor (1983, p. 
76ff.). Here, Fodor distinguishes between a phonological module that has top-down 
processes internal to its operations and a phonological module that is actually 
penetrated by belief states external to the module itself.  
Fodor’s example of the distinction is the phoneme restoration effect (ibid, p. 
65). Replacing the utterance of “s” in an utterance of “legislature” with the sound of a 
cough causes subjects to perceive an utterance of “legislature” (complete with an “s” 
sound!) with a cough in the background. This phenomenon seems to indicate that 
phonological perception is subject to influence not just from acoustic input, but from 
our knowledge of the lexicon as well. He surmises that the system does something 
like construct a perception of “legi” and “lature,” then goes off to find a lexical item 
containing those two segments. Upon finding “legislature,” it constructs a perception 
of “legislature.” Thus, lexical knowledge has top down influence on phoneme 
perception. 
But, crucially, Fodor notes, the extent of this top down influence seems to be 
limited to “levels of representation that the language input system computes” (p. 77). 
That is, knowledge of the lexicon may influence phoneme perception, but extra-








interlocutors may not. It would only be if such extra-linguistic knowledge had a 
bearing on phoneme perception that we could say it’s cognitively penetrable. 
The distinction is perhaps even more salient in the McGurk effect (McGurk & 
McDonald, 1976). Here, seeing someone utter the syllable “ga” whilst simultaneously 
hearing an utterance of “ba” causes subjects to perceive an utterance of “da.” The 
effect thus seems to trade on some knowledge concerning the motor and acoustic 
effects of phonemic utterances. Nonetheless, it is impervious to knowledge about the 
experimental set up. Subjects who are aware of the deception nonetheless have the 
same perceptual experience as naive subjects. In this sense, the effect exemplifies a 
process that involves intramodular top-down processing, but is not cognitively 
penetrated by extra-linguistic knowledge. So, any evidence of cognitive penetration 
ought to demonstrate not just top-down processes, but processes that cut across 
putative modular boundaries. 
Perhaps in the spirit of providing such evidence, Lupyan points to intermodal 
influences in cognition. For example, moving your hand in front of your face can 
produce visual experiences (Dieter, Hu, Knill, Blake, & Tadin, 2013). Now, the mere 
fact that there are intermodal influences on early perceptual processing does not in 
itself entail that the processing is cognitively penetrated. Visual processing could take 
afferent proprioceptive stimuli as proximal input as well as retinal stimuli while still 










The observation that putative modular perceptual processes are not neatly 
divided in terms of sense modalities is an old one. Fodor (1983, p. 67) also makes this 
point! He points out that when you push your eyeball with your finger, you perceive 
apparent motion, even though you know nothing is moving. Thus, the visual system 
“has access to corollary discharges from the motor center and to no other information 
that you possess.” It’s open to inter-modular influences, but is still encapsulated from 
more global belief states. 
If Lupyan’s point is just that more than one sense modality can provide 
proximal stimuli to the same perceptual processes, he’s neither established that these 
processes are cognitively penetrated, nor has he undermined my claim that if they are 
cognitively impenetrable in the right way, their explanation requires no appeal to 
intentional contents. Previously, I’ve argued that we can fully generalize in purely 
syntactic terms the computational processes of a module that generates output that’s 
fully fixed by proximal stimuli. Whether those stimuli come from the retina, the 
proprioceptive system, or both makes no difference to that argument. 
To these worries point, Lupyan replies: 
It might be objected that such effects do not demonstrate [cognitive 
penetration], but rather reflect automatic intra-perceptual 
modulation. For example, Pylyshyn speculates that perhaps the 
putative “early vision” system takes inputs from other modalities 
(Pylyshyn, 1999; sect. 7.1). However, the evidence above suggests 
not a fixed, reflexive system where by some inexplicable quirk 
vision can be modulated by sound or touch, but rather a highly 
flexible system where these modulations can be explained as ways 









Now, if what Lupyan means by a “highly flexible system” is a system of the 
sort subject to isotropic revision that I’ve characterized as intentional, to the extent his 
evidence establishes that early perceptual systems are so open to revision, I’d have to 
concede that explanation of their operations may well require appeal to intentional 
content. But, it’s not clear from these remarks precisely what Lupyan does mean by a 
“highly flexible system.” 
In explicating the view, he notes that “[i]mportantly, this influence of touch on 
vision is by no means automatic, but depends on the task-relevance of those 
movements (Beets et al., 2010)” (8). He doesn’t explicitly explain why dependence 
on task-relevance is so important. But, if the early visual system is influenced by 
factors such a task-relevance, you might infer that it is influenced by beliefs and 
knowledge about task-relevance-- precisely the sorts of influence that constitute 
cognitive penetration.  
So, how precisely does task-relevance influence visual processing? Beets et al. 
(2010) demonstrated that hand movements can influence the way subjects perceive an 
ambiguous visual stimulus-- but only if the hand movements are made in response to 
the stimulus itself. Subjects were presented with an array of moving dots that can be 
perceived as a cylindrical structure rotating either clockwise or counterclockwise.  
First, subjects were asked to use the fingers of their right hands to spin a 
vertical rod attached to a horizontal turntable, either clockwise or counterclockwise 
independently of the direction they perceived the ambiguous stimulus to rotate. They 








rotation by pressing either a button with their left ring finger or index finger, 
respectively. In these trials, the direction subjects were spinning the rod had no 
influence on whether they perceived the dots as spinning clockwise or 
counterclockwise. Subjects who spun the rod clockwise saw the dots rotate 
counterclockwise just as much as clockwise, and vice versa. 
However, when subjects spun the rod in response to their visual percept, the 
action seemed to influence the character of the percept. In one (incongruent) 
condition, subjects moved the rod in the direction opposite to that of their percept 
(and changed their response accordingly when their percept changed). In a second 
(congruent) condition, subjects moved the rod in the same direction as their percept. 
Beets et al. discovered that the durations of percepts of one direction or another were 
significantly shorter in the incongruent condition than the congruent condition. This 
suggests that when subjects in the incongruent direction rotated the rod clockwise in 
response to a counterclockwise percept, the movement caused the visual percept to 
flip to a clockwise percept (and vice versa). 
Notice that this influence of motor action on visual perception occurred only 
when subjects were turning the rod in response to their percept. When subjects were 
asked simply to turn the rod counterclockwise independently of the direction of their 
percepts, the action did not succeed in attenuating the length or number of clockwise 
percepts. This effect is the task-relevance Lupyan cites in reference to the study. 









So, what does this tell us about the cognitive penetrability of early vision? 
Beets et al. demonstrate that proprioceptive input must not automatically have an 
effect on visual processing. But, this fact alone does not entail that proprioceptive 
influence on vision is a matter of cognitive penetration. To establish an answer to that 
question we must figure out just how task-relevance modulates proprioceptive 
influence.  
One possibility is that some aspect of “task-relevance” modulates the input 
sent along to early vision in the first place. That is, it is only when subjects are 
turning the rod in response to their visual percept that proprioceptive states of the 
turning are allowed to penetrate the vision module. This modulation could indeed 
itself be modulated by global belief-like states if the process implements a rule such 
as ‘allow proprioception to influence vision iff you believe that your proprioceptive 
states are generated in response to your visual percept’. This might be cognitive 
penetration of a sort.  
But, if this is the sort of cognitive penetration going on, it’s not sufficient to 
undermine the sort of encapsulated processing I’ve argued is sufficiently 
characterized in non-intentional terms. Suppose that when proprioceptive states are 
not being generated in response to visual percepts, early vision is just as encapsulated 
as Pylyshyn assumes. In that case, as I’ve argued, the operations performed on the 
input can be described in purely syntactic, non-intentional terms. If proprioceptive 
states do serve as input to early vision when they result from responses to visual 








module couldn’t continue to be characterized in terms of the syntactic operations 
applied to the input states. 
Here’s where something like Chomsky’s (2000) argument against intentional 
explanation does have some bite. He argues that visual modules don’t traffic in 
representational states, because, after all, they could be wired up to take input from 
audition while preserving the syntactic characterization of the operations performed 
on its input states. Similarly, in this case, there’s no reason in principle to think that 
simply changing the input of the module from visual sources to proprioceptive 
sources prevents us from characterizing the operations of the module itself in purely 
syntactic terms.36,37  
Of course, Chomsky’s argument isn’t enough to banish intentional content 
from the mind entirely. For one, the explanation glossed here still relies on intentional 
belief states modulating the input to the vision module, even though we conclude that 
states of the vision module itself need not have intentional content. Secondly, as we 
noted in Chapter 1, the mere fact that the vision module can receive input from a 
variety of sources is not sufficient to establish that its states are non-intentional. The 
possibility pointed to here is merely that we can generalize about the activity of the 





36 Macpherson, in her reply to Lupyan (Ibid., p.27), raises a similar (though more outre) objection to 
his characterization of such inter-modal processes as “cognitive penetration” of any kind. 
37 Chomsky’s argument seems to rely on assuming that intentional states must have their contents 
fixed via an overly externalist route. This line of reasoning, as argued in Chapter 1 doesn’t carry much 








module in terms of the proximal stimuli to which it is sensitive-- irrespective of the 
causal etiology of those stimuli.  
So, whatever non-automaticity and flexibility the influence of proprioception 
on vision exhibits might well be the result of intentional processes happening outside 
of a strongly encapsulated early vision module. Of course, Lupyan’s assessment may 
ultimately be correct: but the experimental evidence reviewed above doesn’t decide 
the question.  
4.2 Attentional Explanations of Top-Down Effects 
Other sources of evidence Lupyan cites for his claims similarly have alternate 
explanations in terms of downstream attentional processes. So, for example, he cites 
the fact that people are quicker to perceive red rectangular shaped objects when 
primed with the word, “brick.” Of course, these phenomena could be easily explained 
by appealing to cognitive penetration of object recognition capacities-- largely 
assumed to be downstream of encapsulated, early vision. The word “brick” could 
prime the object recognition system, causing it to be on the lookout for states coming 
in from early vision that are consistent with bricks being in the vicinity. This 
interaction would leave the operations of early vision proper untouched. 
To try and push the influence of such lexical priming further upstream, 
Lupyan & Ward (2013) gave subjects lexical primes while suppressing their object 
recognition system. They presented a steady image of, variously, a zebra or pumpkin, 
to one eye, while simultaneously rapidly flashing a series of images in the other eye, a 








conscious perception of the stable image and, crucially, also inhibits activity in the 
ventral visual stream associated with object recognition (Lupyan, p. 10).  
Subjects were to respond either “yes” or “no” as to whether they perceived 
any stimulus whatsoever. Normally, the CFS made them unable to see the stable 
images. But, hearing the word “zebra” allowed subjects to see a zebra when they were 
presented with the image of a zebra. In addition, hearing the word “zebra” when an 
unrelated image was presented (e.g., a pumpkin), further suppressed their ability to 
consciously perceive the image. 
Since the CFS protocol wiped out object recognition areas along with 
conscious perception, Lupyan & Ward have a good case that the priming effects are 
not operating on object recognition areas. So, they might conclude, the best 
explanation is that the word “zebra” is activating concepts that represent zebras, 
which then penetrate early vision and cause it to construct zebras it wouldn’t 
otherwise without this cognitive influence. 
There’s an alternate interpretation, however, consonant with Carruthers’ 
(2015) architecture, that doesn’t require such cognitive penetration of early vision. 
We might suppose that the retinal stimulation from the zebra picture presented to one 
eye does indeed trigger the operation of an encapsulated early vision module that 
builds up something like Marr’s 2 ½ -D sketch, which is then available to be taken up 
by downstream processes, like object recognition. If something like Carruthers’ 
architectural picture is correct, in order to be taken up by downstream processes, the 








On Carruthers’ picture, mental states become conscious and enter the global 
workspace only when attentional resources are focused on them. We might therefore 
explain the suppression effect of CFS by theorizing that the flashing images eat up 
attentional resources (as changing stimuli are wont to do). So, whereas early visual 
processes have worked as usual on their proximal stimuli, the output of this process 
doesn’t become conscious because attention isn’t brought to bear on it. Hearing the 
word “zebra” causes subjects to direct attention to zebra-relevant states that are 
available to working memory. They therefore access their beliefs that Zebras are 
horse-shaped striped creatures, and thus end up focusing attention on the early visual 
output typical of horse-shaped striped things, bringing it into consciousness. The 
word “pumpkin” causes them to direct attention to pumpkin-relevant contents, thus 
pulling away even more attentional resources that could be used to make the zebra 
percept conscious, explaining why “pumpkin” further inhibits conscious perception of 
the zebra38. 
Yet again, we can explain how cognitive beliefs that operate outside of early 
vision have an effect on our conscious perceptual experience. But, we need not 
suppose that they do so by penetrating and altering the operations of early vision 
itself. 





38 As Carruthers notes (2015, p.69; Veillet & Carruthers 2011) this story need not require that the 








Lupyan rejects such appeals to attention because he has a view of attention at 
odds with the traditional “mental spotlight” approach. He instead adopts Andy 
Clark’s (2013) conception of attention as a surprise-reducing mechanism. Conceived 
in this way, he argues, “attention warps neural representations throughout the brain, 
in a semantically coherent way...—the argument ‘That’s not penetrability, that’s just 
attention’ needs to be retired” (40). 
But, it’s unclear in practice how this view of attention would be inconsistent 
with the attentional explanation of the Lupyan & Ward results given above. Here’s an 
example of the sort of attentional processes Lupyan takes to be at play in cognition. 
He notes that a reliable difference between images of people and images of cars is 
that the former tend to be vertically oriented and the latter horizontally. Therefore: 
 
An effective way of transforming a perceptual representation in the 
service of attending to people therefore might be to accentuate 
processing of vertically oriented features. The vague phrase 
“accentuating processing” corresponds in a predictive-coding 
framework to using the prior (pedestrians are likely to be 
vertically-oriented) to more accurately model the posterior 
distribution corresponding to locations in the scene with high-
power in vertical orientations (p. 16). 
 
He then cites Oliva & Torralba (2006) as evidence that attending to people 
indeed boosts processing of vertical stimuli. 
But this story seems perfectly compatible with that we gave the 
Lupyan & Ward results. We can suppose that early vision remains 








correlate with vertical and horizontal orientations of visual stimuli. Once this 
output is available in the global workspace, an intention to search for people 
primes a belief that people are vertically oriented, thus focusing attention on 
sensory contents that are consistent with vertical orientation. Whether we 
think of this as a process of spotlight focusing or prediction error 
minimization seems beside the point. The difference may well come out in 
other areas-- but prima facie it doesn’t close off the sort of attentional 
explanation of the effect of cognitive states on conscious percepts given 
above.  
4.3 Bottom-Up Explanations of Top-Down Effects 
Firestone & Scholl (2015) point to these attentional effects on perception as one way 
amongst five others to defeat claims that early perception is cognitively penetrated. 
They make the very strong claim that “ there is in fact no evidence for such top-down 
effects of cognition on visual perception” (p.8). We need not rely on a claim this 
strong. In order for the distinction between encapsulated and isotropic processes that 
I’ve been drawing to be interesting, we require only that at least some processes-- 
likely perceptual-- do not admit of isotropic influences. If Firestone & Scholl are only 
half correct, that will be enough to vindicate my claims. 
As we’ve seen, much of the evidence for cognitive penetration is likely 
defeasible in light of considerations about attentional allocation. Firestone & Scholl 
point to other procedural errors that also might explain away much evidence of 








evidence for such penetration are perhaps best interpreted as revealing cognitive 
effects on judgment, or memory rather than online perception. For example, subjects 
who threw balls at a target reported the target to be farther away when they threw a 
heavy ball rather than a light ball (Witt et al., 2004). Firestone & Scholl (p. 26) point 
out that this effect may be driven by a change in the subjects’ post-perceptual 
judgment of the distance rather than a change in the deliverances of visual perception. 
In fact, in a follow-up study (Woods et al., 2009), subjects who were asked how far 
away the target “visually appears” exhibited no change in their responses relative to 
the weight of the ball they threw. Subjects who were asked for “how far away you 
feel the object is, taking all nonvisual factors into account” did exhibit the effect. 
Such results suggest that subjects’ beliefs about the difficulty of throwing the ball 
does not influence their visual perception, even if it does influence their considered 
judgment of the distance. 
More substantively, Firestone & Scholl provide many examples of phenomena 
that have been given cognitive glosses, but can instead be explained in terms of 
bottom up operations on low-level stimuli. For example, faces with characteristically 
Black (i.e., “African-American”) structural features appear darker than faces with 
characteristically White (i.e., “Caucasian”) structural features, despite being matched 
in mean luminance (Levin & Banaji, 2006). This phenomenon is often interpreted as 
indicating that beliefs about race and skin color influence the deliverances of early 
vision. However, Firestone & Scholl (2015) blurred the faces such that subjects could 








darker than the other. This suggests that low-level features of the stimuli influence the 
perception of darkness independently of racial beliefs.39 
Lupyan’s objections to traditional sources of evidence for encapsulated 
perceptual systems admit of the same sorts of alternate explanations that Firestone & 
Scholl point to. The paradigm case here is the Muller-Lyer illusion. Because our 
percept of the lines remains constant despite changes in our belief states regarding the 
length of the lines, Pylyshyn (e.g., 1999) argues that at least some aspect of our 
perceptual processing must remain impenetrable to these beliefs. 
The canonical explanation takes one of two forms. The first is that early vision 
stores hypotheses concerning the arrangement of lines to as to effect size constancy. 
The idea is that the angle of the arrows prompt the vision system to represent the 
arrowed-line as a concave edge and the divergent ends of the second line prompt 
early vision to present it as a protruding edge. Given the hypotheses that the two lines 
subtend the same retinal angle, that convex edges are closer and concave edges 
farther away, and that edges subtend smaller retinal angles the farther away they 
become, the visual system infers that the line with divergent edges is objectively 
larger. It thus represents it as such in the conscious percept. 





39 For, even though the average luminance of the two faces is identical, there are local differences in 
luminance between the two faces. For example, the Black face has a darker jawline and the White face 








Lupyan rightly dismisses this common explanation given the evidence that 
lines with circles and squares on the ends also give rise to the illusion. Instead, he 
picks up on data gathered by Howe & Purves (2005) that lines with “adornments” of 
various types closer to their center are, as a matter of contingent fact, actually shorter 
than lines with adornments farther from the center.  
There are at least four ways these data could be used to explain the illusion. 
The first would posit that the hypotheses used by early vision are of the form ‘lines 
with adornments closer to their centers are generally shorter.” This of course 
wouldn’t be evidence for cognitive penetration of early vision-- just evidence that 
early vision has intentional states that may well be immune to influence from doxastic 
states, such as the belief that in this case the line with adornments closer to the center 
is actually just as long as the one with adornments farther away.  
A second interpretation would have it that there’s standing belief in general 
cognition concerning the correlation of central adornment and length. When we look 
at the Muller-Lyer lines, this belief penetrates early vision, changing the way it 
processes the stimulus so that we get the illusory percept. Of course this interpretation 
leaves it unclear why tutored observers’ standing belief that Muller-Lyer stimuli tend 
to have lines of equal length does not similarly penetrate early vision and reverse the 
illusory percept. It’s also unclear why this interpretation should be favored over that 
above. 
A third option appeals to the notion of “physical constraints” in the tradition 








contingent factual regularities such as that discovered by Howe & Purves. Recall, for 
example, the regularity that differences in reflectance tend to result in very sharp 
changes in the light reflected off of surfaces, whereas changes in illuminance tend to 
result in more gradual changes of same. Thus, the intensity of retinal stimulation that 
results from reflectance differences tends to vary sharply and that from illumination 
more gradedly. Thus, if the early visual system maps discrete retinal intensity changes 
onto one state and graded intensity changes on the other, it will end up with two states 
that correlate generally with changes due to reflectance and luminance, respectively. 
As argued in Chapter 3, we can explain the operations of this process without 
supposing that the visual system relies on something like a hypothesis with the 
content that ‘reflectance differences are sharper, whereas luminance differences more 
gradual.’  
In a similar manner, we could suppose that early vision responds differentially 
to edge-type stimuli with anomalies of some sort near the center and edge stimuli 
with anomalies farther from the center. If it did so by being sensitive to properties of 
proximal stimuli that correlate with “adornments,” early vision could exploit the 
physical constraints discovered by Howe & Purves without either being cognitively 
penetrated or making use of intentional contents. 
It’s perhaps in light of these worries that Lupyan seems to embrace none of 
these interpretations, and instead propounds a third option, championed by Purves et 
al. (2011): 
Purves et al. have convincingly argued that the very concept of 








goal of veridical estimation of the current stimulus rather than the 
globally optimal estimation that perceptual systems appear to 
engage in. Illusions on this view can be explained as “optimal 
percepts” (Weiss, Simoncelli, & Adelson, 2002). (13).  
 
On one reading, this interpretation seems to eschew appeal to intentional 
states of any kind. Insofar as the explanation does away with the intentional notions 
of illusion and veridical estimation, you might think that it’s averting to some sort of 
non-intentional characterization of early perceptual processes altogether40. We’ll 
examine this possibility more in Section 4 below. For now, suffice it to note that the 
interpretation leaves mysterious precisely how cognitive penetration comes into play. 
Indeed, on another reading, Lupyan seems to be altogether prescinding from 
any stance on the precise mechanism involved in generating the Muller-Lyer percept. 
His positive account is that: 
insofar as the Müller-Lyer illusion arises from the visual system 
attempting to represent likely real-world sources… [a] bit of 
additional evidence in the form of training allows the system to 
reach a globally optimal state, making accurate local predictions 
while maintaining globally optimal performance. (13). 
 
Here we are back with intentional terms (“represent,” “evidence”). The 
training here is presumably familiarity with the correspondence of centrality of 
adornment and length. But, the explanation says precious little about how the system 
reaches a globally optimal state. Indeed, any of the three options canvassed above is 














consistent with his claim that what the mind is implementing in this case is a 
procedure that minimizes prediction error! All of them generate on the whole what 
seem to accurate representations of how the world is-- failing only occasionally, as 
with the Muller-Lyer stimulus. On this reading, Lupyan seems not so much to be 
offering an explanation of the Muller-Lyer illusion so much as redescribing the 
phenomenon in terms of prediction error41. 
4.4 Top-Down Perception as Non-Intentional 
Lupyan’s treatment of the Muller-Lyer illusion canvassed above raises some more 
fundamental concerns about ambiguities in his account of cognitive penetrability. 
There’s an initial tension in Lupyan’s characterization of what top-down cognitive 
penetration amounts to. He claims (p. 4) he is merely adapting Pylyshyn’s (1999) 
characterization: 
A perceptual system is cognitively penetrable if ‘the function it 
computes is sensitive, in a semantically coherent way, to the 
organism’s goals and beliefs, that is, it can be altered in a way that 
bears some logical relation to what the person knows’ (p. 343)42 
 





41 Inasmuch as Lupyan is concerned to show that our understanding of the Muller-Lyer illusion is 
consistent with his view that the mind is a prediction error minimizer, this redescription may be 
sufficient for his purposes. The stronger claim that Pylyshyn-style early vision is cognitively 
penetrable might be most charitably read as a bit of rhetorical excess. 
42 Note that this characterization leaves unresolved whether Fodor’s cases of phoneme perception 
canvassed above count as “cognitive penetration” by Pylyshyn’s lights. Whether they do or not is 








But, he also claims that “my saying that something is ‘represented’ should in 
no way be interpreted to mean that the information is explicit or implemented in a 
symbolic form” (p.5, n. 5), and further, “the term ‘theory’ should not be taken to 
mean something explicit or rule-based or symbolic” (6).  
On the face of it, Lupyan’s characterization of “representational” states at play 
in instances of cognitive penetration seem to conflict with those Pylyshyn makes us 
of in his characterization of the phenomenon. To be sure, Pylyshyn tends to think of 
mental states as compositionally structured in a language-like manner. In this respect, 
he is clearly at odds with a view that would characterize such states in in terms that 
are neither rule-based nor “explicit” in the sense of having a basic atomic structure 
such that each atom of a complex thought represents a particular content. 
But, perhaps Pylyshyn’s views on the language-like structure of thought are 
irrelevant to his characterization of cognitive penetrability. We could allow that 
mental states represent in, say, an iconic manner similar to that described by Fodor 
(2008) such that they have no standard rule by which they decompose into constituent 
representations. All that’s needed is that these states interact in “semantically 
coherent” ways that bear “logical relation to what the person knows.” Iconic 
representations seem up to that task (in some minimal sense, at least). 
But, it’s unclear that Lupyan’s intent here is merely to signal his neutrality 
between theories of language-like and iconic theories of representational structure. 
Indeed, there’s some reason to think that his notion of “representation” is non-








notion of representation is one “typically applied to neural states...it is a promiscuous 
term that can be applied to, e.g., the information encoded in the immune system” (p.5, 
n.5). Intentional properties, on the other hand, are usually ascribed to mental states 
individuated at a higher level of abstraction than the neural. 
This, of course, doesn’t in itself necessarily indicate that Lupyan is thinking of 
“representations” in non-intentional terms, but supposing that he does so also explains 
some other phrasing he uses throughout. For example, he writes: 
the processing in lower levels of the perceptual hierarchy is also 
constrained by lower level (more local) predictions that would be 
violated if neurons in those layers ‘ignore’ an object that suddenly 
disappeared. (p. 5) 
 
Here, the intentional term, “ignore,” is set off in scare quotes and is talking 
about “predictions” as states of a multi-level neural network rather than intentional 
processes being carried out by computations over mental states per se. 
More intriguing is the idea that Lupyan is thinking of early perceptual 
processing as non-intentional in much the same way as I have been advocating-- and 
perhaps for some of the same reasons. He repeats approvingly the contention of 
Purves et al. (2011) that: 
the very concept of illusions is erroneous because calling them 
illusions implies the goal of veridical estimation of the current 
stimulus rather than the globally optimal estimation that perceptual 
systems appear to engage in (Lupyan, p.13). 
 
More precisely, the claim that Purves et al. make is that: 
calling any perception of lightness or brightness a “visual illusion” 
is incorrect. Rather, the perceptions that arise are simply the 








to luminance. In these terms, then, the conventional distinction 
between veridical and illusory perception is false; by the same 
token, making inferences about the physical properties of objects 
or states of the world is not how vision seems to work (p. 3. my 
italics) 
 
Here, they are quite explicit that the process of optimal estimation that Lupyan 
champions doesn’t involve intentional processes at all. 
Moreover, the reason they draw this conclusion seems to be similar to the 
reasons I’ve raised to think that many such early perceptual processes are non-
intentional. Their conclusion that early vision doesn’t traffic in inferences about the 
world comes at the end of an explanation of our old standby example, reflectance 
constancy.  
Recall that a grey patch appears lighter when presented against a darker 
background than when presented against a lighter background. In general, this 
phenomenon is attributed to the processes used to implement reflectance constancy in 
the visual system: the capacity we have to generally see objects has having the same 
reflectance properties despite being illuminated by lights of different brightness. 
We’ve already seen two accounts of such processes. One, appealed to by Burge, 
makes use of the gradation of the intensity of proximal retinal stimulation. The other, 
propounded by Brainard et al. characterizes the process as one of Bayesian hypothesis 
testing.  
Purves et al. propose that the process involved result from an empiricist 
process of weighting neural nets. To test the idea, they first searched a database of 








stimuli above. They extracted statistics from this search so as to come up with 
percentile rankings of the likelihood that patches of different luminance occurred 
against a backgrounds of different luminances.  
For example, one distribution would record that a patch of luminance P or 
lighter appeared against a background of luminance B1 80% of the time. Another 
distribution would record that the same patch would appear against a different 
background luminance, B2, 20% of the time. Purves et al. found that percentile rank 
on these scales tracks the lightness value the percept of the patch will appear to have. 
So, a patch of luminance P will appear much lighter against a background of 
luminance B1 (where it falls in the 80th percentile) than it would against a 
background of B2 (where it falls in the 20th percentile). 
From this, Purves et al. conclude that the visual system implements 
reflectance constancy by extracting these probability distributions from its 
environment. They claim that a patch of a given luminance appears darker in some 
contexts and lighter in others “because the frequency of occurrence of the retinal 
projections generated by natural sources is different” (2). Presumably, the story is 
something like the following: the visual system outputs states that tend to correspond 
to patches of light reflectance when retinal stimulation of intensity P is surrounded by 
retinal stimulation of intensity B1. It outputs states that tend to correspond with 
patches of dark reflectance when that same retinal stimulus instead occurs surrounded 








Reflectance illusions occur because the visual system rotely 
implements this procedure even in instances in which the states generated by 
early vision don’t correlate with the actual reflectance properties of objects 
generating the proximal stimuli: 
It follows from this strategy of vision that calling any perception of 
lightness or brightness a “visual illusion” is incorrect. Rather, the 
perceptions that arise are simply the signature of how the visual 
brain generates all subjective responses to luminance (p. 3, italics 
theirs). 
 
Their reasoning here seems to be that we should not characterize the 
operation of early vision in intentional terms because the system will respond 
to the same proximal stimuli in the same way regardless. There are no 
additional counterfactuals positing intentional content would help explain. 
That is certainly, it should be clear by now, the gloss I would give on the 
account. 
Indeed their account of reflectance constancy differs from others 
we’ve examined, only in the etiological story about how the visual system 
ends up in a state that is so differentially sensitive to proximal retinal stimuli 
(and also, of course, precisely which aspects of the proximal stimuli it is 
sensitive to). Many theories, assume that such biased responses are innately 
hard-wired. Purves et al. argue that the visual system so responds because it 
rewires itself to become sensitive to the same statistics they use to derive the 








experience-dependent refinements of connectivity during postnatal 
development and adult life would allow individuals to contend 
with the challenge presented by the inverse problem more 
successfully than could be achieved on the basis of inherited 
circuitry alone (p. 2). 
 
Just what evidence Purves et al. have for this strong developmental 
claim is unclear. Regardless, this debate about innateness in orthogonal to our 
concern about whether early vision is subject to cognitive penetration in a way 
that requires explaining its operations in terms of intentional properties. What 
is clear is that the account Purves et al. offer gives no reason to suppose vision 
is cognitively penetrated in a way that would undermine the claim that early 
vision is not open to isotropic revision.  
If anything, their account is just another example of the sort of non-
isotropic process I’ve been arguing doesn’t require intentional explanation. 
This time, for what little it’s worth, not only my conclusion, but my reasoning 
seems to come with the psychologists’ explicit endorsement!  
In conclusion, if the sort of explanation offered by Purves et al. is the 
parade case of the sort of considerations Lupyan takes to argue for his 
predictive coding view, there’s no reason to suppose a mind implementing 
such a predictive coding architecture would not allow for certain processes 
that are best characterized in non-intentional computational terms. 
If the general framework in which Lupyan is working is broadly 
speaking the sort of non-intentional hierarchical neural net architecture 








penetrable” would seem not to be a claim about the extent to which globally 
available intentional states influence early perceptual processing. For, such an 
architecture doesn’t quantify over intentional states in the first place.  
In this instance, the claim may be best read as one that neural activity 
commonly associated with non-perceptual processes often influences that 
associated more closely with perceptual processes proper. But, whether this 
claim challenges my assumption that at least some of the processes involved 
in early perception are not open to isotropic revision depends on the details of 
how best to characterize this influence. As we saw in sections 4.1-3 above, 
there are multiple ways of cashing out the interaction between high level and 
low level processing, some of which preserve an architecture with Pylyshyn-
esque encapsulation.  
Moreover, the psychologists cited by Lupyan appeal to some of the 
very same considerations I’ve pointed to in motivating the claim that early 
vision is best thought of in terms of non-intentional processing. In this way, 
Lupyan’s architecture of multi-level hierarchical influence seems in principle 
compatible with the picture I’ve been painting in which at least some early 
perceptual processing is non-intentional because it is not embedded in a web 
of isotropically revisable intentional states. 
The considerations I raise here against Lupyan are not intended as a 
devastating or comprehensive critique of his predictive coding project. They are 








encapsulated is still a live empirical hypothesis. The success of the research programs 
of Scholl, Pylyshyn, and the like, in addition to the success of Marr-inspired theories 
of early vision processes, including Bayesian accounts such as Brainard et al.’s, 
evidence the fruitfulness of the hypothesis. Of course, they’re open to defeat in light 
of further empirical investigation. But, as long as they are relevant, so too is the 
present proposal that such strongly encapsulated processes do not on their face 
require intentional contents for their explanation.  
5. Conclusion 
So far, my argument has had a conditional form. If intentional contents play an 
explanatory role in cognition, we would expect to see that role realized in cognitive 
systems that are open to revision from an indefinite disjunction of stimuli. By 
contrast, the operations systems that are not open to such revision can be explained 
entirely by generalizations over non-intentional computational properties of their 
input states. 
The present chapter shows that this hypothetical proposal has some empirical 
bite. The distinction it points to is likely to be realized by multiple mental 
architectures put forth by competing theories. It is even compatible with some 
readings of recent theories arguing that cognition is cognitively penetrable. To the 
extent that it’s not compatible with these theories, the data that they rely on still 
admits of interpretations that allow for mental processes that are variously strongly 








The following chapter will provide a detailed case study of a putatively 
modular capacity that has been argued by some linguists not to involve intentional 
states: phonological perception. The framework I’ve argued for in the preceding 
chapters will allow us to see why, on the contrary, explanation of phonological 












In Chapter 3, we concluded that intentional content allows us to type-individuate 
states in a way that allows them to feature in counterfactual generalizations that 
cannot be couched in terms of states individuated solely by their purely syntactic role. 
We further saw that we need to rely on this method of generalization only within 
systems that are open to isotropic revision. It’s in such systems that type-identifying 
states in terms of intentional content does explanatory work. Chapter 4 argued that the 
distinction between encapsulated, bottom-up processes and more isotropic processes 
is still a live one. 
Chapter 4 also argued that this distinction between encapsulated and isotropic 
processes need not map onto the classic Fodorian divide between encapsulated 
modular processes on the one hand and global belief fixation processes on the other. 
It was a live possibility, we concluded, that there may be processes that are modular 
(in something like Carruthers’ (2006) sense), and nonetheless open to isotropic 
influence. The following is an account of one such process: phonological perception.   
As we’ve seen, Chomsky himself (2000) has famously declared that while the 
research program in generative linguistics appeals to “representations,” the appeal is 








being about things such that they can be tokened accurately or inaccurately. Collins 
(2004; 2007; 2008; 2009) has argued extensively for this claim in the realm of syntax 
and semantics, while Rey (2006; 2008) has been one of its most nuanced opponents. 
This debate up until now has been largely waged over the extent to which 
syntax and semantics appeal to intentional states.  Little attention has focused on 
phonology and phonetics. Collins argues against Rey that syntactic states can be type-
individuated independently of any intentional content in terms of their computational 
roles in relation to one another. But, it’s not obvious that phonological states can be 
similarly type-individuated. The phoneme /k/ can combine with /æt/ to form /kæt/-- 
but /s/ can also combine with /æt/ to form /sæt/. So, it’s not obvious how we can type-
individuate /k/, /s/, and /æt/ solely on the basis of their relations to one another. The 
best alternative may be to individuate them in terms of their intentional content. 
Indeed, the following argues that this is precisely what we must do if we are to 
capture the generalizations of phonological science. 
This argument for ascribing intentional content to phonological states as 
necessary to individuate them has not, to my knowledge, been raised in the literature. 
Rather theorists have raised other considerations that might lead them to think that 
phonological states must have intentional content. For example, Rey (2003) has 
pointed to generalizations concerning 'articulatory grounding' as examples of 
processes that can’t be understood without attributing content to phonological states. I 








is correct, we can obviate these reasons for thinking that phonological states have 
intentionality.  
An additional conclusion from Hale & Reiss’ work, however, is that we 
indeed cannot individuate phonological states in terms of their internal relations to 
one another. They can combine so promiscuously that the very same phoneme may 
stand in radically different relations to others from one idiolect to another. Since we 
cannot individuate phonemes in terms of their computational role, we are left trying 
to individuate them either in terms of intentional content or alternatively their 
relations to external states. 
Section 6, surveys the phonological perception literature to assess the 
plausibility of the hypotheses that we can individuate phonological states either in 
terms of the articulatory gestures to which they give rise or the acoustic/auditory 
phenomena that cause them to be tokened. If we could type-individuate a phoneme as 
just that state that is caused by acoustic phenomenon X, or just that state that causes 
articulatory gesture Y, then we would have no reason to ascribe intentional content to 
such states. The conclusion of Section 6 is that neither of these strategies will work, 
however.   
I argue that the only way to sufficiently type-individuate phonological states is 
to ascribe intentional content to them as an essential individuating feature. This 
strategy not only gives us a principled way to type-individuate phonological states, 
but it also allows us to make phonological generalizations that would otherwise be 









2. Linguistic Content 
Collins (2007; 2008; 2009) argues that generative linguistics gets along quite well 
without intentional content. That is, linguists can attribute structures to the mind such 
as: 
 
[Who will [VP <who> beat Fred] and [VP be awarded <who> the prize]] 
 
without supposing that the mind thereby represents things such as VPs and <who>s. 
The mind may well instantiate computational structures with tokens linguists type-
identify as ‘VP’ and ‘<who>.’ But, these syntactic tokens are not about anything, 
much less the properties of being a VP or a <who>. 
Much ink spilled debating Collins’ claim has dwelt on the status of external 
entities that could serve as the referents of putative linguistic representations. So, 
Chomsky (2000) sometimes argues that linguistic states could not have intentional 
content because there are no externalia that satisfy that content. In opposition, Devitt 
(2006a; 2006b; 2008) has argued (1) that linguistic entities, such as VPs, do exist 
external to our mental states, and (2) either that generative linguistics should be 
interpreted as generalizing over these externalia themselves, or, to the extent that 
linguistics generalizes over mental states, those mental states should be understood as 








Rey (2008) and Collins (2009) have defended the view that referents are not 
necessary in order to attribute intentional content to mental states. Collins adopts a 
convention that intentional states have content insofar as they have correctness 
conditions, which may or may not ever be actually realized. As Collins puts it: 
For a state to have content [x] , there must be conditions C and C* 
such that [x] is satisfied under C and not satisfied under C* 
 
As Rey (2008) points out, Chomsky (2000) seems to assume that the above 
conditions, C, must in fact obtain in at least some circumstances in order for states to 
be intentional. But, Collins and Rey both point out that we need not assume that these 
correctness conditions ever in fact obtain. Thus we can have a  WITCH state that is 
satisfied by and only by witches-- and thus about witches-- without requiring that 
witches actually exist. Thus, for both Rey and Collins, the debate as to whether 
phonological mental states have intentional content is orthogonal to the debate 
concerning whether there are actual entities--sonic, articulatory, or otherwise-- in the 
world that might serve as their referents.  
As Collins notes, there are some subtle worries about the extent to which 
something like the above criterion is correct-- particularly when it comes to cases of 
fictional entities, logical impossibilia, and the like. Both agree that the existence of 
externalia is neither necessary nor sufficient for attributing intentional content to 
mental states. In the following, I’ll assume they are correct in order to adjudicate 
some more subtle points of disagreement between the two. I’m not engaging their 
debate as to the existence of mind external phonological objects. Rather, I’m asking 








whether or not there are (or metaphysically could be) objects that actually satisfy that 
content. 
 
3. Phonological Explanation 
In order to see why it’s necessary to attribute intentional content to 
phonological states, it will be useful to canvass in brief just what sort of work they are 
supposed to do. Standard theories of phonology start with the observation that we 
perceive many speech sounds as the same despite differences in their acoustic 
properties and the manner in which they are produced. For example, native English 












This, despite the fact that the vowels in the two groups have reliably different 
acoustic properties: vowels in the latter group have shorter duration than those in the 
second. The task, then, for the phonologist, is to sort out how it is that language users 
reliably sort a wide diversity of sounds (and in the case of signed languages, gestures) 








Standard phonological theories, then, consist of rules that attempt to 
systematically account for which utterances get sorted into which equivalence classes. 
For example, a classic phonological account explains the above phenomenon by 
postulating a rule to the effect that: 
/e/ is realized as [ӗ] when followed by a voiceless consonant, and 
as [e] otherwise 
 
where the phones, [ӗ] and [e], reference the short-duration vowel of 'safe' and the 
long duration vowel of 'save,' respectively. The phoneme, /e/ references the 
equivalence class that English speakers tend to sort these two sounds into. It’s 
because words in the latter group have voiceless consonants that explains why we 
produce the phoneme /e/ as [ӗ]. 
Phonemes and phones are both further characterized in terms of a feature 
geometry. Features, are often glossed as features of the articulatory apparatus. For 
example, the consonants above varied in terms of their [voice] features. [v] is 
[+voice] whereas [f] is [-voice], indicating that the former, but not the latter, is 
articulated with the vocal folds engaged. Another set of features-- [place] features-- 
indicates the place in the mouth at which a sound is usually articulated. The feature 
[+bilabial], for example, is a feature of the articulation of the phone [m]. [Manner] 
features, on the other hand, describe other positions of the vocal apparatus during 
articulation. Both [m] and [n] have the manner feature [+nasal], indicating that they 
are articulated with the soft palate lowered (so air can flow through the nose while the 
mouth is closed). In contrast with [m], however, [n] has the features [-bilabial] and 








hard palate. Phonologists characterize both phones and phonemes as being composed 
of constituents corresponding to the above features. So, for example, /m/ and [m] can 
both be decomposed into [+bilabial +nasal +voice].  
Now, rules such as (a) above confusingly elide a distinction between mental 
states (phonemic and phonetic states) on the one hand, and properties of the 
articulatory system or acoustic phenomena on the other. As Rey (2003, p. 172) points 
out, generative phonology has been mired in use-mention confusion since its 
inception. Chomsky (1955, as quoted in Rey, p.172) explicitly stipulates: 
We will henceforth apply the term `phones' to symbols of Pn, as 
well as to utterance tokens represented by them' (p. 159) 
 
In an attempt to avoid this confusion, I stipulate that 'phoneme' and 'phone' 
shall refer instead solely to mental states-- and not to the acoustic or articulatory 
phenomena they may putatively represent. In this way, phonemic states, such as /e/, 
computationally transform into phonetic states, such as [ӗ], which subsequently give 
rise to articulatory and auditory consequences. I’ll refer to mind-external properties of 
the articulatory apparatus or acoustics in curly brackets, e.g.: '{ӗ}.'43 
We can think of both phones and phonemes as being composed out of 
components from the same set of features. Whether a particular set of features is 
identified as a phoneme or a phone depends on whether it’s in a 'phoneme box' or a 
'phone box.' That is, the phoneme box comprises sets of features that constitute 













underlying forms. The general phonological process is to take these underlying forms 
from the phoneme box, transform them computationally in terms of the phonological 
rules operating within a language (such as (a)), and put the result in the phone box. 
The contents of the phone box then cause articulatory gestures that result in acoustic 
phenomena. 
So, to take our example from earlier, we might start with something like the 
underlying form, /seF/, in our phoneme box. The computational structure of our 
phonological system is such that in transferring from the phoneme box to the phone 
box, the feature [+short] gets added to the feature bundle, /e/. Thus, in the phone box, 
we end up with the surface form [sӗF]. This phonetic output then transduces to the 
motor system to cause the motor/acoustic phenomenon, {sӗF}. 
Before moving on to discuss more substantive issues, it will be helpful to get a 
brief gloss on one of the dominant theories of how to characterize such phonological 
transformations: Optimality Theory (OT). Recall that phonological rules characterize 
how an underlying phonemic form is transformed into a phonetic surface form. The 
rules of OT all take the form of constraints.  
Markedness Constraints constrain the form that the surface, phonetic form can 
take. The rule against voiced obstruents at the end of words is such a constraint. 
Given that the infinitive of the German 'rauben,' to rob, is pronounced with a {b}, we 
might suppose that the underlying form has as a constituent, /b/. However, the 
gerundive form, 'raub,' robbery, is instead pronounced with a voiceless {p}. Thus, a 








after the final obstruent in the gerundive form, the phonetic output drops the [+voice] 
feature from the underlying phonemic form, and so the /b/ is realized as a {p}. 
Computationally, this is realized by transforming the underlying /b/ in the phoneme 
box to a [p] in the phone box, which then causes the utterance of a {p}. 
Faithfulness Constraints on the other hand, constrain the extent to which the 
final phonetic form is allowed to diverge from the underlying phonemic form. For 
example, one possible constraint is that the value of the [voice] feature in the 
phonemic form must be preserved in the phonetic form. You might imagine such a 
constraint operating in English. This explains why the English words, 'rob' and 
'robbery' are realized as {rɑb} and {rɑbəri}, respectively: both with a voiced {b}. 
This indicates that the underlying phonemic form, /b/, remains unchanged when 
transferred to the phone box as [b]. 
OT supposes that every language (I- or E-) has the same universal set of 
constraints. They even have constraints, like those given above, that are mutually 
contradictory. Each language, however, imposes a different strict ordering on the 
constraints. Differences in the phonetic generalizations holding within different 
languages (as that between German and English above) are the result of different 
orderings on these constraints. 
The translation from underlying phonemic form to phonetic form is 
accomplished first by generating a list of possible phonetic form candidates, each 
varying in terms of their phonetic constituents. There is no mechanism for 








indefinite in extent!44 Each candidate is then checked against each of the constraints 
in order. If a candidate form violates a constraint, it gets thrown out. The last 
candidate standing at the end of this process is the phonetic form generated by the 
underlying phonemic form. Here’s a toy example: 
 
 
/Raʊb/ 'raub' *Voiced_Coda Ident(voice)  
[Raʊb] !  
[χaʊp] ! ! 
[Raʊp]  ! 
 
 
The phonetic form [Raʊp] managed not to violate any constraints for longer 
than the other two possible forms we considered, so it is generated as the phonetic 
form of /Raʊb/. We can explain the English data if we simply assume that in English 
the ordering of the constraints is reversed: 
 





44 This 'richness of the base' is sometimes touted by OT’s proponents as a selling point of the theory- 
but is regarded by others as being the most psychologically implausible aspect of the theory! This 









/rɑb/ 'rob' Ident(voice) *Voiced_Coda 
[rɑp] !  
[ɬɑp] !  
[rɑb]  ! 
 
 
In this case, the phonetic form of 'rob' comes out with a voiced [b], as 
required. It’s important to keep in mind that in both grammars, the output form 
violates at least some of the constraints: constraints are not prohibitions on output, but 
merely guiding computational structures. 
Note that OT suffers from the same ambiguity as to whether terms in square 
brackets refer to phonetic mental states or to the articulatory/auditory consequences 
thereof. The unfortunate ambiguity in reference between phones and mind external 
phenomena makes it ambiguous just which entities phonological constraints are 
quantifying over. A constraint against voiced obstruents could be a constraint limiting 
the construction of phonetic forms of the form [-son +voice]45, or it could be a 













constraint limiting the engagement of air in the vocal chords while constricting the 
vocal tract. 
Hale & Reiss (2008, pp.149-154) demonstrate how our choice of 
interpretation might entail that phonemic and phonetic states have intentional content 
as of the articulatory gestures they cause. The next section airs these concerns and 
develops Hale & Reiss’ reasoning that such considerations do not in themselves entail 
that phonemic or phonetic states have intentional content. 
 
4. Phonology With and Without Substance 
Given the systematic ambiguity canvassed above, there are at least two ways we 
could interpret OT constraints. On the one hand they could constrain possible 
configurations of the articulatory apparatus or acoustic consequences thereof. Hale & 
Reiss (2008, p. 149 ff.) call such a view Phoneticist. Alternatively, they could 
constrain the possible computational transformations between phonemic mental states 
and phonetic mental states. Hale & Reiss call such a view Traditionalist (ibid.). 
The Phoneticist view of constraints would seem to entail that phonetic mental 
states have intentional content as of the articulatory apparatus or acoustic phenomena. 
Insofar as it’s correct, we’d have good reason to attribute intentional content to 
phonological states. In what follows, we’ll see that Hale & Reiss give good reason for 
supposing that it is not correct, so we need not ascribe intentional content to 








The Traditionalist approach does not in itself entail that phonological states 
have intentional content. But, as Hale & Reiss point out, many Traditionalists 
suppose that constraints on phonetic forms are in some way 'grounded' by constraints 
on actual articulatory mechanisms. One way of making sense of this grounding 
relationship is to suppose that phonetic states reflect constraints on the articulatory 
apparatus because they represent aspects of that apparatus as such. While Hale & 
Reiss are not explicitly concerned with banishing intentionality from phonology, the 
conclusion of this section will be that the arguments they launch against Phoneticist 
and 'grounding' views exclude these considerations as sufficient to attribute 
intentional content to phonological states. 
Let’s tackle the Phoneticists first. They posit constraints within the grammar 
that operate on either articulatory systems or a speaker’s acoustic production. Note 
that such constraints themselves are not mere properties of the articulatory system or 
acoustic phenomena, indicating that, for example, it’s physically impossible for the 
back of the tongue to touch the bottom lip. They are supposed to be abstract 
properties of the cognitive processes that lead to speech production. For, remember, 
constraints are often violated. Nonetheless, such constraints are characterized in terms 
of articulatory production (or, alternatively, acoustic phenomena). For example, a 
constraint against voiced obstruents would be interpreted by the Phoneticist as a 









As Hale & Reiss note, one way to make sense of the fact that these constraints 
operate on the grammar, but are individuated in terms of the articulatory system and 
acoustic phenomena is that the grammar has what Hale & Reiss call ‘phonetic 
‘knowledge’’ of the articulatory/acoustic consequences of implementing phonetic 
structures46. We can remove the scare quotes and just talk about phonetic states as 
having intentional content as of the articulatory system. 
We could, for example, make sense of a constraint on voiced obstruents in 
Phoneticist terms as follows. The phonetic form [+voice] represents the property of 
the articulatory system such that air flows over the vocal chords and [-son]47 
represents the obstruction of the vocal tract. Thus, the constraint on vocal cord 
engagement simultaneous with vocal tract obstruction is realized as a constraint 
against the phonetic mental state, [+voice -son]. This state, in turn, is characterized as 
a state with intentional content as of the relevant state of the articulatory apparatus. 
The Phoneticist also explains why constraints are operative by appeal to phonological 
knowledge. It’s because the phonological system represents that it’s relatively 
difficult to voice obstruents that it imposes a constraint against them48. Thus, if 





46 Insofar as Hale & Reiss reject the Phoneticist paradigm, they also reject this appeal to phonetic 
knowledge. 
47 [-son] characterizes obstruents. 
48 The pronunciation of obstruents is generally done by obstructing the flow of air through the larynx-- 
which, given our anatomy, makes it difficult to articulate voicing by running air across the vocal folds! 








Phoneticist construals of phonology are correct, we may have good reason to attribute 
intentional content to phonological states. 
Unlike the Phoneticists, Traditionalists take phonological constraints to be 
operating on phonetic states rather than on the articulatory system itself. Nonetheless, 
they often borrow the same reasoning as the Phoneticists to explain why particular 
constraints are operative in human phonology. They might assert that there is a 
constraint against voiced obstruents because it is relatively difficult for the 
articulatory apparatus to engage the vocal chords while the vocal tract is obstructed. 
Such accounts are appeals to articulatory grounding: the existence of phonological 
rules or constraints is explained in reference to properties of the articulatory system.  
Articulatory grounding as employed by the Traditionalists is ambiguous two 
ways. On a diachronic construal, it may simply be an appeal to an historical-causal 
account of why certain constraints on human grammar were selected. It’s because, in 
our evolutionary history, voiced obstruents were relatively difficult to pronounce that 
the grammar grew a constraint against the [+voice -son] forms that typically caused 
such articulatory processes. Such a process wouldn’t necessarily require that [+voice -
son] have content as of the articulatory actions it often produces. Alternatively, a 
synchronic account would have it that the grammar implements a constraint against 
[+voice -son] because it represents that voiced obstruents are difficult to articulate 
and it takes [+voice] to have content as of the voicing gesture and [-son] to have 








Thus, while there is one version of articulatory grounding that does not entail 
that phonological states have intentional content, there is a version of it operative in 
some forms of Traditionalist phonology and all forms of Phoneticist phonology that 
would seem to require that phonological states have content as of properties of the 
vocal tract. 
Indeed, it’s such characterizations of articulatory grounding that seem to lead 
Rey (2003, p.178) to conclude, contra Chomsky’s protestations, that phonological 
states require content. He references Kenstowicz (1994) who notes that nasal 
fricatives are impossible because 'so much airflow is diverted to the nasal cavity that 
not enough remains to generate the turbulence required of a fricative' (p.16). Rey 
concludes that phonological explanations can’t get on without referencing the 
articulatory apparatus. So, you might presume, features like [+nasal] must be features 
of the articulatory system itself. If features like [+nasal] are features of the 
articulatory apparatus, Rey argues, the only way in which they could be subject to 
mental computational processes is if there are representations as of such features that 
the mind computes over. 
As we’ll see, Hale & Reiss argue that phonology can dispense with such 
articulatory grounding. Instead, they argue that all phonological structures are 
computationally possible. That some are constrained or unattested can be explained 
without appealing to articulatory grounding. To the extent that we can do away with 
articulatory grounding, we can also do away with any appeal to intentionality it might 









4.1. Against Articulatory Grounding 
Take for example the constraint against voiced obstruents considered above. An 
articulatory grounding of such a claim would have it that the constraint exists because 
the phonological system represents that it’s relatively difficult to voice an obstruent. 
What if, Hale & Reiss suppose (2008, p.154 ff.),  it was no longer difficult for 
humans to voice obstruents? Suppose humans develop expandable skin sacs below 
their oral cavities, much like bullfrogs. These sacs would allow air to flow over the 
vocal folds even as an obstruent blocked airflow to the upper vocal tract. Voicing 
obstruents would be quite easy.  
Even if we had such necks, and our phonological system represented as much, 
Hale & Reiss argue, we’d still be able to acquire German, a language that, as we’ve 
seen, OT theorists have it relies on a constraint against voiced obstruents. Children 
raised around German speakers would continue pronouncing 'raub' as {Raʊp} even 
though they have no articulatory ground for not pronouncing it as {Raʊb} instead. 
An intuitive commitment to articulatory grounding and a thought experiment 
pumping our intuitions about it does not really give us a basis for deciding on its truth 
either way. So, Hale & Reiss present evidence that phenomena purported to be 
explained by such grounding are better explained without appeal to it. For example, 
take the observation that, in some languages, vowels at the beginning of words tend to 
have the same value despite changes in the surrounding phonological context (due to, 








the word are often subject to neutralization: they are pronounced differently as the 
surrounding phonological context changes.  
As Hale & Reiss point out (2000, p.163), one way to account for this 
phenomenon would be to posit an explicit constraint on the phonological system that 
prohibits vowel neutralization at the beginning of words, but licenses it in other 
positions, along the lines of Beckman (1997). Since the beginnings of words tend to 
be more perceptually salient, such a rule would maintain distinctions between vowels 
in different words in just those positions that are more perceptually salient. Beckman 
cites this result as a point in favor of positing such a constraint. 
Her reasoning seems to be that the data about perceptual saliency and 
neutralization is consistent with a view of the phonological system such that it 
represents facets of the articulatory/perceptual system. Given that the phonological 
system represents the beginnings of words as being more perceptually salient, that 
explains why it would therefore impose a constraint that limits vowel neutralization at 
that position. 
In contrast, Hale & Reiss argue that the data about perceptual saliency 
actually argues against positing such a constraint on the phonological system itself. 
Instead, they argue that this psycholinguistic data itself explains the regularity that 
word initial vowels are less prone to neutralization, obviating the need to posit a 
constraint on the phonological system. It’s because word initial syllables are so 
perceptually salient that children acquiring a language tend to maintain the contrasts 








are less salient that children acquiring a language might tend to gloss over distinctions 
in vowel values that might be present there.  
Over time, then, a language (I- or E-) could well settle into a state in which 
distinctions between high and mid vowels at the beginning of words are stable across 
a wide variety of contexts, but there are few such distinctions at other positions. 
Patterns of vowel neutralization in a language are explained by facts of the 
acoustic/psycho-perceptual environment in which language acquisition takes place 
rather than facts about the language faculty itself. 
Since their explanation requires fewer theoretical posits, Hale & Reiss argue 
simplicity considerations prefer it. Beckman’s explanation is an instance of 'substance 
abuse' in that it needlessly posits that constraints on perception and production 
influence constraints we should attribute to the phonological system itself. The 
simplest hypothesis is that phonological features are allowed to combine without 
constraint. Any regularities in phonological structures that are never or rarely realized 
are the result of restrictions on the articulatory apparatus itself. If a speaker creates a 
phonological structure that is impossible to make manifest with her articulatory 
apparatus, then no other speaker will learn to make such a structure because her 
articulatory apparatus will not be able to create the data necessary for others to 
reconstruct the phonological structure. We need not posit that speakers represent that 








4.2. Against Phonological Functionalism 
These considerations also give Hale & Reiss reason to dispense with another possible 
source of intentionality within phonology: functionalist reasoning. 'Functionalism' has 
a special sense here, apart from its usual use within cognitive science more generally. 
The basic doctrine is that the phonological system starts out with an aim to 
accomplish two goals: minimize ambiguity for the hearer while nonetheless 
minimizing articulatory effort for the speaker. 
Given two broad goals like these, the phonological system establishes a set of 
constraints on phonetic forms that variously help to accomplish these goals. The view 
often goes hand in hand with OT. In general, faithfulness constraints, which maintain 
contrasts between forms at the phonemic level, help reduce ambiguity. Markedness 
constraints, which prohibit phonetic forms it would be difficult to pronounce, help 
minimize articulatory effort. Construction of phonetic forms then proceeds out of a 
competition amongst these constraints.  
Obviously, if something like functionalism were true, the phonological system 
would have to represent a great deal of information: the two goal states, aspects of the 
articulatory system, hypotheses as to what phonological structures will best avoid 
ambiguity in speakers, etc. For example, the account would have it that there is a 








[+voice] as being about the action of engaging vocal chords, represents [-son]49 as 
being about the action of constricting the larynx, and represents that it’s difficult to 
constrict the larynx while at the same time engaging the vocal chords! 
Even more trenchantly, consider the constraint from Kirchner (1997, p. 104), 
referenced by Hale & Reiss (p. 184): 
 
LAZY--Minimalize articulatory effort 
 
To follow this constraint, it would seem the phonological system would have 
to represent as such just which articulatory gestures were more effortful than others. 
It might, for example, represent that a retroflex stop, articulated with the back of the 
tip of the tongue against the palate, requires more effort than an alveolar stop, which 
is articulated with the front tip of the tongue. In order to be sensitive to this 
knowledge, it would have to represent these two actions. If the phonetic state, [ ʈ ], 
represented a retroflex gesture, and the phonetic state, [d], represented a gesture that 
used the front tip of the tongue against the palate instead, it might then obey the 
constraint by outputting a [d] rather than a [ ʈ ].  
The considerations raised above against articulatory grounding also indicate 
that such functionalist theory is otiose. Certain phonological structures may not 













manifest very often because they are in fact difficult to pronounce or perceive-- not 
because the phonological system represents them as such. There may well be 
pressures on speakers to reduce articulatory effort and minimize ambiguity in speech-
- but these pressures need not operate via the articulatory system representing them as 
goals, as functionalist reasoning maintains. 
Thus, Hale & Reiss eliminate many of the loci where intentional content has 
been thought to play a role in phonology. They show how phonological 
generalizations can be captured without constraints that could be construed as 
representational. And, they show how these rules can be implemented without 
supposing that they must be grounded in knowledge of the articulatory system or the 
perceptual systems of potential listeners. 
4.3. Carr’s Objections to Substance Free Phonology 
Philip Carr (2000) seems to argue that phonological features must be intentional 
simply because they must transduce information to motor systems and from acoustic 
perceptual systems50. He claims that under Hale & Reiss’ story, 'phonological 





50 Carr’s claim is actually conditional. If phonological features are thought of as mental states along 
the lines of Hale & Reiss, then they must be intentional, he argues. Carr takes this conclusion as a 
reductio of the claim that feature states are computational states that are a part of UG. Rather, he 
champions, along with Burton-Roberts (2000) a picture of phonology as outside of linguistic cognition 
proper. Instead, their picture seems to be that phonological generalizations range over external E-
language type phenomena rather than aspects of cognition. I lay this view aside, as it obviates the 
question raised in this paper: if there just aren’t any mental phonological states, there’s no question as 
to whether such mental states are in fact intentional! To the extent the reader is sympathetic to this 
view, she may take my argument to provide succor for her views insofar as they defend the antecedent 








representations have intrinsic acoustic content' (97) and that 'intrinsic articulatory 
content also seems to find a place in Hale and Reiss’' account (98). Unless phonology 
is simply a formal system spinning in a void, without any connection to speech, it 
must have some systematic bearing on the sounds that get produced by speakers and 
the structures produced by hearers as the result of acoustic information reaching their 
ears. Given that this is the case, Carr argues that there are at least three reasons to 
suppose that phonological states are intentional. He’s wrong on the first two counts. 
His third complaint can be interpreted as a recapitulation of the individuation worry 
we’ll consider in Section 5. Ultimately, we’ll show that this worry is damaging to the 
thesis that phonological states are nonintentional. But, we’ll have to examine much 
more evidence than Carr adduces to demonstrate that this objection is warranted. 
First, Carr notes that 'the input and output of a transducer are intimately 
connected, and that they stand in a non-arbitrary relation to each other' (97). 
Therefore, in holding that the relation between the formal process of phonology and 
the mechanisms of speech production and perception is one of transduction, 'Hale and 
Reiss undermine their view that they are not intimately connected' (97). 
It’s unclear how these considerations damage Hale & Reiss’ account. 
Precisely what Carr’s objection is here is unclear. It’s true that transduction must be 
'non-arbitrary' in the sense that the connection between the input and output must be 
at least somewhat systematic. Given, say, an input alphabet of numerals and a Latin 
output alphabet, there would be no information transduced if any numerical input had 








we must capture the generalization that certain acoustic inputs reliably give rise to the 
construction of the same phonological structures. We could not make sense of the 
observation that [+voice] is reliably tokened in hearers when they hear speakers 
produce sounds by engaging their vocal folds if [+voice] did not bear some 
systematic causal relation to such events in our normal environments. 
This observation may be sufficient to establish that acoustic and motoric 
events are 'intimately related' to phonological states in some sense. But, this 
connection is not enough to establish that phonological states themselves are about 
such events or otherwise are constrained in their possible combinations with other 
feature states in virtue of this connection. There is a systematic connection between 
coat wearing and temperature in that more people wear coats the colder it becomes. 
But, we need not suppose that instances of coat wearing are about temperature in 
order to explain the phenomenon. Neither need we suppose that this connection 
constrains the conditions under which coats may be worn. It’s perfectly possible to 
don your coat when it’s hot out even though, in general, there is a systematic relation 
between coats being worn and cold weather.  
So, yes, articulatory and acoustic phenomena may well be 'intimately 
connected' to phonological states, but not necessarily in any way that undermines 
Hale & Reiss’ claims about their connection. Whether they do is a matter of just 
precisely the nature of their connection amounts to. For that, we must turn to more 








Against these considerations, Carr claims that as long as the tokening of 
phonological states 'depend' upon auditory perceptual states, phonological states 'have 
intrinsic acoustic content… they are a species of acoustic image' (97). It’s just not 
obvious, though, that anything caused by proximal auditory stimuli must be about the 
acoustic phenomenon that caused that stimuli. Suppose, rather eccentrically, that the 
feature [+alveolar] gets tokened in hearers if and only if they receive proximal 
auditory stimulation of the kind usually caused by a pure tone of 440 Hz. This 
dependency of phonological state on auditory stimulus seems perfectly 
characterizable without appeal to intentional content. The simple statement of the 
causal regularity above is sufficient-- and that did not appeal to any intentional 
content of the [+alveolar] state.  
Eventually, I will argue that to capture the actual relations between distal and 
proximal stimuli and phonological states, we will have to attribute intentional content 
to those states. But, to demonstrate that this is the case, we will have to establish that 
the relation between phonological states and the stimuli they are causally dependent 
upon is of a special type. The example above demonstrates that the mere existence of 
any sort of dependence between the two is not sufficient to require the attribution of 
intentional content. 
Carr’s final objection is that, on their face, the feature states posited within 
phonology seem to have intentional content given that they are named in terms of 
articulatory phenomena. Place features, such as [+alveolar] seem to be identified in 








palate. Carr objects: 'if the features in question are defined in articulatory terms, then 
they are substantive' (98). We’ve already seen that it may well be difficult to type-
individuate feature states in terms of their relations to one another. So, we may well 
have to individuate them in terms of their relationships to things such as the alveolar 
ridge.  
But, type-identifying feature states in terms of articulatory apparati does not in 
itself damage Hale & Reiss’ conception of SFP. Neither does it in itself entail that we 
must ascribe content to such states as of places like the alveolar ridge. It could be that 
when a speaker tokens [+alveolar] in her phone box, as it were, it nearly always puts 
into motion articulatory actions that cause the tongue to make contact with the 
alveolar ridge. We could thus individuate the state [+alveolar] in terms of its usual 
causal consequences without further supposing that the state is about those 
consequences. In the same way, we can individuate a spark plug in terms of its 
tendency to ignite the compressed gasoline in an engine cylinder, without supposing 
that the spark plug represents the cylinder. 
We’ll see in Section 6that such a simple story can’t be told for phonological 
states. The present point is just that contra Carr, it is not enough to attribute 
intentional content to note that computational states interact with non-computational 
physical structures, like articulators and acoustic waves. Section 6 will explore 
accounts of these relations, arguing that most of them do not require intentional 








we’ll see just which aspects of speech perception do require us to attribute intentional 
content to phonological states. 
4.4. Against Internalist Individuation 
The Hale & Reiss picture is consonant with the Chomskyan 'Galilean' program of 
abstracting away from variations in performance to characterize the idealized 
competence of the language faculty. Thus, they insist that phonology should be the 
study of the computationally possible states of the grammar, rather than simply states 
of the grammar that are in fact generated given further constraints imposed by the 
nature of language learning, the environment, vocal tract, or what have you. 
In principle, then, phonological states can combine in any way: their 
combinatorial properties are not limited by aspects of the articulatory/perceptual 
systems51. Insofar as these two things are true, we may well be able to make 
phonological generalizations that don’t appeal to states of production and perception 
systems. So, you might think, we need not characterize phonological states as being 
about sounds or articulatory gestures. In what follows, I’ll argue that such a 
conclusion is not correct. 





51 Hale & Reiss go on to argue against constraints and OT more generally. I leave it a live possibility 
that OT theory is generally correct-- only accepting Hale & Reiss’ reasons for rejecting interpretations 
of the theory that appeal to articulatory grounding. So, maybe the combinatorial computational 
processes of the phonological system are governed by constraints-- but these constraints need not be 








Indeed, it is this very capacity for promiscuous and indefinitely extendable 
combination that requires that phonological states be type-individuated by their 
intentional content. The phoneme /k/ can combine with /æt/ to form /kæt/-- but /s/ can 
also combine with /æt/ to form /sæt/. So, it’s not obvious how we can type-
individuate /k/, /s/, and /æt/ solely on the basis of their relations to one another.  
Now, if there had been restrictions on which phonemes are able to combine 
with other phonemes, we could use these properties to individuate them. So, for 
example, suppose there was a non-violable restriction on nasal fricatives (on the 
grounds, for example, that it’s difficult to actually pronounce this combination)52. We 
might then be able to individuate [+nasal] in terms of its inability to combine with the 
class of features that constitute fricatives. This strategy would be akin to Collins’ 
suggestion that we individuate NP states from VP states in terms of the constraints 
that allow the latter to check case on the former, but not vice versa. But, if we hew to 
the substance free line, this path isn’t open to us in the realm of phonology. 
So, it does seem that the substance free approach prima facie leaves us 
without a mechanism to type-individuate phonological states. An alternate possibility 
is that features are individuated in terms of simple causal connections to other states--
computational or otherwise-- external to phonology. So, for example, [+voice] could 
be individuated in terms of its tendency to be causally connected to the vibration of 













the vocal folds. Or, it could be individuated in terms of certain acoustic phenomena 
that cause it to be tokened in perception. If we cannot find such a principle of 
individuation, there may be nothing for it but to individuate distinctive features by 
ascribing to them intentional content. The thesis of Section 5 is that there are not such 
principles. Thus, we attribute intentional content to feature states in order to type-
individuate them. Before airing that argument, though, it will be helpful to appreciate 
in more detail just why type-individuation is a problem for mental states in general. 
 
5. The Individuation Problem 
This problem of individuation has played a role in the running debate about 
intentionality in the realm of syntax and generative semantics. A key point of 
contention between Collins and Rey seems to be the extent to which intentional 
content might be necessary to type-identify the tokens of linguistic computations. Rey 
(2008) suggests that, absent intentional properties, there is no principled way to 
individuate NPs and distinct from VPs. The worry is that any attempt to individuate 
linguistic states in terms of their relations to one another-- via Ramsification, say-- 
will fail to adequately distinguish collateral from essential properties of those states. 
Fodor raises a similar problem for individuating concepts. 
Fodor is not worried about Ramsification as a strategy to individuate 
theoretical entities per se. Problems there may be. But, he does not find any problems 








Ramsification. Beliefs may be beliefs because they interact with desires in a 
particular way, and vice versa. 
Fodor’s concern (1987; 1998) is that Ramsification just won’t do for 
individuating conceptual states in particular. As Collins notes, the difference seems to 
be that relations amongst intentional contents are not stable enough to accommodate 
Ramsification. It may be just fine to Ramsify over the physicist’s term, 'star,' 
adjusting our quantifiers as we learn more about stars and their relations to other 
entities, such as hydrogen, helium, and gravity. In order for this process to even get 
off the ground, however, the physicist must have some content, STAR, that can 
remain stable across multiple revisions to our ramsification of the theoretical term, 
'star.'  
The physicist may start out Ramsifying 'star' in relation to terms like 'heavenly 
canopy' and 'hole,' but after sufficient investigation, sever these connections and 
instead relate 'star' to 'incandescent gas' and 'nuclear fusion.' That’s fine: properties 
we used to think were essential to starhood become either contingent or obviated: the 
stars themselves remain fixed, and we’ll continue to investigate until we get things 
right. The physicist is able to continue to revise her Ramsification, though, only 
because she has a fixed target that she is after: starhood.  
By contrast, insofar as the psychologist wants to characterize STAR mental 
states-- and not 'star's-- she has no stable state to fall back on as she does when 
investigating what makes something the theoretical term, 'star.' So, in order to 








Collins (2008) criticizes the application of Fodor’s (1998) argument to the 
current dispute as begging the question: 
 
Fodor’s argument explicitly rests upon the presumption that 
psychology/linguistics is an intentional science that deals with 
represented contents (p. 286) 
 
Indeed, Fodor (pp. 58-59) does argue that the relation of the psycho-linguist to 
theoretical terms such as AGENT is different from the physicist’s relation to terms 
such as 'Higg’s boson' precisely because AGENT tokens are supposed to be 
intentional. The physicist is free to leave the term, 'Higg’s boson' undefined insofar as 
it’s a term of the meta-language the physicist uses to make generalizations about 
Higg’s bosons. But, when the psycholinguist attributes an AGENT state to a subject, 
she cannot leave the term, AGENT, undefined, because it’s not merely part of her 
meta-language. Instead, she is using the meta-linguistic term, 'AGENT,' to attribute 
an intentional state, AGENT, to her subject. Thus, it is encumbent upon her to give a 
gloss on just what it is for her subject’s AGENT state to be about agents, as opposed 
to about anything else. 
True, this argument presupposes that the primitives of psychological enquiry 
are intentional, and whether the terms of linguistic theory are intentional is just what 
is currently under dispute. So, as Collins notes, this particular argument from Fodor 








does not so beg the question53. The premise here is not that there is some intentional 
state, STAR, that’s about stars. Rather, the premise is that there is some mental state, 
X, shared both by Aristotle and a modern cosmologist. Put aside whether X has 
intentional content or not. In Aristotle, X is linked up to other mental states, call them 
canopy-states and hole-states. In the cosmologist, X is instead linked up to helium-
states and fusion-states. So, if we’re to preserve the assumption that X is common to 
Aristotle and the cosmologist, they cannot be type-individuated by their relations to 
other states.  
There are at least two ways out of this impasse. First, we could type-
individuate mental states by way of stable mind-external causal relations. For 
example, we might hope to identify STAR states as just those states caused by stars. 
This a no-go because, again, the causal responsiveness to distal stimuli of Aristotle’s 
STAR state and mine seems just as promiscuous as their responsiveness to other 
mental states. Lots of non-stars could cause STAR states and sometimes stars won’t 
eventuate in STAR states. 
Alternatively, we could deny confirmation holism altogether and suppose that 
mental states stand in generally stable, non-promiscuous, relationships over which we 
can Ramsify. This is the suggestion that Collins takes up when he notes that VP-states 





53 The following is similar to Fodor’s (1998, p. 13) circularity objection to inferential role semantics, 
or his (2000, pp.15-16) argument as to why rationalist psychologists can’t individuate constituents of 
propositions in terms of their causal relations to one another. We need not accept Fodor’s externalist 
conclusion of these arguments if we think there is some way of individuating states in terms of 








can be distinguished from NP-states in that the former check case on the latter, but 
not vice versa (p. 284). Thus, the theoretical term 'VP' is more akin to the theoretical 
term 'star' than it is to the mental state, STAR.54 Insofar as the debate is restricted to 
the realm of syntax in matured language faculties, I’m sympathetic to Collins’ 
arguments. 
However, the considerations of Hale & Reiss raised above suggest that this 
strategy isn’t open to phonology. The Hale & Reiss approach would have it that any 
phonological state can in principle computationally combine with any other. There 
aren’t any restrictions on phonological states of the type Collins points out for 
syntactic states. 
An alternative strategy would be to individuate phonological states in terms of 
their external relations to, say, the articulatory and auditory systems. It’s, again, not 
clear that we can individuate phonological states in terms of their distal causes any 
better than we can do so for STAR states. The range of distal causes to which they are 
sensitive seems similarly indefinite. In Section 6, we’ll survey evidence that both of 
these prima facie obstacles to individuating phonological states do in fact hold. 





54 It may seem prima facie that lexical items. at least, must trivially face the same difficulties Fodor 
proposes for concepts. Lexical items-- words-- seem to exhibit precisely the same indefinite 
productivity faced by concepts: they can be related to one another in seemingly endless variety. One 
might think, however, that the verificationist strategy may work out for words in a way it never did for 
concepts. For instance, you might suppose that lexical items are type-individuated by their relations not 
to one another but either to concepts themselves or to phonological structures. That is, it may not be 
characteristic of the word, 'cat' that it appear in the sentence 'the cat is on the mat.' But, it may be 
characteristic of it that it is causally related to the concept, CAT, or the phonological structure, /kaet/, 








Thus, phonological states will be in the same boat as Fodor takes conceptual 
mental states to be in. Both are too promiscuously sensitive to one another and to 
external stimuli to be amenable to individuation by way of either of the methods 
canvassed above. I argue in Section 7 that the best available way to individuate 
phonological states, therefore, is to do so in terms of their intentional content. This is 
the same conclusion Fodor’s reconstructed argument given above recommends for 
conceptual states. Given that we cannot individuate STAR states in terms of the 
totality of their internal or external relations, we appeal instead to their intentional 
content. 
Now, specifying how terms get their meaning may well involve giving an 
account of their relations either to external states (as in, e.g., Fodor’s externalist 
account) or to other intentional states (as in, e.g., Rey, 2009). Notice, though, that 
both these strategies entail individuating mental states in terms of their content. 
Fodor’s externalism gets around the individuation problem by specifying that 
the external relations relevant to individuating mental states are of a particular type. 
Namely, he argues that there are external conditions in which the state is tokened 
correctly, and those under which it is not. Insofar as states with correctness conditions 
just are states with intentional content, Fodor individuates mental states in terms of 
intentional content.  
Alternatively, you could specify that particular privileged internal relations 
are relevant to determining intentional content. BACHELOR might have as its 








meaning ‘unmarried’ and ‘man’ (as, e.g., elaborated by Rey, 2009). But, as Rey 
notes, such an approach presupposes that mental states are already individuated in 
terms of their content. You can’t relate BACHELOR states to MAN states unless you 
have already individuated MAN states as having the content, ‘man.’  
So, I’ll refrain from taking a stand on whether the appropriate theory of 
content constitution is internalist or externalist. What remains is the insight that 
individuating states in terms of their intentional content helps get us out of the 
quandary of being unable to individuate states in terms of the totality of their internal 
or external relations. This is, in Ramsey’s (2007) terms, the 'job description' of 
intentional content in phonology. 
We have not yet, however, demonstrated that intentional content is necessary 
to individuate phonological states. There remain two possible individuation strategies 
that do not appeal to intentional content. One alternative is that phonological states 
are individuated in terms of the articulatory gestures that they cause. For example, a 
[b] might be individuated as just that state that causes the lips to move together in a 
certain way. Another alternative is that phonological states, such as [b], are 
individuated in terms of the acoustic properties that give rise to them.  
Section 6 considers these two possibilities and argues that neither works. 
Section 6.1 argues that phonological states cannot be individuated in terms of their 
relations to acoustic phenomena. Section 6.2 argues that neither can they be 
individuated in terms of their relations to articulatory gestures. As we saw in Section 








another. Therefore, we are left unable to individuate phonological states in terms of 
either (1) their relations to one another, (2) their relations to articulatory gestures, or 
(3) their relations to acoustic phenomena. Section 7 concludes that type-individuating 
phonological states in terms of intentional content is the best alternative to these 
failed strategies. 
6. Individuation Via Phonological Interfaces 
If we can’t individuate phonological states in terms of their de facto internal relations 
with one another, you might hope that we could individuate them in terms of their 
relations to the proximal states that mediate their auditory and motor interfaces. It’s a 
common phonological assumption that the states that cause us to produce speech 
sounds are the very same states into which we sort auditory speech stimuli. So, a /p/ 
state is a causal antecedent of my utterance of 'pepper' as well as a causal consequent 
of me hearing someone else say, 'pepper.'  
This picture leaves open two strategies to individuate phonological states. One 
strategy would be to individuate /p/ in terms of the motor instructions to which it 
gives rise. In this case, /p/ would just be that state that gives rise to a set of motor 
instructions, such as to bring the lips together, inter alia. If this strategy fails, we 
could instead try individuating phonological states with respect to their relations to 
proximal auditory stimuli. On this hypothesis, /p/ would be just that state that is in 
fact caused by auditory stimuli of a particular type. 
If either of these strategies were to work, we could describe phonological 








after all, individuate the states in terms of properties of the proximal stimuli or 
receptors to which they connect, and, assuming Hale & Reiss are correct, describe 
their interactions amongst one another in purely syntactic terms.  
However, these strategies don’t work. There simply are no reliable 
correlations between phonological states and their interfaces with perception and 
production that could serve to type-individuate them. This section examines evidence 
from theories of speech perception that establish this claim. 
Phonologists and phoneticians have never been explicitly concerned with the 
question of how to type-individuate phonological states, much less our larger question 
of whether such states have intentional content. Therefore, we must do some work to 
see how the dialectic within the speech perception literature maps on to our present 
concerns. Theories of speech perception generally fall into three major approaches.55 
Generally, they are distinguished by what they consider the proper 'objects' for speech 
perception. Motor Theory (MT) has it that these objects are the articulatory 
instructions of the speaker. Direct Realist Theory (DRT) has it that it is the actual 
articulatory actions themselves. General Auditory Approaches (GA) have it that the 
proper objects are the acoustic waves generated by articulatory actions. 
Just what it means for something to be an 'object of speech perception' is 
unclear. Speech perception theorists certainly do not tend to write explicitly in terms 













of establishing the intentional content of states. Indeed, the criteria they cite in favor 
of one possible set of 'objects' seems to indicate that they are often engaged in purely 
verbal disputes amongst one another. What theorists take it to be an 'object of 
perception' may well vary one from the other. 
It is tempting to gloss the debate as one concerning the intentional content of 
phonological states. Under this construal, all theorists would agree that phonological 
states are intentional, but would disagree as to whether the states represent variously 
articulatory actions, instructions to implement those actions, or the acoustic results of 
those actions.  
Alternatively, the debate over the objects of perception could be premised on 
the idea that phonological states are not intentional. It could be, for example, that 
phonological states regularly covary with the proximal stimuli caused by acoustic 
phenomena, or properties of articulatory gestures, instructions to produce the same, or 
auditory stimuli. In this case, the debate about objects of perception could be 
construed as a debate over just which correlations with external phenomena are 
appropriate to individuate states independently of any content. We’ll see that all of 
these non-intentional strategies fail. 
6.1. Motor Theory: Against Auditory Individuation 
In explicating their Motor Theory, Liberman & Mattingly (1985) argue that because 
phonological states can’t be individuated in terms of the proximal auditory stimuli 
that cause them, they must be thought of as states with intentional content as of motor 








But, the considerations of Motor Theory are sufficient to eliminate one of our 
candidate hypotheses about non-intentional individuation: we cannot individuate 
phonological states in terms of their mere causal co-variation with proximal auditory 
stimuli that cause them.  
Motor Theory has it that: 
phonetic objects cannot be perceived as a class by reference to 
acoustic stigmata, but only by a recognition that the sounds might 
have been produced by a vocal tract as it made linguistically 
significant gestures. (Liberman & Mattingly, 1985, p. 24, my 
italics) 
 
Their general reasoning seems to be that (1) there is no 1-1 mapping between either 
acoustic properties or the proximal stimuli resulting from them, on the one hand, and 
phonological states on the other. Because of this lack, (2) which phonological state 
the language faculty tokens as the result of proximal auditory stimuli is the result of it 
assessing how much evidence the proximal stimuli provide for the one state over 
another given its background representations of the vocal tract and its acoustic 
consequences. Considered as such, the theory is clearly intentional. However, the 
inference does not go through. 
To see why, let’s first get a grip on the task the auditory-cum-speech 
perceptual system must perform. Phoneticians often characterize sounds in terms of 
different frequencies, the intensity of which changes overtime. When these changes 
are mapped on a spectrograph, they appear as bands called formants. Each formant 








time. For example, the spectrograph for an utterance of /di/ and that of /du/ looks 




Formants are labeled numerically in order of ascending relative frequency as 
F1, F2, etc. So, here, the acoustic consequences of /du/ are such that F1 rises in 
frequency as F2 lowers. 
These acoustic properties cause proximal stimulation of the auditory system. 
Somehow the speech perception system must construct phoneme representations 
given states that track the information given in such spectrographs. Liberman & 
Mattingly are correct to point out that the information recorded by such spectrographs 
does not match 1-1 with the phonemes that they give rise to. As seen above, two very 
different acoustic events can each give rise to the perception of a /d/. 
However, this observation alone is not enough to establish that the process of 
mapping proximal stimuli engendered by such acoustic phenomena to phonemic 
representations is an intentional one. Instead, there could be regularities in the 















mapping between acoustic cues and phonemic states that the perceptual system could 
exploit. 
For instance, take an example from Liberman & Mattingly themselves: 
if the onset frequency of the transition of the second formant 
during a stop release is sufficiently low, relative to the frequency 
of the following steady state, the stop is perceived as labial; 
otherwise, as apical or dorsal (11). 
 
To effect this regularity, the perceptual system would need (1) some proximal 
state that co-varied with the relative frequency of the second format, and (2) a 
computational process that mapped values of this state that correspond to formants 
with low initial values onto the feature [+labial], and not otherwise. The system 
would not have to represent that [+labial] states give rise articulatory gestures that 
result in acoustic properties such as the above. It would merely need to implement a 
computational system that transformed its proximal input so as to track this 
regularity. 
There are many such regularities that seem to factor into our speech 
perception abilities. In the literature, they are called cues. Second formant transitions 
such as the above cue the perception of [+labial]. Liberman & Mattingly note that 
such cues are often in themselves sufficient for perceiving certain features, but never 
necessary. Moreover, they stand in complementary relations for one another, so that 
the absence of one cue can be compensated by the presence of another. So, for 
example, both differences in formant transitions and in silence can cue the difference 








difference in silent periods maintains the perceptual distinction, and vice versa 
(Liberman & Mattingly, pp. 11-12). 
Liberman & Mattingly cite the above phenomena as evidence that motor 
instructions, and not acoustic properties, are the appropriate objects of speech 
perception. Because of the variety of acoustic cues, 'there is simply no way to define 
phonemic categories in purely acoustic terms' (12). If the goal is to list necessary and 
sufficient acoustic conditions on the property of being a phoneme, they may well be 
correct. The list of sufficient conditions would be long, and the necessary non-
existent. There simply may be no acoustic objects that could be identified as 
phonemes.56 
All this is just to recapitulate the observation that began this section: that the 
phonemic states of hearers seem to vary roughly 1-1 with the phonemic states of 
speakers, but not with the acoustic events they generate. Thus, Liberman & Mattingly 
conclude that we cannot, as GA theorists would, individuate phonemic states in terms 
of the acoustic stimuli to which they respond. They write: 'An auditory theory that 
accounts for invariant perception in the face of so much variation in the signal would 
require a long list of apparently arbitrary assumptions' (14). It’s unclear, however, 
precisely what would be problematic about such assumptions. 













On the one hand, one might worry about the supposed 'arbitrary' nature of the 
assumptions about the structure of the perceptual system. Why should a rising second 
formant before /i/, and a falling second formant before /u/ both give rise to a 
perception of /d/? That the auditory perceptual system makes such a distinction would 
seem arbitrary unless we consider that the perceptual system is so constructed so as to 
be able to covary with utterances of /di/ and /du/.  
But, this apparent arbitrariness problem is no problem at all. From the 
perspective of the theorist, of course, it may be obscure why the perceptual system 
should sort proximal stimuli the way it does. It’s thus useful for the theorist to realize 
that the system is sorting stimuli into equivalence classes that co-vary with 
articulatory instructions. But, it does not follow from this that it is useful for the 
perceptual system itself to have this realization! It could just be a happy historical (i.e. 
evolutionary) accident that the speech perception system is structured in just such a 
way that it reliably is able to reconstruct the phonetic states of speakers out of the 
auditory stimuli they generate.   
Alternatively, the problem may not be that the list of proximal stimuli that 
give rise to the same phonemic percepts is arbitrary, but simply that it is so long! 
You might think it an inelegant solution to the perception problem to suppose that it 
just relies on a look-up table by which it compares proximal input to a long list of 
possible input paired with the appropriate phonemic output. Each phonological state 
would have to be individuated in terms of a very long, hugely contextually dependent 








Now, just because this method of individuation would be inelegant does not 
demonstrate that it’s not in principle possible. In fact, we might not even have to 
reference all disjuncts of the stimulus disjunction in order to individuate phonological 
states. Even if there are not any acoustic cues that are necessary to engender a /d/ 
percept, we might be able to individuate the state in terms of just some subset of 
conditions we could demonstrate are sufficient. Thus, /d/ could be individuated as just 
that state that is tokened by, amongst others, those proximal stimuli eventuated by the 
/di/ and /du/ type utterances above, and any other states that listeners consciously 
perceive as being phenomenally similar. An arbitrary state, /x/, is identified as a /d/ 
just in case it is so perceptually similar to the state perceived to be in common in /di/ 
and /du/. 
The problem with this method of individuating phonological states is that 
conscious phenomenal similarity does not seem to be a necessary property of 
phonological states. True, phonological state tokens of the same type usually have 
this property, and it’s often used as a proxy by speech scientists to identify which 
phonological state a stimulus has engendered in a listener. Nonetheless, phonological 
states can be tokened even if listeners are not consciously, perceptually aware of their 
tokening. Subjects with Broca’s aphasia may have difficulty with syllable 
identification and discrimination. But, this inability to explicitly respond to 
discrimination tasks doubly dissociates with speech recognition impairment (Holt & 








recognizing a phenomenal similarity between them. So conscious perceptual 
similarity can’t serve as a necessary condition on phonological states.  
It’s fine to type-identify entities via description of properties that they may 
turn out to merely accidentally share rather than possessed constitutively. So, insofar 
as current syntactic theory has it that verbs check case on nouns, but not vice versa, 
it’s fine to type identify noun and verb states by reference to this property-- even 
though we may in future discover nouns that check case on verbs. But this maneuver 
is kosher only insofar as this case-check asymmetry is, however contingently, a 
universal means for type-identifying out all states we currently identify as nouns and 
verbs. Perceptual similarity to an index phoneme perception just doesn’t have this 
universal property. 
So, if we are to type-individuate phonological states on the basis of proximal 
auditory stimuli, we’ll have to do so by reference to a long, multifarious disjunction 
of such stimuli. But, the problem goes even deeper than this. We have evidence that 
the contextual cues that could cause us to revise our tokening of a phonological state 
constitute an indefinite disjunction. In this sense, there do not even seem to be 
sufficient conditions on the proximal stimuli that could be used to type-individuate 
phonological states. For any given proximal auditory stimulation, an indefinite 









These context effects are legion, so I’ll survey only a few striking examples 
here.57 In what follows, I’ll continue the convention of containing IPA expressions in 
{curly brackets} when using them to describe external phenomena (i.e. acoustic blasts 
or articulatory gestures), thus leaving [square brackets] and /slashes/ to 
unambiguously refer to phonetic and phonemic mental states, respectively. 
Famously, the same acoustic blast is perceived as /ga/ when preceded by {al} 
and /da/ when preceded by {ar}. This contextual effect is fortuitous because we are 
wont to pronounce /da/ and /ga/ differently relative to the preceding syllable. 
Producing {ar} shifts the tongue toward the back of the mouth, so the following {d} 
or {g} is also articulated further back in the mouth. Pronunciation of {al} likewise 
shifts articulation forward. Outside of this context, {da} usually has a higher F3 onset 
than {ga}. But, when produced after {ar}, further back in the mouth, the F3 onset of 
{da} lowers. Similarly, when produced forward in the mouth, after {al}, the F3 onset 
of {ga} goes up. Thus, the acoustic blasts produced in pronouncing /da/ and /ga/ in 
these contexts are extremely similar. Nonetheless, our perceptual system does not 
perceive these acoustic blasts as the same phoneme: it’s able to compensate, 
perceiving it as a /da/ before {ar} and a /ga/ before {al}. 
There’s reason to think that this particular context effect is not mediated by 
representations of the human articulatory system. It’s been found to obtain in native 













Japanese speakers (Mann 1986), who do not distinguish /l/ and /r/ phonemes, as well 
as quail (C. japonica: Lotto et al., 1997)!  One explanation is that the perceptual 
system simply perceives F3 onsets as higher than they actually are after low F3 
offsets, and vice versa (Lotto et al. 1997; Diehl, Lotto & Holt 2004). 
But, the context in which perception of these sounds switches from one 
phoneme to another is not exhausted by F3 offset effects. Fowler et al. (2000) showed 
that the same sound can be shifted from being perceived as a /da/ to a /ga/ and vice 
versa by the preceding visual context. The sight of lips mouthing {al} before the 
sound leads it to be perceived as /ga/; the sight of {ar} changes perception to /da/. 
Fowler takes the result to show that articulatory representations are mediating 
phoneme perception. 
But, taken together with the quail data, these results raise the possibility that 
the perception of /da/ versus /ga/ is mediated neither by proximal audio-visual context 
nor by representations of the human articulatory apparatus. Rather, the underlying 
contextual effect might be best described at the level of phonemes themselves. The 
rule might be something like: ceteris paribus, sound {%} is perceived as /da/ when 
preceded by /ar/, and /ga/ when preceded by /al/. It makes no difference which 
proximal stimuli occasioned the tokening of the /al/ or /ar/: be they auditory, visual, 
or something else, what matters is whether an /al/ or /ar/ has been tokened in the 
mental phoneme box. 
But, whether such context effects are driven by low level auditory contexts or 








individuate phonological states. You might think we could pick out /da/ under the 
description: ‘the state that’s tokened when proximal stimulus {%} impinges on the 
perceptual system in the case that it has just tokened an /ar/.’ But, individuating /da/ 
in terms of /ar/ presumes that we have a good way of type-individuating /ar/: that’s 
far from clear.  
First, /ar/ would seem to be susceptible to the same sorts of contextual effects, 
making it difficult to individuate it in terms of proximal auditory stimuli. Further, 
context effects such as the above are defeasible because they can propagate 
backwards in time. For example, the same sound may be perceived as an /s/ when it’s 
followed by a {u}, but a /ʃ/ when followed by {a} (Mann & Repp 1980). These 
effects could also be described at the phoneme level. Whether sound, {s}, is 
perceived as an /s/ or an /ʃ/ could turn on whether following stimuli are parsed into a 
/u/ or an /a/. But, this raises the possibility that the rule described above is defeasible. 
It’s true that the sound {%} may give rise to a /da/ when following /ar/-- but that is 
subject to change relative to the following phonemic context. 
Even if we could characterize a finite disjunction of phonemic context effects, 
there are nonetheless context effects that operate independently of phonemes. 
Auditory signals that are not perceived as speech, and thus would not influence 
phonemic context, nonetheless also influence phoneme categorization (Holt & Lotto 
2010, p. 1222). 
Furthermore, the generalization is also susceptible to revision in light of 








acoustic properties of a preceding phrase can change phonemic perception of a target. 
The same sound will be perceived as either 'bit' or 'bet' depending on whether the 
preceding phrase-- 'please say what this word is'-- has its F1 frequencies raised or 
lowered. So, whether a particular sound, {%} is perceived as a /da/ may depend not 
only on the phonemes that are tokened before and after it, but also on the global 
nature of the speech sounds preceding it. 
As the previous example suggests, phonemic perception is also subject to 
lexical context effects. In the Ganong Effect (Ganong 1980) an ambiguous sound is 
heard as /g/ when followed by 'ift' and as /k/ when followed by /iss/. Additionally, 
such lexical effects interact with more global context: they are enhanced in the 
context of lexical stimuli and attenuated in the context of non-lexical phonemic 
stimuli (Mirman et al. 2008). They also interact with phonemic context effects. An 
ambiguous sound that that shifts from an /s/ to an /ʃ/ due to the lexical effects from a 
preceding 'bli-' or 'bru-' engenders compensation for coarticulation in perception of 
the following phoneme. The same sound will be heard as a /t/ in the 'bru-' context and 
as a /k/ in the 'bli-' context because a preceding /s/ prompts the following phoneme to 
be heard as articulated backward in the mouth (/k/), and a preceding /ʃ/ as more 
forward (/t/) (Magnusson et al. 2003).  
There also seem to be possible semantic context effects on phoneme 








'The dairy farmer forgot to milk the _____' and as 'coat' in context of a sentence like 
'The tailor took care to press the _____' (Borsky, Tuller, & Shapiro 1998).58 
So, phonemic, lexical, and global context effects are not only multifarious, but 
interactive. The lesson is that any attempt to circumscribe the conditions under which 
a particular phoneme will be tokened in perception is defeasible by some other 
contextual condition. Thus, any attempt to type-identify phonemes in terms of the 
proximal stimuli that gives rise to them will fail.59 Moreover, as argued in Section 
4.4, neither can we individuate phonological states in terms of their relations to one 
another. As we saw in Section 5, type-individuating conceptual states in terms of their 
intentional content allowed us to individuate them absent a similar inability to do so 
in terms of their conceptual roles or responsiveness to stimuli. The same strategy thus 
recommends itself for our present predicament.  
6.2. General Auditory Approaches: Against Articulatory Individuation 
Though individuating phonemic states in terms of either their relations to one another 
or the stimuli that give rise to them fails, we need not yet concede that we must type-





58 It is, however, unclear to me whether these results indicate an effect on phoneme perception rather 
than just lexical perception.That is, the language faculty may have constructed a phonemic structure 
that ordinarily would pick out the 'goat' lexical item, but later revised its lexical retrieval without 
revising the original phonemic structure. Fodor (1983, p. 65 ff) addresses a similar worry in regard to 
interpretation of the phoneme restoration effect Here, an utterance of an {s} is replaced by white noise 
in a word like 'legislature,' viz.: 'legi{%}lature.' The white noise is nevertheless perceived as an /s/. It 
seems on the face of it that this perception is driven by the lexical context rather than the auditory or 
phonemic context. 
59 This is precisely the situation that undermined the Verificationists’ attempt to type individuate 








individuate phonological states in terms of intentional content. One last non-
intentional alternative remains. That is that phonological states can be individuated in 
terms of the articulatory movements they give rise to in production. So, for example, 
it’s possible that a feature like [+voice] could be individuated as just that feature that 
when appropriately tokened leads the vocal folds to vibrate.60 However, we’ll see that 
even this strategy proves inadequate because, just as with phoneme perception, there 
are context effects operating on speech production as well. Thus, in the end, we will 
have to type-individuate phonological states in terms of intentional content. 
We’ve already seen that phoneme perception is modulated by a tendency to 
compensate for coarticulation. This perceptual context effect goes along with actual 
coarticulation on the production side. The phonemic context in which a phoneme is 
embedded influences the actual articulatory gestures it gives rise to. Thus, you might 
worry that individuating phonemic states on the basis of articulatory production will 
fail because any particular tokening of a phoneme will have a wide range of 
articulatory consequences depending on the context in which it’s embedded.  





60 Something akin to this view might describe Fowler’s (e.g., 1996) DRT view. She holds that the 
'objects' of speech perception are articulatory gestures. But, she seems to deny that phonological states 
are mental states. She writes that vocal tract gestures '(not their neural control structures) are 
phonological components of an utterance' (p. 1731). Further, we can perceive such gestures directly: 
'unmediated by processes of hypothesis testing or inference making and unmediated by mental 
‘representations’ in the literal sense of mental stand-ins for real-world things' (ibid.), and yet also 
independent of variation in acoustic cues.The view seems to be that listeners instantiate states that co-
vary with articulatory gestures in a manner that skips over any sort of processes that might mediate 
between the production of those gestures and the tokening of the states. She asserts that 'the theory of 









Thus, phonemic features cannot be mapped one-to-one with actual articulatory 
movements. The movement to which any given phonetic feature gives rise depends 
upon the current state of the vocal tract at the time the feature is tokened. For 
example, ‘lip rounding’ may involve not just the lips, but the jaw as well (Liberman 
& Mattingly, p. 22). The same articulatory structure may also be recruited to enact 
different gestures at the very same time. So, the lips may be simultaneously rounding 
to produce [u] and closing to produce [b] when producing the syllable [bu] (ibid.). So, 
we cannot individuate phonetic features in terms of the particular articulatory 
movements to which they give rise, because these movements change depending on 
context. 
There nonetheless remains the possibility that we can individuate phonetic 
features in terms of the changes they induce in the vocal tract regardless of context. 
Liberman & Mattingly point out: 
for any particular gesture, the same sort of distinctive deformation 
is imposed on the current vocal-tract configuration, whatever this 
‘underlying’ configuration happens to be (p. 22). 
 
So, for example, the feature [+open] initiates movement in the tongue, lips, 
jaw, and hyoid to varying degrees, depending on context. But, in all contexts, these 
articulators move so as to 'give the tract a more open, horn-shaped configuration than 
it would otherwise have had' (Liberman & Mattingly, p. 23). So, perhaps [+open] can 
be type-individuated as just that feature that gives rise to a more horn-shaped 








But, if this is the way in which we individuate features, it’s unclear that we 
can do so without attributing to them intentional content as of the changes they effect. 
After all, if [+open] effects the change above, it does not do so through some simple 
causal reflex transmitted to articulators. In order to effect the open, horn-shaped 
configuration in any given context, the articulatory system would have to take into 
account how the articulators are positioned in that context, and calculate how to 
transform them so as to bring about the requisite shape. 
More than this, [+open] isn’t occasioning the production of the same shape 
each time, but simply a shape that is more open than it would otherwise be. Thus, it 
seems as though the articulatory system would have to represent counterfactuals 
about what is more or less open relative to an indefinite span of contexts. So, if we 
individuate phonemic states in terms of the articulatory stats to which they give rise, 
we must assume that they represent changes to the articulatory system. 
It’s still unclear, however, whether we can even type individuate phonemic 
states in that manner at all. First, there is evidence that non-human animals of diverse 
phylogeny seem sensitive to phonemic distinctions across contexts. So, for example, 
Chinchillas (Kuhl 1981; Kuhl & Miller 1975), macaques Kuhl & Padden 1983), zebra 








1997) have all demonstrated abilities to discriminate phonemic contrasts61. It seems 
doubtful that such animals make use of representations of the human vocal tract to 
accomplish such feats! 
Of course, just because non-human animals are able to discriminate phonemic 
distinctions in auditory stimuli, it does not follow that we must individuate the states 
they thereby token as the same phonemic states tokened by the human speech 
perception system. It could be that we share with chinchillas, Japanese quail, and 
other animals an ability to parse auditory stimuli into segments that correspond to the 
acoustic phenomena created by human speech utterances. It would not be surprising if 
humans capitalized upon this general auditory capacity when evolving a set of 
phonemic items for use in language. That is, it could be that phonemic states were 
selected that effected articulatory movements that eventuated in just those acoustic 
phenomena that our general auditory capacity could easily parse. Nonetheless, 
perhaps the phonemic states so selected are type-individuated in articulatory terms 
according to the manner described above. 
However, there’s a further worry that sometimes phonetic features don’t seem 
to have any articulatory consequences at all. Phenomena such as assimilation and 
schwa deletion suggest that sometimes the phonological system tokens phonetic 
features in production, but that they nonetheless fail to have articulatory 





61 In many cases, the animals can do this within diverse phonemic contexts. For example, the quail can 








consequences. In this the case, individuating [+alveolar] as just that feature that gives 
rise to contact of the tongue on the alveolar ridge would fail to pick out instances of 
the feature that fail to have these consequences.  
Assimilation occurs when certain features that normally would have certain 
articulatory consequences instead have articulatory consequences associated with 
different features.  In English, the word 'green' is usually pronounced with a final [n] 
sound. However, when uttered with certain other words, as in 'green boat,' speakers 
often pronounce the final consonant as an [m]-- so it sounds as though you might read 
the nonsense phrase, 'greem boat.' When saying 'green king,' they sometimes 
pronounce the final syllable as [ɳ], as one might read the nonsense phrase, 'gring 
king.' In doing so, they are changing the final syllable of 'green' such that it has the 
same [place] feature as the [k] in 'king' and the [b] in 'boat.' Just as [b] is articulated 
by bringing the two lips together, so is [m]. Otherwise, [m] is identical in terms of its 
feature geometry to [n]. The same goes for [n] and [ɳ]: they differ only insofar as the 
placement of the tongue in [ɳ] matches that in the [k] of 'king.' In this way, words like 
'green' are susceptible to having their final consonant  assimilate the [place] feature of 
the first consonant of the following word. 
Assimilation seems to be an 'optional' feature of English idiolects. Some 
people do it, some don’t, and those that do it tend not to do it consistently: there 
seems to be no way of specifying the contexts in which it takes place. Through all 
that, few other than phoneticians notice that anyone is varying their speech in this 








nonetheless not the result of any phonological rule. That is, it seems to be the result of 
performance factors rather than an aspect of phonological cognition proper62. So, it 
would seem that phonological processes would generate a surface phonetic form [grin 
bot] even though in production, the articulation produced is {grim bot}. Thus, if we 
individuate [n] as just that feature that gives rise to {n} articulations, we’d miss out 
on the instances in which it instead gives rise to {m} productions! 
A similar phenomena occurs in schwa deletion. Words such as 'every,' 'family' 
and 'memory' generally have the same middle vowel: a schwa, or [ə]. In production, 
however, [ə] is sometimes deleted in these contexts so the words are pronounced 
'fam’ly,' 'ev’ry,' etc. Again, this deletion seems to be an optional feature even of 
individual idiolects, so it’s not likely the result of a phonological rule specifying that 
[ə] gets deleted in the phonetic form in certain contexts. Instead, it seems as though 
[ə] is always present in the phonetic form of these words, but does not always have 
articulatory consequences.  
Browman & Goldstein (1992) survey evidence that such assimilation and 
deletion phenomena could be accommodated by a principle that individuates features 





62 Alternatively, we could account for assimilation in terms of the intentional content 
of phonological states. Because the assimilated sound depends upon the features of 
phonological states occurring later in production, it seems the phonological system 
must anticipate what these features will be in order to effect the assimilation. In order 
to anticipate, it may well have to represent what these features will be (thanks to 
Georges Rey for making this point in conversation). If this is the case, so much the 








in terms of articulatory instructions in the terms given above. They note (pp. 36-39) 
that articulations in which assimilation or deletion has taken place often differ from 
articulations of segments that simply don’t have the deleted feature in the phonetic 
form. For example, when the initial schwa in 'beret' is deleted, the articulation formed 
is nonetheless distinguishable from that that standardly produces 'bray.' Thus, they 
argue that assimilation and deletion are not cases in which the assimilated or deleted 
features have no articulatory consequences. Rather, they are simply cases in which 
the surrounding context makes the articulatory consequences of these features more 
imperceptible than usual. 
Nonetheless, even if the Browman & Goldstein picture is correct, we’d be 
without a principle of individuation for phonological states. It may be that in 
instances of assimilation, assimilated phones still have articulatory consequences. 
But, nonetheless, these consequences are different depending on whether the phone is 
assimilated or not. Nonetheless, the case still establishes that any attempt to type-
individuate the phonological states in terms of their articulatory consequences would 
have to appeal to a more or less unwieldy disjunction of possible articulations.  
Alternatively, you might suppose that we could type-individuate phonological 
states in terms of ceteris paribus characterizations. For example, we might 
individuate [n] as the state that, ceteris paribus, causes the movement of the tongue 
against the palate. It’s only when cetera are not paris, as when 'green' is pronounced 








But, if we are to allow such ceteris paribus characterizations, we ought to 
have some principle for accounting for the instances in which exceptions to the rule 
arise. We need not be able to generalize all the cases in which we can expect 
exceptions, but for any given exception, we ought to be able to explain why the rule 
has failed.63 These explanations don’t seem available to us in the case of assimilation. 
As we noted, the contexts in which assimilation occurs appear to be largely arbitrary. 
So, we cannot individuate phonemic states directly in terms of their 
articulatory consequences, because, as with acoustics, there is no one-to-one mapping 
between them. We may perhaps be able to individuate such states in terms of their 
context-relative effects on the vocal tract. But, doing so seems to require that we 
attribute to them intentional content as of aspects of that vocal tract. If we cannot 
individuate phonemic states in these terms, I argue in the next section that there is 
nothing for it but to individuate them in terms of intentional content. 
7. Intentional Phonology 
The lesson of the foregoing is that the contexts that may influence whether a given 
proximal input may give rise to one phoneme or another do not seem characterizable 
in terms of properties of those proximal stimuli themselves. We seem even incapable 
of delineating a finite disjunction of proximal stimuli that characterize the context 
effects to which stimuli impinging on the speech perception system are susceptible. 













Similarly, we seem unable to individuate phonological states in terms of the motor 
instructions to which they give rise.  
But neither, if Hale & Reiss are correct, can we individuate phonological 
states in terms of their de facto relations to one another. Like concepts, they combine 
too promiscuously to identify any de facto relation between phonemes as constitutive. 
We cannot take the strategy Collins adopts for individuating syntactic states. It may 
be true that VPs check case on NPs and not vice versa, but no such relational 
generalizations seem to hold for phonological states. 
We thus cannot individuate phonological states in terms of either their 
relations to one another or in terms of their relations to states at their articulatory and 
perceptual interfaces. As remarked above, this is precisely the impasse Fodor takes us 
to be in with regard to conceptual states. They are too promiscuous to be individuated 
by their internal relational states, and too flexible to be individuated in terms of either 
their behavioral consequences or the proximal stimuli that give rise to them. 
Ascribing content to concepts makes psychology possible in that it allows us to 
generalize across subjects that exhibit diverse behaviors and arrangements of mental 
states. So too, attributing content to phonological states can make phonology possible. 
Absent a way to individuate phonological states via their relations to one 
another or their proximal connections to the external world, we can individuate them 
in terms of their relations to intentional contents. Thus, a /p/ state is individuated by 








This claim of course raises the question as to what exactly it is to be a p. Is it 
to be a sound of a particular type? A particular articulatory gesture? What? We can be 
non-committal on the answers to these questions while still buying that /p/-states are 
individuated in terms of p-contents. After all, we can hold that psychological laws 
hold across mental states that are individuated in terms of being about cats while 
remaining agnostic as to what exactly it is to be a cat. To be a CAT-state is just to be 
about cats, however they are individuated. 
Of course, there are interesting questions as to what explains how it is that any 
intentional state-- phonological states among them-- has the intentional content that it 
does. The general answers are familiar. It might be some counterfactual disposition to 
co-vary with the things it represents in a particular way. Or, it might be the result of 
bearing some internal relation to other intentional states. You might worry, then, that 
the considerations I’ve raised against individuating phonological states in terms of 
either their internal or external relations would preclude us giving any standard story-
- either internalist or externalist-- of the content constitution of those states. 
This worry, however, is ill-founded. I’ve argued that we can’t individuate /p/ 
states in terms of the acoustic phenomena that in fact cause them. There seems to be 
an indefinite disjunction of acoustic phenomena that sometimes will and sometimes 
will not cause the tokening of a /p/ depending on a host of contextual factors. 
Nonetheless, we could coherently claim that to have the content as of p just is to 
asymmetrically co-vary with a particular acoustic phenomenon under ideal conditions 








Similarly, we could give an internalist semantics of the contents of 
phonological states consistent with the obstacles to individuation canvassed above. It 
may well be that two people share a /p/ state despite massive differences in their 
inter-phonemic state relations. Nonetheless, what constitutes a /p/ as such may be, 
say, its disposition to be tokened as a result of certain auditory mental states being 
tokened in some ideal circumstance. In any event, it’s perfectly coherent to hold that 
the content of a mental state, /p/, may be constituted by its counterfactual tendencies 
to co-vary with internal and external entities in particular circumstances while 
denying that the state is individuated in terms of the entities it in fact co-varies with. 
Alternatively, it could be that the intentional contents of phonological states 
are intentional inexistents, along lines argued by Rey (2012). This view has it that 
phonological mental states have as content objects that do not in fact exist. While 
acoustic phenomena may cause the tokening of phonological states, we could hold 
that the content of those states is not any particular set of acoustic phenomena. We 
could go even further to insist that phonological states have as content properties that 
couldn’t possibly exist. Perhaps, for example, the content of /b/ states is a particular 
acoustic property that could not exist as a matter of metaphysical possibility.  
Whatever of these stories of content constitution we might adopt, there are a 
number of other subtle questions to deal with concerning the nature of phonological 
content. For example, we’d want to address the possibility that phonological contents 
admit of Frege cases. They may even be hyper-intensional (with an s!), in that they 








suspicion (as aired earlier in Chapter 3, n. 29)  is that Frege cases won’t arise in our 
best theory of mental content. But, that’s a suspicion only, and I won’t attempt to 
argue for it here. 
Indeed, I prescind from taking a position on exactly which of any the above 
positions we should take in regard to phonological states. They are all interesting 
questions, but far beyond the scope of the current work. All that’s needed for our 
present purposes is to allow that /b/ states have content as of bs and /p/ states have 
content as of ps, whether bs and ps are particular acoustic phenomena, articulatory 
phenomena, or inexistent objects (whether possible or impossible). Just what bs and 
ps are will likely require at examining carefully the counterfactual generalizations of 
phonology.  
The key property of intentionality that is useful for us is that it gives us a way 
of characterizing states independently of whatever contingent relations they may 
happen to enter into. Whichever answers we may adopt to the questions posed above, 
this unique property of intentional content will remain. And, it’s this property that 
plays the key role of allowing us to type-individuate mental states despite vast 
differences in the causal and computational relations they enter into as a matter of 
fact. 
My argument that phonological states are individuated intentionally is not 
demonstrative, but rather abductive. Given that we can’t individuate them any other 








But, ascribing intentional content to phonological states also buys us additional 
explanatory virtues. 
Intentional content allows us to make counterfactual generalizations and 
predictions about just the sort of circumstances under which certain phonological 
structures might be tokened. So, for example, consider the McGurk effect. Subjects 
who see someone uttering {ga}, but synchronically hear the sound {ba} mentally 
token the phoneme, /da/. Why do these particular audiovisual stimuli cause a tokening 
of /da/? Well, it may be because the phonological system represents that /ba/ states 
usually result in closed lips, represents that the lips of the speaker are not closed, and 
so infers that the speaker is not producing a /ba/. Her phonological system may also 
represent that /ga/ states usually result in acoustic consequences different from what 
she’s hearing. The acoustic states she is hearing, she may represent as more 
characteristic of /da/ states. So, all things considered, her phonological system infers 
that it is perceiving a /da/.64 
This sort of explanation would not be open to us if we did not individuate 
phonological states intentionally. We can explain why the phonological system took a 
particular computational route from proximal auditory stimuli to representing a /da/ 
because this route preserved semantic properties of the phonological states. Given 
that the system represented the mouth as being open and something like the 













conditional: {mouth open} → not-/b/, it could not have tokened a /b/ and still have 
preserved the truth of the conditional.65 
This is not necessarily to say that the semantic properties of the phonological 
states caused the system to transition as it did. The above picture is perfectly 
compatible with a methodological solipsism in which we assume that it was the 
syntactic properties of the mental states that caused one to transition to the other. Any 
particular semantic inference will be implemented by a syntactic process sensitive 
only to the local causal properties of the states bearing the intentional content.  
Nonetheless, we can make sense of why a /da/ gets tokened as the result of the 
McGurk effect and as the result of seeing someone whisper, and as a result of hearing 
a certain sound over a garbled loudspeaker, by generalizing that in each instance, the 
computational process that led to tokening of a /da/ was truth preserving of the 
phonological system’s representations about the property of being a d. Individuating 
in terms of intentional content allows us to generalize over the types of computational 
processes to which phonological states are sensitive. It is sensitive to computational 
processes that involve representations as of being a d. 
Thus, intentional explanation provides two virtues to phonological theory: 
namely, the two laid out in Chapter 3. First, it allows us to type-individuate the states 





65 Of course, the picture also allows for characterization of cognitive processes as consisting of causal 
relations between semantically characterized states. I remain agnostic as to whether it’s best to 








over which the theory quantifies independently of either their relations to one another 
or phonology-external states. Secondly, the correctness conditions allow for 
counterfactual generalizations that would not be available to us otherwise 
The voice synthesis model of phonology that Liberman & Mattingly propound 
seems to make use of intentional content in these two respects. They postulate a voice 
synthesis module within the perceptual system. When acoustic input arrives, it is 
compared against candidate articulatory antecedents generated by a synthesizer that 
incorporates complete information about the anatomical and 
physiological characteristics of the vocal tract and also about the 
articulatory and acoustic consequences of linguistically significant 
gestures (p. 26). 
 
Thus, upon encountering the McGurk effect stimulus, the synthesizer may 
generate a list of phonemes likely to have generated the auditory stimuli and a list 
likely to have generated the visual stimuli. It will from these select the phoneme 
likely to have caused both the auditory and visual stimuli. It’s hard to see how to 
describe this process if not in representational terms. 
It cannot simply identify phonemes with particular auditory or visual stimuli 
because ex hypothesi there are multiple possible phonemes that could be the cause of 
the proximal stimuli. Thus, it must have a way of type-individuating the states 
independently of the proximal states that give rise to them. As we’ve noted, ascribing 
intentional content to the states would be a useful way to accomplish this 
individuation. Ascribing intentional content to the states hypothesized by the 








that the synthesizer is sensitive to. We could, for example, explain the McGurk effect 
by reference to the intentional content of the synthesizer’s states.  
The key to explaining the McGurk effect is to explain why the same acoustic 
phenomenon is perceived as a /ba/ in isolation from visual stimulation, but as a /da/ in 
the presence of the visual stimulus. We can explain why the visual stimulus makes a 
difference to the synthesizer by appealing to its representation that the utterance of 
/da/ phonemes result in the sort of visual stimuli present in the McGurk stimulus, 
whereas /ba/ phonemes generally do not. Thus, the McGurk visual stimulus causes 
the acoustic stimulus to be perceived as a /da/ because of representations the 
synthesizer has about the visual consequences of /da/ and /ba/ phonemes. Thus, 
attributing intentional content to the phonological synthesizer allows us to capture 
counterfactual generalizations about its operation. 
Now, Liberman & Mattingly identify the 'objects' of phonological perception 
as the mental states themselves that give rise to articulatory gestures. So, when I 
token a /d/ as the result of you making a particular utterance, I am representing that 
your utterance is the result of you yourself having tokened a /d/ mental state, which 
gave rise to your utterance. It’s unclear that we are licensed to make this strong 
conclusion about what precisely the content of phonological states are. The contents 
may, for example, be intentional inexistents, such as those proposed by Rey (2006). 
For example, even if something like the Liberman & Mattingly’s synthesizer 
model is correct, it may not represent phonemes as motor instructions per se. In fact, 








it need not represent them as mental states, or sounds. It need only postulate that they 
exist and that particular visual, auditory, and perhaps semantic information serves as 
good evidence as to whether they are present or not. That, at least, seems sufficient 
for running the explanations sketched above.  
In any case, the individuation thesis I’m advancing here is metaphysical rather 
than epistemic. I don’t for a moment presume that phonologists will use the criteria 
I’ve laid out here as a means of figuring out which phonological state a subject has 
tokened. The phonologists will likely continue to rely on, at least as a first gloss, their 
own 'impressionistic representation… of the acoustic or articulatory realization' of 
phonological states (Hale & Reiss, 2008, p. 146). The thesis that phonological states 
are intentional simply makes it intelligible how linguists’ generalizations can 
metaphysically range over mental states subject to indefinite disjunctions of internal 
and external relational properties. 
8. Conclusion 
Thus, phonological explanation helps vindicate the contentions of this thesis. First, as 
argued in Chapter 1, there is a coherent distinction between computations with and 
without representation. Thus, it’s a live question as to what extent a computational 
theory of mind must appeal to intentional content to run its explanations.  
Chapter 2 argued that many theories of intentional content advanced over the 
last several decades assumed an explanatory role for intentional content that was 
vacuous. They assumed that appeal to intentional content merely vindicates our 








generalizations that could be captured just as well in non-intentional terms. Neither of 
these functions, I hold, amount to an interesting explanatory role.  
Chapter 3 argued that nonetheless there are instances of computational 
cognition that do require non-vacuous appeal to intentional content for their 
explanatory power. Namely, intentional content allows us to type-individuate states 
within and couch counterfactual generalizations over computational systems that are 
open to an indefinite disjunction of proximal input. By contrast, systems that are 
encapsulated and subject to just a finite disjunction of input do not require intentional 
content to type-individuate their states or make counterfactual generalizations over 
them. 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that such a distinction still allows for intentional 
explanations of unconscious, modular processes that are not necessarily part of a 
person-level global belief fixation system. This final chapter has vindicated this claim 
by examining one such modular process: the phonological system. The phonological 
system is largely (though perhaps not wholly) insensitive to our conscious belief 
states. Nonetheless, it exhibits a competence such that it is sensitive to an indefinite 
disjunction of possible proximal input. Consonant with our conclusions from Chapter 
3, intentional content is therefore necessary to type individuate phonological states 
and generate counterfactual generalizations over them. 
Nonetheless, as we saw in Chapter 3, there may be a wide array of cognitive 
processes that do not evince such a competence, and thus do not require intentional 








of our thoughts-- conscious, person-level, or otherwise-- are indeed about something. 
But, we have also seen that this is not always the case. There are many cognitive 
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